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Bind us in time, O Seasons clear, and awe.    
O minstrel galleons of Carib fire, 
Bequeath us to no earthly shore until 
Is answered in the vortex of our grave 
The seal’s wide spindrift gaze toward paradise.  
 


















I fear that what follows this preface will appear quite like one of the disorderly 
monsters it investigates. But should you find anything in this work compelling on account 
of its being lucid, know that I am not responsible. Not long ago, you see, I was brought 
up on charges of obscurantisme, although the only “terroristic” aspects of it were self-
directed—“Vous avez mal compris; vous êtes idiot.”1 But I’ve been rehabilitated, or 
perhaps, like Aphrodite in Iliad 5 (if you buy my reading), habilitated for the first time, to 
the joys of clearer prose. My committee is responsible for this, especially my chair 
Richard Janko and he who first intervened, Benjamin Fortson. I thank them.  
If something in here should appear refined, again this is likely owing to the good 
taste of my committee. And if something should appear peculiarly sensitive, empathic 
even, then it was the humanity of my committee that enabled, or at least amplified, this, 
too.  
Richard Janko has not only increased my philological rigor many times over; he 
has also inspired me to want to do it for myself. And by means of his learning, he has led 
me to those joys and treasures that reside in the µυχοί and at the edges of the ancient 
world. Ruth Scodel, both by example and in dialogue, has made me a more sensitive 
reader of Homer and Hesiod; even if we diverge widely from one another in our 
understanding of parts of these texts, she has helped me to enrich even my misreadings. 
                                                
1 Searle (1983) relates Foucault’s assessment of Derrida as follows: “Michel Foucault once characterized 
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In addition to conducting me toward more legible prose, Benjamin Fortson, who suffered 
through reading this project in its extreme infancy (emphasis on its being infans), has 
always offered sage advice on vexed linguistic issues, including when it is better to 
confess ignorance than to construct Rube Goldberg machines. Gary Beckman, my 
cognate member, has been generous with his time and patient with my dilettantism: he 
has offered astute corrections to my estimation of ancient Anatolia and its languages. 
Finally, Sara Ahbel-Rappe has met me bravely and graciously at the shadowy interface of 
poetry and philosophy, where she not only helped me refine the language with which I 
talked about ontology and epistemology, but also encouraged me to push my readings 
further and to be unafraid of the ineffable. 
The Department of Classical Studies at the University of Michigan must also bear 
some responsibility for this, since they have funded me without stint and encouraged me, 
even in my pursuit of phantasmata. Michelle Biggs, our Graduate Coordinator, has been 
unflagging in keeping my colleagues and me intact and on course. Even now she 
performs the invaluable job of sending our dossiers out to prospective employers. I am 
deeply indebted to her. 
H.D. Cameron, too, must be blamed and thanked for what appears, since he 
read—with patience and good humor—the entire Iliad and Odyssey with me. This was an 
ἔξοχος χαρά.  
I thank my peers in the department, current and former, who have been willing to 
hear me talk through my ideas, even when I was doing so obscurantly. My cohort—Clara 
Bosak-Schroeder, Harriet Fertik, and Ellen Lee (nee Cole), as well as Ellen’s partner, 
Evan Robert Lee—have supported me, challenged me, and commiserated with me 
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throughout this process. My good friends, Michael Leese (now at the University of New 
Hampshire), Amy Pistone, and particularly Matthew Cohn (now at the University of 
Toronto), have never shied away from reading or listening to even the most malformed of 







Otherwise, I will bear some responsibility for what I hope this dissertation can 
offer its readers: a new insight into the relationship between poetry (broadly defined), 
mythic narrative, and mortal anxiety about the cosmos and the language with which we 
describe it. This is an anxiety I have felt deeply since I was very young and realized for 
the first time that I ultimately focalized all the narratives of my world, that the God I 
prayed to looked suspiciously like Jambi the Genie from Pee-wee’s Playhouse, and that 
positive assertions of knowledge unsettled that knowledge. This is an anxiety that I 
nurtured in Rome, in the classrooms of 19 via A. Algardi on the Gianicolo, in the park 
surrounding the Villa Doria Pamphili, where every day I ran as fast as I could in search of 
respite from consumptive yearning, and in the Camposanto Teutonico, where a stray 
sarcophagus uttered the mutually consoling words of an ancient Roman couple in banal 
elegiac couplets. This is an anxiety I applied stubbornly as a method of reading in a 
seminar on Propertius at the University of Michigan. This is an anxiety I detected in the 
proem to Parmenides’ hexametric poem ‘On Nature’ and the Goddess’ description of 
men’s dikraneia. This is an anxiety I saw ultimately as fueling the oldest extant Greek 
poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey, and the even older myths from the Near East about 
gods, heroes, monsters, and the universes in which they meet one another. Poetry and 
myth, it seems, are products of a psychopathology of mortal self-awareness. 
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To conclude this section I thank my friends and family outside the field both for 
offering sanity (or at least a different kind of insanity) and for earnestly wanting to 
understand what it is I work on; I thank dear Cherry, who cares not one wink what I think 
about Homer or Hesiod but loves me tirelessly; and I thank my Mom and Dad, to whom 
this whole thing is dedicated, because they have loved me and supported without 
condition, even at times inconvenient for them. I will forever fall short of adequately 
expressing my gratitude to all of them. 
Not one to buck trends, I remind my readers that any infelicities herein—and they 
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As Genesis 3 comes to a close, God drives Adam and Eve from Eden, but not 
before addressing a nameless and faceless heavenly audience (3:22):  
“Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: 
and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of 
life, and eat, and live for ever.”2  
 
In contrast with what God tells Adam and Eve, verse 22 shows that God expels the 
couple to solve a theological crisis, not to punish them. Or rather, the prohibition and 
attached punishment are shown to be a theological concern. In this project, I examine the 
literary and intellectual aspects of this crisis among many other examples of cosmological 
exigency from Ancient Greek, Hebrew, Anatolian, and Mesopotamian sources, using a 
breadth of materials usually reserved for surveys rather than thesis-driven projects. I aim 
to demonstrate that these texts are all part of a broad cultural-linguistic milieu, a koinê, 
that matured in the late Bronze Age and continued to develop through the Iron Age—the 
age of Homer and Hesiod—and that they mutually inform and enrich one another across 
geographic and linguistic boundaries.  
In broad terms, this project involves defining the intellectual dimensions of the 
various accounts of cosmic crisis. For example, by tasting the fruit, man acquires one of 
the features of the divine, from which he was made to be distinct; if he should become 
immortal, too, he would be, insofar as the minimalism of Genesis admits, just like God. 
                                                
2 KJV translation. 
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The very notion of divinity would thereby dissolve. The language that communicates the 
system of meaning that depends on the binary opposition between men and gods would 
then fail to refer sensibly to anything. These threats to the intelligibility of the cosmos are 
indicated through clever, though sometimes very subtle, linguistic and poetic details. 
These details stand as pivots around which the narrative turns, from order to disorder to 
order reaffirmed. Thus, I suggest one discrete, but crucial, socio-(psycho-)linguistic 
apparatus for the cross-linguistic sharing of ideas. 
For while Classicists and Near-Easternists have detailed for some time now the 
early interfaces between the Greeks and their eastern Mediterranean neighbors, my 
project emphasizes the shared importance of these precise intellectual items, what I call 
the poetic indices of cosmic disorder. These indices include etymological figures, 
misapplication of formulas and epithets, even musical (i.e. metrical) and phonetic play. 
To me, these units of the language and music most powerfully convey, even actualize, the 
sense of disorder. 
With respect to the political and socio-economic infrastructures that facilitated 
cross-linguistic exchanges of mythological data, I have largely relied on the work of 
others (e.g. Burkert 1992, West 1997, Lane Fox 2008, as well as the excellent volume of 
essays edited by Collins, Bacharova, and Rutherford 2008). The movement of things, 
people, and ideas around the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas is tremendously 
complicated, and the bare data is often suggestive and in need of clever synthesis. 
Although much, often very subtle, work has been done in the service of synthesizing 
information from across the broader Mediterranean and across the Bronze and Iron Ages, 
we can still ask other questions about how people thought across languages, and how 
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stories and the specialized language of certain types of storytelling, i.e. poetry, became 
complicit in the movement of thought in the ancient world. 
Thus, this dissertation is about how poetics, even across languages, would have 
been consumed as such and would have influenced exchange of lexical data and 
mythological information; in particular, it focuses on the broadly represented central role 
of poetics in the expression of human anxiety about the cosmos in which humans 
participate as linguistic beings. One of the main objects of inquiry here is wordplay, and 
the ability of wordplay to function both as an expression of climactic peril in a given 
narrative—including the danger language itself faces—and as a means of conveyance for 
all sorts of mythological and narratological data both within and across idioms; this latter 
function might be understood as ‘intertextuality’. As will become clear, my dissertation is 
also heavily influenced by the work of Watkins (1995), whose work focuses on Indo-
European rather than Mediterranean poetics, as well as that of Slatkin (1991) who 













In His Image (and Language): Theomorphization in anthropogonies 
 
1.1 / Introduction: The birth of death 
 In the broadest sense, this chapter deals with the intellectual crises that arise in the 
earliest accounts from Greece and the Near East of the birth of mankind. In particular, I 
focus on how structures of language, narrative, and ontology get disturbed in early 
Mediterranean anthropogonies: the binary opposition between men and gods—the 
linguistic opposition of the mortality of the one and the deathlessness of the other—is 
unsteady until demonstrated in stronger, (unsurprisingly) violent terms. In other words, at 
first, these myths do not take as a given the presence or, more precisely, the emotional 
burden, of death in the lives of men, in stark contrast with its absence from the world of 
gods. This assimilation of the first men to the divine produces a kind of cognitive 
dissonance. Human history must move forward, but this movement is impeded by 
perfection. 
There are, I think, two reasons why ancient Mediterranean peoples imagined early 
man as almost indistinct from the divine. First, there may be a general sense, in any given 
present but especially in times of turbulence, that people must be becoming less close to 
the gods, and so it is natural to imagine backwards from this to a time when men and 
gods enjoyed commensality at the least. Second, the emotional and intellectual anxiety 
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that death causes in the present must generate fantasy about worlds and times in which 
this was not the case. We yearn in part to escape death and its relatives, decay, 
degradation, and loss, or at the very least the fear and anxiety that we experience because 
of these realities. In these alternative worlds, men and gods are more similar, with respect 
to both the external goods to which they have unfailing access and the freedom from 
passion that this access affords: men live unhaunted by the specter of the evanescence of 
their environment and apart from the toil that devours the soul when the earth withholds 
bios. Although the earliest myths present these alternative realities as having expired and 
given way to the current state of things, we also have examples of races of men who, 
although ostensibly mortal, live in bliss contemporaneously with men who suffer, but are 
geographically all but inaccessible to them. 
 In these fantasies, men rarely participate in the deathless state of the gods per se; 
however, the paradises and the activities that take place in those paradises are infused 
with the blitheness of the gods’ own lives, a mirth that immortality itself seems to confer. 
In these worlds, although death still apparently subdues men, men appear to feel no 
anxiety about it. (The situation in Eden is a bit more complicated.)  
One obvious result of this freedom from suffering is that the division between 
men and gods becomes intellectually and linguistically murky. Chapters 3 and 4 will 
explore how the gods’ blitheness falters when they get wrapped up in narratives that 
involve human loss: as long as they maintain intimacy with the world that they created 
and whose natural and metaphysical forces they command, they suffer when it does, and 
at times they have to remind themselves of their immortality, usually by emphasizing the 
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mortality of men. These myths provide a secondary aetiology for our remoteness from the 
divine. 
 In this chapter, however, I explore how the narrative and linguistic markers of 
earliest man’s unflagging happiness dissociate him from his mortality, and propose 
further that the idiomatic aporia that results from descriptions of men that look very 
much like descriptions of gods drives early myth forward: the very machinery of epic 
story-telling, for example, is fueled by this self-discrepancy. To put it another way, much 
myth in general, and epic in particular, confronts the intellectual impediments to its own 
project. 
 I also explore cases where we might have evidence of cross-linguistic sharing of 
intellectual ‘data’, i.e. that certain shared features of these myths may be counted as 
evidence, perhaps tantalizing, but worthy of consideration regardless, of mutual influence 
among these myths. In later chapters it will become clearer how closely the moments of 
disruptive grammar in the literature of the different languages resemble one another. In 
this chapter, the details are somewhat less salient, but they are there; and coupled with the 
other shared features of paradise, they suggest a rich and deeply self-engaged 
Sprachbund. While it is speculation, and an unnecessary one at that, to allege that there 
were multilingual poets who were regularly reading texts or listening to recitations not in 
their native tongues, it is unthinkable that the early poets of the Mediterranean were not 




1.2 / The structures of Hesiod’s myth of races: Mortal fantasy and cosmic requirements 
One of the earliest extant anthropogonies is a Greek one. About one eighth of 
Hesiod's late 8th-early 7th century poem, Works and Days (WD), chronicles the 
successive races of ἄνθρωποι. The passage (109–201), as well as the poem at large, is 
fraught with textual and interpretive problems. While the rich history of interest in the 
passage has indicated how these problems impede our already precarious understanding 
of Hesiod’s poetic programs, there still seems to be little satisfaction at the proposed 
solutions. I offer here some views that differ to varying degrees from what others have 
suggested. If these, too, do not satisfy, I hope they will remove at least a few of the 
roadblocks barring our path to fuller readings of the poem, including the broader literary-
intellectual milieu in which it is at least temporally and geographically situated.  
This somewhat refractory myth of races already provoked literary responses from 
a number of Hesiod's readers in antiquity and has challenged a considerable number of 
modern scholars, especially since Vernant suggested that Hesiod’s ἕτερoς λόγος (106) 
did not simply account for the fall of man from proximity to the divine and distance from 
evils to increasing exposure to decay and pain,3 but is rather “une suite articulée en deux 
étages” in which “chaque plan, divisé en deux aspects antithétiques, présente deux races 
formant la contrepartie l’une de l’autre et s’opposant respectivement comme dikè à 
hybris.”4 More recently, Most challenged many assumptions about the passage’s 
                                                
3 “Le mythe hésiodique des races: Essai d’analyse structurale” (1960) and “Le mythe hésiodique des races: 
Sur un essai de mise au point” (1966). Both essays are included in the 1985 edition of Mythe et pensée chez 
les Grecs: Études de psychologie historique (Paris); references are to that edition. The second essay, his 
1966 response to Defradas’ critique of his first, clarifies his position and indicates the strength of the 
structural method for a text like WD. 
4 Vernant (1966:65). Clay (2003:87) correctly counters that δίκη actually does not function at all for the 
gold men. Even so, the gold men resemble βασιλῆες, as Vernant (1960:27) argues. The gold men are 
paradigmatic for a world in which δίκη is opposed to ἀδικία. 
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organization, including some of Vernant’s, when he argued that the men of the heroic age 
ought to be considered as closely connected with the iron age of Hesiod’s present:  
“They share our biological constitution and our moral chances in 
a way that the gold, silver, and bronze men did not; yet their 
failure, when they failed, meant annihilation, the worst that could 
happen to us, and their success, when they succeeded, outstripped 
anything we can ever hope to achieve ourselves.”5 
 
On the surface, the races of men do appear to degenerate from a life of leisure and 
“living like gods” (112) to a world where hubris runs rampant, unchecked, and so 
unmitigated by any goods that eventually Aidôs and Nemesis will leave, ostensibly 
taking with them any “protection against evil” (181–201). Yet this simplification of the 
scheme has actually confused the story more.6 The concurrent motif, for example, of the 
encroachment of old age is “fragmented and obscure.”7 
Vernant dealt with other interpretive problems, too: the intrusion of the fourth 
race, which does not have a metallic appellation, into the metallic schema; the iron race’s 
apparent division into that of the present and that of the imagined future; and the question 
as to what will happen to the world once the iron race is destroyed. Inviting solutions to 
some of these issues may emerge collaterally from this study, but other questions strike 
me as more crucial.  
In searching for answers to these questions we will move in a slightly different 
interpretive direction: in short, I want to use Hesiod’s myth of races for the insights it 
provides into how early hexameter poetry (1) decided that mortality was a sine qua non 
                                                
5 Most (1997:119). His interpretation is based on the sense of προτέρη γενεή (160) and the likely 
inauthenticity of 173d-e, on which see also West (1978:194–5 ad 173a–e). 
6 As Most (1997:105) puts it, “In general, the literary and scholarly reception of this passage in ancient and 
modern times may be interpreted as a series of attempts to rescue the limpid clarity of what readers have 
thought to be the Hesiodic myth from the puzzling awkwardness of the Hesiodic text in which it has 
somehow become trapped”. 
7 West (1978:173). 
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of an account of the cosmos and (2) determined, and experimented with, the mythic and 
poetic parameters of mortality.8 In other words, Hesiod’s anthropogony illustrates the 
ancient mythic, religious, and poetic, what I will sometimes call in shorthand the 
“intellectual”, fixation on the mortal condition. Furthermore, the poem highlights how 
mythopoetic components, not just the large-scale narrative but also the more discrete 
linguistic ones, are involved in proving and transgressing the system of boundaries that 
gives order to the cosmos. Often, the poet reasserts or clarifies those parameters with 
similar mythopoetic tools.  
These intellectual experiments, particularly those that are couched in terms of 
bygone and inaccessible eras and places, emerge from competing psychological activities 
generated by the human condition: as I alleged above, humans may long to be relieved of 
the anguish of mortality and the harshness of reality, and even fantasizing about lost 
beatific environments and lifestyles and heartier physiology may provide a remedy of 
sorts; but on the other hand, these fantasies obscure the otherness of the divine. Without 
going too far afield for this particular study in imagining the variety of intellectual 
consequences of such a blurring of distinctions, I argue that one major consequence is 
that the story-telling project is enervated. Hesiod’s poem, of course, does not, at least as 
its primary function, emphasize this sort of obsession, but it does reveal the structure and 
dynamics of mortal self-awareness in the course of issuing a practical protreptic 
regarding the proper pursuit of ἀρετή. 
 
                                                
8 A good deal in my methods aligns with those of Clay (2003). While I do not require the same extent of 
mutual harmonization between the Theogony and Works & Days that she seems to espouse in her view of 
Archaic epos, my general sense is that the evocation of particular images can indicate common engagement 
with common material.  
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1.3 / Gold is best 
 With these issues in mind, I examine Hesiod's golden race, particularly the fact 
that their demise is not, like that of the other races, given a rationale; the annihilations of 
the other races either directly or consequentially result from their faults. Irked by this, 
other scholars have attempted to unearth from beneath Hesiod’s minimalism the reasons 
for the extinction of the golden men. Recently, Jenny Clay gave a practical answer: “the 
men of the race of gold… d[o] not have the ability to reproduce themselves; and without 
this ability, they quickly bec[ome] extinct.”9 I will postpone full evaluation of the 
specifics of this suggestion, but for now I point out that what Clay proposes is a quo 
modo of their annihilation; the moral-ethical “wherefore” remains buried with the race. In 
other words, even if the golden men die out without procreating, why would the gods 
make so much worse the subsequent races of men? 
Ballabriga approaches the sort of analysis I want to offer here. He suggests that 
the gods allow the men of the golden race to disappear because they were too similar to 
the gods:  
“Il faut sans doute comprendre, bien que la piété ordinaire refuse 
de se l'avouer, que les dieux ont besoin de créer l'humanité pour 
se sentir pleinement dieux. Mais si cette humanité est trop 
proche d'eux leur divinité ne sera pas assez apparente.”10 
 
Combining this notion of problematic similarity with Most’s interpretation of the 
paradigmatic functions of the races for Hesiod’s audience, I suggest that the reason for 
the golden race’s demise is actually indicated by the poet’s reticence about it. The golden 
                                                
9 2003:87. Scodel (per litt. ad 121) suggests the question of their demise might not be meaningful, and that 
the race “vanishes because the story requires it.” Even if they have no admonitory function like the 
subsequent race, and Scodel is right to point this out, their demise is aetiologically important nonetheless, 
as I will argue throughout this chapter. 
10 Ballabriga (1998:322). 
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men are incompatible with discourse in two deeply connected ways: 1) their perfection is 
at odds with narrative; and 2) they themselves have no need of the diversive power of 
story-telling. By diversive, I mean capable of diverting one’s attentions away from the 
harshness of reality. This second problem is much graver than it first looks. I will discuss 
it below. 
With respect to (1), I see it working as follows. The golden men have no explicit 
shortcoming, as their successors all do; while the silver and bronze men may not have 
variegated lives themselves, their failings—excessive impiety and bellicosity, 
respectively— directly lead to their demise and therefore provide negative exempla. In 
other words, what they do generates a narrative movement that culminates in their deaths. 
By contrast, the golden men fail to produce exemplifying narrative; they are not even 
particularly useful moral paradigms.11 It is only when they are made daimones and 
become part of the dialectic of modern men that they seem to take on paradigmatic 
function, but even then not truly in the capacity of moral exemplars, even if they do 
“watch over dikai and wicked deeds” (124).  In other words, as daimones, the golden men 
function more as agents of the cosmic moral structure than as morally autonomous (and 
upright) actors within that cosmic structure. (I will discuss below how this is connected 
with their phuê.) 
Thus, the entire vocabulary of human excellence that Hesiod uses to encourage 
Perses’ reformation would be meaningless in the time of the golden men. Even though 
they are content, can we ascribe moral lives, let alone ethical frameworks, to the golden 
men? It would seem to me that the ideas of the πανάριστος, of ἀρετή, of δίκη do not 
                                                
11 The mental lives of the golden men is a difficult question; I will discuss it further below. 
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function in the golden world. In Hesiod’s cosmos the advent of δίκη requires the 
sublimation of the golden race into the irrecoverable and, as we shall see, nonsensical 
proto-state of mankind. The poet, in imagining a near-perfect human race remote from 
eris, confronts a logical impediment: since he cannot introduce strife and psychological 
turmoil into their epoch, which would make them less golden and paradigmatic, he has to 
remove them quietly, leaving the audience to wonder why the golden men warranted 
annihilation. 
The role of golden men in the broader context of early myth and thought requires 
discussion of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden in Genesis, a passage intimately 
connected with the demise of the golden men but seemingly never adduced as a Near 
Eastern parallel. Before we broaden our scope, however, we must examine the other 
extinct γένη of Hesiod’s myth and determine whether their respective demises can help 
us explain the poet’s account of the extinction of the seemingly flawless golden men and 
show what makes them, while living, problematic for Hesiod’s cosmos and Hesiod’s 
poetics. 
 
1.4 / Not at all like gold 
For the silver, bronze, and heroic races, Hesiod offers an explicit mode and 
rationale for their respective destructions, although for the heroes we have to look 
elsewhere for a πρόφασις.12 For example, Zeus “hides” the silver race because he is angry 
that they do not extend honors (τιµαί) to the gods (138). These timai ostensibly comprise 
the actions that are indicated by θεραπεύειν (135) and sacrificing on the altar (136). 
                                                
12 See González (2011) for a discussion of πρόφασιν in fr. 204 M-W. 
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Likewise, we learn that the bronze men destroy themselves by overzealously applying 
themselves to the “works of Ares” (145–6) and end up going to the “moldy house of icy 
Hades” (154); death takes them, and they “abandon the shining light of the sun” (154–5). 
The “divine race of hero men,” whom we will consider first because of their own genetic 
proximity to the divine as well as their apparent overlap with the iron men, (159) appears, 
in Hesiod’s eyes, to come to an end after Troy:  
166 {ἔνθ’ ἦ τοι τοὺς µὲν θανάτου τέλος ἀµφεκάλυψεν,}  
τοῖς δὲ δίχ’ ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἤθε’ ὀπάσσας  
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐν πείρασι γαίης, 
καὶ τοὶ µὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυµὸν ἔχοντες 
170 ἐν µακάρων νήσοισι παρ’ Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδίνην·  
 
{There truly did the finality of death enshroud some(?) 
of them,} while to some(?) father Zeus, Kronos’ son, 
offered livelihood and dwellings apart from men and 
settled them at the limits of the earth, and these dwell 
possessed of a carefree spirit on the Isles of the Blest 
beside Ocean with his deep eddies. 
 
The nature of Zeus’ actions here and at Cat. fr. 204.99 ff., which West adduces to explain 
167 (διχ’ ἀνθρώπων κτλ.), are somewhat elusive, especially given how vexed 
interpretations of the Catalog fragment are13 as well as the problematic status of key lines 
in the WD passage. By addressing some of the textual and interpretive difficulties 
scholars have faced, we can begin to adumbrate some of the ‘decadence’ motif insofar as 




                                                
13 See González (2011) for the discussion of the problems with particular supplements and the 




1.5 / Line 166  
The first textual complication that we encounter in Hesiod’s account of the heroic 
age is the status of line 166. Ercolani summarizes the crux well: “A 161 τοὺς µέν = gli 
eroi nel loro complesso; quindi si hanno due sottogruppi: A = τοὺς µέν 162 e B = τοὺς δέ  
164. Fin qui tutti concordano. Con 166 le interpretazioni divergono.”14 With respect to 
the manuscript tradition, line 166 is absent from the two papyri that include the 
surrounding lines, and Proclus neglects it in his commentary.15 West argues for its 
inclusion despite the weakness of the textual evidence for it, pointing out that it would be 
strange for Hesiod to say that the entirety of the heroic race was transported to the Isles of 
the Blest.16 If that were the only possible sense for the lines without 166, West’s 
argument would be attractive because, as he notes, Elysium does not appear to be the de 
facto home in the afterlife of the heroes of early epic. (I would caution, however, that, 
although Elysium and the Isles of the Blest seem to be functionally equivalent by this 
time, the extreme scarcity of both terms in epic does not help us organize the underworld 
geography or decide whether they are to be fully equated. Below, I will consider the 
possible connections of Elysium with Eden.) Ercolani cautiously upholds West’s text and 
specifies further that those heroes who get to go to the Isle of the Blest are those who died 
in Troy, as opposed to the Theban fighters. But even a well-reasoned literary argument 
for the inclusion of a poorly attested line must sustain a hefty burden of proof, and West’s 
does not. However, it does impel us to confront deeper impediments to interpreting the 
                                                
14 2010:190 ad 166. 
15 Π38 (P. Berol. 21107) and Π40 (P. Strasb. 2684) in West’s catalogue and summary of the ‘Ancient 





passage. Let us look at the context (158–70), which I leave untranslated here so as not to 
suggest a reading prematurely: 
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ποίησε, δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον, 
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἳ καλέονται 
 ἡµίθεοι, προτέρη γενεὴ κατ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.         160        
καὶ τοὺς µὲν πόλεµός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνὴ 
τοὺς µὲν ὑφ’ ἑπταπύλῳ Θήβῃ, Καδµηίδι γαίῃ, 
ὤλεσε µαρναµένους µήλων ἕνεκ’ Οἰδιπόδαο, 
τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐν νήεσσιν ὑπὲρ µέγα λαῖτµα θαλάσσης 
 ἐς Τροίην ἀγαγὼν Ἑλένης ἕνεκ’ ἠυκόµοιο.                      165    
{ἔνθ’ ἦ τοι τοὺς µὲν θανάτου τέλος ἀµφεκάλυψεν} 
τοῖς δὲ δίχ’ ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἤθε’ ὀπάσσας 
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐς πείρατα γαίης. 
 καὶ τοὶ µὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυµὸν ἔχοντες...          169                          
 
 
The sequence of particles has vexed interpreters (I still find myself uneasy about 
the whole thing.) Most’s interpretation of 161–8 provides an example of just how vexing 
it can be.17 (He glosses over the status of line 166 altogether, but his reading of the 
passage assumes the line’s absence.) He analyzes the heroes indicated by τοῖς δέ (167), to 
whom Zeus extended a special afterlife, as contrasting with those indicated by τοὺς µέν 
(161), whom “evil war and dread clashing” destroyed either in Thebes or Troy.18 From 
this reading he suggests that the heroes of the Theban and Trojan wars (οἱ µέν) are not 
being exalted in any way but are rather annihilated precisely because of their subscription 
to bad eris, which the poet decried earlier in the poem and which Most thinks is 
periphrased by πόλεµός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνή of 161.19 There are a number of 
problems with Most’s interpretation.  
                                                
17 Most (1997:117) concedes that the interpretation of the series of µέν’s and δέ’s is still controversial. On 
Most’s treatment of the passage in his Loeb edition (2006) see below, n. 19. 
18 Most (1997:117). 
19 Most (1997:118–9, 123). 
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For one, his reading requires that lines 161–8 distinguish between those whom 
war brought to Thebes and Troy and destroyed and those who avoided death and live in 
Blessed Isles. One problem is that, for this analysis to work, Most needs to read 
Menelaus’ special status in the Odyssey into Hesiod’s poem and further adduces other 
anonymous Menelaus-like heroes in order to make sense of the plural τοῖς (167), since 
Rhadamanthys is older than both the Trojan and Theban Wars. And even if we grant 
Most's point that Menelaus traditionally enjoys the double boon of being Zeus’ γαµβρός 
and being peculiarly opposed to large-scale strife (this latter suggestion is really quite 
unconvincing), Most’s reading demands that we understand that war and dread clashing 
did not destroy all of those who went to Thebes or Troy.  
Yet the contrast offered by the sequence of particles, if we exclude 166, and if we 
accept that the contrasted elements are groups of people, is expressly between those 
whom war drove to Thebes and Troy and annihilated and those whom it did not even 
conduct to those famed locales. The heavy emphasis on the places and the reasons for the 
fighting indicate that the contrast involves war’s (one almost wants to capitalize Πόλεµος 
and Φύλοπις) conveyance (ἀγαγών, 165) of the heroes to the battlefields, and not just 
their annihilation.20 Thus, the inclusion of 166 would be preferable if we wanted Hesiod 
to be contrasting some of those whom war drove to Thebes and Troy (or the Theban 
heroes as versus the Trojan?), who were destroyed and simply enshrouded by death, and 
others who, throughout the tradition, were transported to the Isles of the Blest, having 
either fallen in the field or died at home.21 In this case it would follow that the first µέν 
                                                
20 Most’s compelling connection of line 161 with the description of bad Eris loses its force otherwise. 
21 We must remember that death as indicated by ὄλλυµι is often, but not necessarily, violent. Most includes 
line 166 in his Loeb text and translation (2006); further his translation seems to indicate that he has had a 
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(161) does not expect the δέ of 167, but is better taken as indicating the author’s certainty 
about his equation of the heroes with those who went to Thebes and Troy (and the 
author’s certainty about the audience’s knowledge of the heroes’ mythic lives).22 Yet all 
these interpretive moves are beside the point.  
As I mentioned above, West dismisses some sturdy textual evidence against the 
authenticity of 166, and both West (and Ercolani) and Most seem to take it as a foregone 
conclusion that the contrasted elements are necessarily the groups of people indicated by 
the various pronouns preceding the µέν’s and δέ’s. However, this is not necessarily the 
case, especially in epic. I insist that line 166 must be regarded as an interpolation whose 
purpose was to square Hesiodic material with Homeric by indicating different fates for 
different heroes; the interpolator is likewise guilty of a cursory reading.  
Solmsen, in his review of West’s handling of the line,23 believes the line to be an 
interpolation impelled by the same sorts of interpretive difficulties that West himself 
faced. On textual grounds alone, the line ought to be omitted. If the two papyri that 
include the surrounding lines have omitted it (West’s apparatus ought to have indicated 
the line’s absence with deest), one from the 1st–2nd c. and the other from the early 2nd c., 
and if Proclus neglected to comment on it, we have good reason to suspect that it is 
interpolated. That the scholia vetera report the line complicates the picture somewhat.  
                                                                                                                                            
change of heart regarding Hesiod’s sense, opting to see some of the Theban and Trojan combatants as 
simply being enshrouded by death and others as receiving a special afterlife. Pindar Ol. 2 refers to a single 
Isle of the Blest, over which Rhadamanthys presides. Peleus and Cadmus are counted among the 
inhabitants, and Thetis conducted Achilles there, having persuaded Zeus with her prayers (78–9). 
22 Cf. perhaps WD 122. An alternative, as Ruth Scodel suggested to me per litt., is that the µέν of 166 is 
merely resumptive of the µέν in 161 and that being enshrouded by the end of death is not necessarily 
preventive of being offered a special after life. Later we will examine whether this is the case, but it 
suffices here to say that at least some heroes get a special afterlife dispensation. 
23 1980:217.  
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Furthermore, the line seems phraseologically amalgamated and anomalous, 
although statistics do us no good here. We should note that the phrase θανάτου τέλος 
with contracted genitive and in that order is unparalleled in verse before Aeschylus 
(Septem 905); τέλος θανάτου is found once in the Homeric corpus at Od. 5.326, whereas 
τέλος θανάτοιο occurs 6x in the Iliad (1x in the Odyssey), and θανάτοιο τέλος occurs 3x 
in the Iliad (1x in the Odyssey).  
Furthermore, the verb ἀµφικαλύπτω, both univerbated and in tmesis, while well 
represented in Homer, occurs only once elsewhere in the Hesiodic corpus (WD 555) in an 
entirely different context. While one could argue that Hesiod sees far fewer individuals 
being enshrouded by death than Homer does, by that same evidence it is arguable that the 
Homeric context has been cobbled together by the interpolator. That an interpolator is the 
culprit, and not Hesiod, is perhaps more strongly evidenced by the adverb-particle 
sequence at the line’s beginning (ἔνθ’ ἦ τοι or ἔνθ’ ἤτοι). This sequence occurs twice in 
the Iliad and several times in the Odyssey, but nowhere else in Hesiod. My inclination is 
to think that an interpolator, who was a fan of Homer, perhaps more of the Odyssey than 
of the Iliad, came up with line 166 to correct24 the seeming inconcinnity between the 
destruction of the race (ὤλεσε, 163) and Zeus’ translating them and proffering them 
βίοτος in 167.  
One more text-critical argument should suffice to support our conclusion that the 
line is interpolated. Given the naturalness of the interpolation, and its success in aligning 
Hesiod’s account with Proteus’ words to Menelaus at Od. 4.563–4 (ἀλλά σ’ ἐς Ἠλύσιον 
πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης / ἀθάνατοι πέµψουσιν, ὅθι ξανθὸς Ῥαδάµανθυς), it is much 
                                                
24 See Frazer (1981:271) for the corrective use of ΗΤΟΙ as it applies to this passage. Again, if anything, this 
is very Homeric, and not very Hesiodic.  
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more likely that a tradition-oriented adjustment made its way into the text than that it was 
original to Hesiod and was later overlooked by two scribes, who cannot have been misled 
by any homoeoarchon or homoeoteleuton. Thus we have to identify other possibilities for 
Hesiod’s sense; a new close reading may enable us to do just that. 
 
1.6 / The afterlife of heroes 
First, we need to reconsider the context of the chronicle of the heroic race. It is 
fitted into a scheme that is organized by metallic associations, in which each metallic race 
(including the present race of iron) is envisaged as collectively destroyed, either in the 
past or in the increasingly ugly future; a collective fate and a shared destruction might be 
expected of the heroes as well.25 Furthermore, while the ‘heroes’ elsewhere in early epic 
seem to be synonymous with warrior men, irrespective of divine lineage, Hesiod restricts 
his commentary to those who are related to or have otherwise special relationships with 
the divine in two ways. First he refers to the heroes as constituents of a θεῖον γένος, a 
phrase that appears once elsewhere in early epic: at Il. 6.180, the Chimaera is specified as 
θεῖον γένος οὐδ’ ἀνθρώπων.26 Whether and how the emphatic ‘polar addition’—the 
Chimaera is divine, and not at all of the stock of men (sc. mortals)—bears on WD is 
unclear, but note that this fourth race is not called ἄνθρωποι;27 the term is only used to 
                                                
25 Cf. Ercolani (2010:191 ad 166), who notes that “il parallelismo con le precedenti generazioni spinge a 
credere che anche qui si descriva l’esistenza degli eroi post mortem.” 
26 The adjective θεῖος seems otherwise specialized in Homer. As West (1966:336 ad 731) notes, it is used 
“in Homer of heroes, heralds, and bards, men with a special relationship with the gods, or men who seem 
more than human.” West regards the use of the word at Th. 731 as the only instance of it having “our sense 
of ‘godly’, θεουδής.” 
27 The silver race is not referred to as ἄνθρωποι either, but the poet omits that qualification in favor of 
including the necessary valuation of the race as πολὺ χειρότερον. Compare 109–10 with 127–8. 
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indicate the group from whom the heroes are separated as part of their privilege in the 
afterlife.  
Second, Hesiod notes that this race comprises “those who are called (καλέονται) 
hêmitheoi” (159–60). While the use of ἡµιθέων γένος ἀνδρῶν at Il. 12.23, which is the 
only instance of ἡµίθεος in Homer, enables the poet to give an impression of remoteness 
and omniscience regarding the destruction of the Achaean wall and perhaps a 
contemporary practice of referring to the entire host of warriors at Troy as ἡµίθεοι,28 the 
nod to the ‘Myth of Destruction’ makes it likely that Homer here chooses the term to 
point to the demise of divine offspring specifically, although I do not take it that Hesiod 
means the sons of gods exactly.29 Hesiod’s use of καλέονται (always as the line-final 
‘biceps+final foot’ sequence in early epic) may actually point to a similarly purposeful 
choice of the term rather than suggest an editorialization by the poet, since καλέονται 
very often functions as a quasi-copula in early epic.30 Even if Hesiod does not use the 
term τέκνα θεῶν, as Catalogue’s poet does, the latter appears to be making a general 
statement about the race of ἥρωες, whether they are the immediate progeny of gods or 
not. Likewise, for Hesiod, the heroes fall under the broad category of ἡµίθεοι by virtue of 
their sometimes forgotten divine lineage, as well as their functioning ἐξ ἴσου with half-
gods; perhaps the poet recognized the murky parameters of the terms and used them—
paradoxically given the resultant scholarly tangle—to simplify his chronicle of the race.31  
                                                
28 Sο West (1978:190-1 ad 159, 160), but some of his examples of the term’s use like Sim. 523.1–2 are 
much more precise than others. On Pl. Crat. 398cd, see n. 27 below. 
29 On the wall and the broader milieu, see Scodel (1982). 
30 Cf. Il. 5.342, 14.279, h. Aphr 96, etc. On the equation of the copula and καλέονται see Od. 15.433 and 
LSJ s.v.  
31 Socrates, in etymologizing ἥρως to ἔρως, says that “the heroes are hêmitheoi” and that “all of them were 
born of a male god lusting after a mortal woman or a mortal man after a goddess” (Crat. 398cd). 
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A third piece of evidence from WD corroborates this reading. At line 167 the 
description of the afterlife as “separate from the ἄνθρωποι” (167) indicates that the 
heroes/demigods are in fact a specific race, that which was born of mortal-immortal 
unions.32 The ἥρωες whom Hesiod has in mind are to be distinguished from other men 
because of their lineage and their spheres of activity. That is not to say that Hesiod 
envisages only ἡµίθεοι at Thebes and Troy, but that the nameless ἄνθρωποι of those wars 
do not serve a paradigmatic function by pretending to superhuman excellence. 
(Diomedes, of course, does not appear to have divine lineage, but does become the Iliad’s 
most effective theomachos.) The moral interpretation that Most offers, namely that the 
heroes are utterly destroyed because of their subscription to evil strife, oversimplifies the 
lives of the ἥρωες who were annihilated in war, essentially equating them with the race of 
bronze, and makes the broad chronicle that Hesiod offers particularized in a way that 
loses sight of the text.  
To summarize, we have determined that either Hesiod was aware of a tradition in 
which all of the ἡµίθεοι received a special afterlife like the one that is assigned to 
Menelaus in the Odyssey, or he altered the traditional parameters of this special afterlife 
to include the ἡµίθεοι as a paradigmatic group. It is dangerous to use, as Most does, 
Homeric paradigms about the afterlife to conjure up a ‘tradition’33 because, as Jasper 
                                                
32 We can thus identify the semantic range of ποίησε (158) for the heroes as comprising the mortal-
immortal unions that Zeus caused to occur (like that of Aphrodite and Anchises) or those in which he 
himself participated. 
33 The tradition is in general largely a phantom for certain ideas. For example, although Menelaus and 
Rhadamanthys appear to be the only ones whom Homer transplanted to the Oceanside resort, as West 
(1966:192–3 ad 167) notes, “By the sixth century… the club has become less exclusive, and admits at least 
Achilles, Medea, and Diomedes.” Thus we have a relatively early terminus ante quem for the inclusion of a 
considerable group of heroes in the µακάρων νῆσοι, one of whom, at least, enjoys a ubiquitous tradition 
regarding his death; I therefore agree with West that Hesiod must be thinking of a significant group here 
and not just those privileged by being relatively unwarlike in the Iliad.  
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Griffin made plain,34 Homer takes pains to minimize fantastic elements, especially those 
which might interfere with his project of validating the poetry’s peculiar analgesic or, 
more precisely, deific value: the κλέα ἀνδρῶν are important both because they delight the 
soul and because they can become the only incorruptible remnants of the ἀνέρες. The 
difficulty of Most’s method is further amplified by the fact that Hesiod, in the case of the 
heroes, fits very specifically Greek mythic traditions into a much more broadly 
represented mythic scheme; the insertion of the heroic race into the metallic 
organizational motif results in heroes’ obtaining the ‘morphological’ characteristics of 
that motif—namely 1) a nonspecific account of their collective creation, 2) an illustrative, 
but generalizing summary of their lifestyles, and 3) either a nonspecific or a generalizing 
account of the race’s collective demise. For Hesiod, the wars at Thebes and Troy 
destroyed the heroic/half-god race at large, and Zeus proffered to that race a special 
afterlife. If 166 be judged inauthentic, there is no need to accept the illusory contrast that 
Most observes or West’s quibble with the inaccuracy of Hesiod’s statement vis-à-vis the 
tradition. The heroes’ special afterlife connects them with both the golden race and the 
gods, indicating their exceptionality vis-à-vis the bronze men, than whom they are 
δικαιότεροι καὶ ἀρείονες (158), and vis-à-vis their fully human coevals.35  
 
1.7 / Better than bronze 
At this point it makes sense to explore the primary reason for the race’s 
destruction; that they were destroyed fighting in large-scale warfare over property and 
                                                
34 1977. 
35 Clay (2003:92) observes that “the comparatives are equally valid in respect to the following age of iron.” 
Grammatically and practically this is valid, but the pattern in the myth shows that the comparisons of each 
of the successive races are with the previous race. 
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Helen provides a modus and secondary rationale, since the war was famously a divine 
machination. The primary, that is cosmic, reason for the race’s demise can be outlined as 
follows: by virtue of both their genetics and their mythic activities, the latter of which 
make them ἶσοι θεοῖσι in Homer, they must be at least geographically distinguished from 
the gods, from whom they descend and to whose ranks they aspire, and from mortal men, 
with whom they share the allotment of death.36 The problematic status of WD 173a–e 
notwithstanding,37 Hesiod otherwise indicates that Zeus settles the heroes ἐν πείρασι 
γαίης (168), which, in addition to being δίχ’ ἀνθρώπων (167), is equivalent to τηλοῦ ἀπ’ 
ἀθανάτων (173a).38 So even if 173a is an interpolation, based on the passages from the 
Theogony in which we find τηλοῦ (or νόσφιν) ἀπ’ ἀθανάτων, we can still suppose that 
the separation of heroes from the deathless ones, whom they go so far as to injure in 
Homer, is an idea consistent with Hesiodic cosmology. For example, the passage in the 
Theogony that describes the Echidna, who is not at all like “men or gods” (295–6), tells 
us that the gods allocated her (δάσσαντο) a cave beneath a hollow rock, apart from 
immortals and mortals, to be her famed dwelling (301–3). So just as a flesh-eating 
maiden-serpent hybrid is inhumed because of her incompatibility with men and gods 
(ἄλλο πέλωρον ἀµήχανον, οὐδὲν ἐοικός),39 heroes might require isolation from the divine 
                                                
36 The question as to the co-presence of ordinary mortals is made more difficult by the partial and 
problematic preservation of lines 173a–e. If Zeus per 174d established the iron race subsequent to the 
death/relocation of the heroes, then it would appear that only one race exists at a time. If, however, the line 
is interpolated, the parallelism is disrupted and one might posit that Hesiod envisions the heroic men as 
only typologically distinct from the iron race. Most (1997) argues that the heroes are merely an earlier 
γενεή rather than a different γένος from the iron men. The question is perhaps further complicated by the 
Odyssey, where there are vestiges of peoples who still commune with the gods (e.g. the Ethiopians and the 
Phaeacians). See Scodel (1982:35, 48–50) on the fate of the Phaeacians. 
37 See West (1978:194–5 ad 173a–e). 
38 cf. Il. 8.478, 14.200, 301. 
39 WD 295; for ἀµήχανον cf. Th. 836, which begins the contrafactual statement describing Typhoeus’ near 
ascent to heavenly sovereignty, and Chapter 3. 
 
 24 
(and from other humans) in practical terms because of their own dissonance from the iron 
age reality of Hesiod’s audience and in structural terms for their ability to unsettle an 
effectively crystallized Olympus; the ways in which they do so will be more fully 
explored in Chapter 3.  
While it is true that the heroes are sanctioned hybrids and in fact are the 
instruments of “the annihilation of the monstrous brood”40 of hybrid monsters at the end 
of the Theogony, the heroes whom Hesiod identifies in the myth of races, especially those 
who went to Troy, become sources of pain to the gods and in that way recall some of the 
abovementioned ‘unsanctioned’ entities.41 We can infer such an underlying principle 
from Hesiod’s poems, but explicit rationales in other ancient sources for the destruction 
of the heroic age may lend some more detail to the picture.  
The pertinent fragments of the Catalogue (frr. 1, 204 M-W), though difficult to 
piece together fully, point to deliberate action on the part of Zeus to bring an end to the 
miscegenation of gods and men and ostensibly clean up the remnants of such an epoch.42 
The Cypria (fr. 1 Bernabé) describes Zeus’ motive as wanting to lighten the 
overpopulated earth (Γῆ βαρουµένη according to the Scholium to Il. 1.5) of the burden of 
men, and the Scholium to Il. 1.5 adds a moral component by indicating the absence of 
piety among men (µηδεµίας ἀνθρώπων οὔσης εὐσεβείας).43 The moral component in part 
echoes evidence from Euripides’ Orestes (1640–2),44 where Apollo explains to Menelaus 
                                                
40 Clay (2003:155)  
41 While it is perhaps dangerous to read the Homeric tradition into Hesiod’s scarcity of detail, we should 
not shy away from imagining how Hesiod encountered and engaged the exploits of heroes detailed in the 
Homeric poems. After all, for Hesiod, humans are genetically connected with divine violence. 
42 See Scodel (1982:37) and Gonzalez (2011). 
43 Bermabé (1996). 
44 Scodel (1982:39–40); for the ‘Myth of Destruction’ at large see all of Scodel (1982). 
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why he must choose another bride, since the immortal Helen is to take her place next to 
Castor and Polydeuces: 
… ἐπεὶ θεοὶ τῷ τῆσδε καλλιστεύµατι 
Ἕλληνας εἰς ἓν καὶ Φρύγας συνήγαγον 
θανάτους τ’ ἔθηκαν, ὡς ἀπαντλοῖεν χθονὸς 
ὕβρισµα θνητῶν ἀφθόνου πληρώµατος. 
 
… since the gods brought together in war the Hellenes 
and the Phrygians by means of her beauty, and thereby 
wrought their deaths, so that they could lessen from the 
earth the wantonness of the unstinting number of 
mortals. 
 
The moralizing and utilitarian rationales that are found in the Cypria, the Scholium to the 
Iliad, and Euripides also appear in Genesis, the Babylonian epic of Atra-ḫasis, and other 
Near Eastern sources. However, all these texts obscure or elide the primary psychological 
infrastructure of the myth-type summarized above. 
We can uncover this infrastructure by recognizing that the heroes are granted the 
mythical abundance of the golden men because they struggled for divinity and by their 
struggling produced kleos, whereas the golden men, as I mentioned above, are incapable 
of being sung about (for very long) because they were privy to the inalienable plenty of 
the divine; while the golden men may have ‘kingly geras’ (126), they end up perhaps 
even more νώνυµνοι than the bronze men. A few points must be clarified: Most seems to 
interpret the translation of mortals to the Isles of the Blest as fully eliminating death from 
their fates. This is not a foregone conclusion, since, given the elevated status of the 
µάκαρες, it is likely that the statement of a hero’s establishment there is euphemistic: 
‘Menelaus [died and] went to the Isles of the Blest’ is more probable than ‘He forewent 
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death by going to the Isles of the Blest’.45 Although the two ideas seem functionally 
synonymous, Orphic salvation language at least preserves the indispensability of 
experiencing death to receiving immortality, though one need not look beyond the 
English repertory of euphemisms for dying to see that transmission or movement to 
another, paradisiacal, place occurs post atque ob mortem. In Homer, the lexeme τλάω and 
its congeners are marked for a similar bivalence: one suffers, but one also endures. The 
heroic men suffer and perish like us, but because of their divine blood, and no less their 
symbolic pursuit of the divine, they are, in special cases, given golden paradise and retain 
a famous name, which becomes the charge of poetry. 
Thus the preferable reading of Hesiod’s chronicle of the heroic age46 is that the 
poet is indicating in general terms that the Theban and Trojan wars brought about the 
race’s end.47 Zeus established these ἡµίθεοι on the Isles of the Blest. Thus, the heroic age 
is still exemplary for the present because the heroes provide extensive and ethically 
complicated µῦθοι by virtue of their struggles, however practically foreign they may be to 
Hesiod’s audience. By contrast, the golden men experience even death without struggle 
(116); it is as gentle as sleep and not consequent upon the activities of their lives. Their 
nearness to the divine in lifestyle, therefore, is hardly counterbalanced by their experience 
of death. They thus become a symbolic part of the moral infrastructure of Hesiod’s 
cosmos, employed as a group of δαίµονες (122) who protect mortal men (123) and grant 
wealth (126). 
 
                                                
45 The fantastic elements of the Cycle, especially the apparent apotheoses of Achilles and Memnon, perhaps 
problematize this distinction. On the Cycle, the fate of heroes, and fantasy see Griffin (1977). 
46 That of Scodel (1982). 
47 Perhaps more precisely the end of the semi-divine age. 
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1.8 / Speechlessness and unmetricality 
Unsuitability for myth itself, therefore, becomes one of the latent aitia for the 
demise of the races that Hesiod enumerates in his ἕτερος λόγος. This is indicated by his 
qualification of the silver and bronze races. The silver man lives an “utterly infantile” 
existence for a hundred years by his mother’s side “in his home” (130-1). Since to be 
µέγα νήπιος is to be utterly baby-like,48 and as the departure from home is a necessary 
precondition of the epic hero’s mythic life, we can surmise that the silver man’s 
remaining at home for one hundred years as a nursling impedes his progress toward 
appropriateness for heroic and didactic myth. (As I argued above, the heroic age is 
paradigmatic for Hesiod.) What the silver men eventually do once they “have come to the 
measure of youth” (132) is wholly opposed to the heroic, and therefore mythic functions, 
of the ἡµίθεοι: they have ἄλγεα on account of their ἀφραδίαι (133-4), which include their 
inability to keep themselves from committing ἀτάσθαλος49 ὕβρις against one another and 
their unwillingness to serve the gods and perform sacrifices as is themis for men to do 
(134–7). One is reminded of Odysseus’ men’s fate (Od. 1.7–9): 
αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο, 
νήπιοι, οἳ κατὰ βοῦς Ὑπερίονος Ἠελίοιο 
ἤσθιον· αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιµον ἦµαρ.  
 
For they perished by virtue of their atasthaliai, the fools! 
They gobbled down the cattle of Hyperion Helios, and 
he took away their day of return. 
 
                                                
48 Whether or not νήπιος is etymologically connected with ἠπύω is irrelevant, since the context here 
connects the term with babies. While it would be especially neat for the present argument if the silver men 
were to be viewed as actually incapable of speaking, we can only guess at the extent to which Hesiod 
imagined the silver-men as infants. 
49 The etymology of this word and its Greek congeners is unknown. Hesychius’ explanation, ἀπὸ τοῦ ταῖς 
ἄταις θάλλειν, while false on formal grounds (namely the length of the initial α), does a good job of 
covering the examples of ἀτασθαλίαι in epic. We might say that it indicates an obliviously self-destructive, 
and thereby foolish, subscription to wickedness. See Beekes (2010:s.v.). 
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Although Odysseus’ comrades are collectively destroyed for their own recklessness, they 
do function in the myth and retain names. (We will let aside the role of Odysseus’ own 
failings in the destruction of his men.) In other words, Odysseus’ men are heroes who 
suffer a moment of destructive (silver-aged) folly, while, according to Hesiod, the silver 
men know only witlessness, which apparently becomes punishable when they reach 
puberty. We might say that as soon as heroes commit ἀτασθαλίαι they become subject to 
summary destruction; or more precisely, the apparent incapability of Odysseus’ men to 
learn from their ἀτασθαλίαι commits them to a structural role in the poem: their folly is 
paradigmatically opposed to Odysseus’, in that he counterbalances (and outdoes) his own 
folly with examples of mêtis.  
The issue with the bronze men is not entirely dissimilar from that of the silver; 
after all, as Vernant argues, I think persuasively, they are not explicitly worse than the 
silver men, just οὐδὲν ὁµοῖον (144).50 Although they do not receive the τιµή of being 
hypochthonic µάκαρες like the silver men, this discrepancy could be due to the symbolic 
value of the golden and silver ages as seemingly better and worse βασιλῆες, if we follow 
Vernant’s reckoning; but we should qualify Vernant in light of our assessment of the 
logos. The silver men might represent the worst parts of the βασιλῆες—the Iliad, after all, 
begins with dueling temper tantrums between kings—but the ethical lives of the gold 
men are more complicated, as we will continue to explore throughout this chapter. 
The bronze men, by contrast, devote themselves fully to the “lamentable works of 
Ares” and “acts of hubris”; they are proto-heroes, brutish, malformed.51 The 
                                                
50 1960:23–4 (cf. 1966:63–4). 




foregrounding of their devotion to the “moaning works of Ares” is telling. Even in the 
Iliad, Ares is somewhat out of place; he embodies the intensity of battle, both the 
superhuman and the bestial capabilities of men in war, but not the civilized human ones, 
such as intellect, planning, and restraint. He has to be compartmentalized or deactivated.  
Moreover, the bronze men resemble the Hundredarmers in the ineluctability of 
their χεῖρες, and the Cyclopes in the absence of bread from their diet.52 They are 
consummate warriors, so essentially so that they cannot generate or participate in society. 
They may not even be fit for hexameters. Hesiod emphasizes the pervasiveness of bronze 
in their lives by way of a cumbersome hexameter-and-a-half (up to the feminine caesura 
of the second line) (150–1): 
τῶν δ’ ἦν χάλκεα µὲν τεύχεα, χάλκεοι δέ τε οἶκοι,  
χαλκῷ δ’ εἰργάζοντο·  
 
Their arms were bronze and bronze were their homes, 
and they worked with bronze. 
 
In order to scan the principes of the fourth and fifth feet, one must pronounce the 
synecphoneses, and although that of –εα of χάλκεα is unnecessary for its scansion, it is 
imaginable that the proximity of the other two influences successive recitations of the 
line to adopt the phonological change.53 The spondaic two feet that begin line 151, in 
addition to picking up bronze ‘excess’ of 150, carry on the rhythmic ungainliness. 
 To summarize thus far, we have noted that each of the races possesses defining 
characteristics that make them unfit for the cosmos vis-à-vis either the divine (the silver, 
the heroes) or themselves (the bronze), and unfit for the poem because of the monotony 
                                                
52West (1978:187–8 ad 145–9). 
53 Against this reading, perhaps, is the fact that for all instances of χάλκεα in Homer (4 or 5) the –εα sits in 
places where it can be bisyllabic. By the same token, however, fewer than 4% of the much more plentiful 
τεύχεα require synecphonesis of the bisyllable, but it does here.  
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of their narratives. The heroes are somewhat more useful in didactic terms since they 
embody a mixture of goods and ills like that experienced by the present men.  
 
1.9 / Unwitting κοσµόµαχοι 
The golden age is unfit to continue for anachronistic reasons, which we began to abstract 
to the following axiom: if myth and its enunciation in logos (to use Hesiod’s term at 106) 
constitute the principal method by which we know ourselves and communicate about our 
differences and deficiencies, and the means by which we (post-lapsarian) ἄνθρωποι 
access the divine, which is necessarily Wholly Other, at least with respect to their 
deathlessness, then the golden men, who know only divine surfeit, fail to maintain the 
divine. In other words, since the gold men live ὥστε θεοί (112), when we retroject Iron 
Age religious and cosmological constructs onto them, they fail to recognize the θεοί. The 
conception that the divine ontologically depends on both the existence and the otherness 
of men is not deeply concealed in, let alone absent from, early Greek or Mediterranean 
thought. The Hymn to Demeter (h. Dem.) testifies to such a concept: 
καί νύ κε πάµπαν ὄλεσσε γένος µερόπων ἀνθρώπων 
λιµοῦ ὕπ’ ἀργαλέης, γεράων τ’ ἐρικυδέα τιµήν 
καὶ θυσιῶν ἤµερσεν Ὀλύµπια δώµατ’ ἔχοντας, 
εἰ µὴ Ζεὺς ἐνόησεν, ἑῳ δ’ ἐφράσσατο θυµῷ. (310–3) 
And now the entire race of mortal men would have died 
from painful hunger and would have deprived those who 
hold Olympian homes of the glorious honor of gifts and 
sacrifices, had not Zeus taken notice, and understood it 
in his heart. 
 
A comparison with the Hittite Telepinu myth indicates that the threat of the apodosis in 
the hymn is cosmic. Besides the annihilation of the human race, the loss of the gods’ 
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θυσίαι can be more than a matter of inconvenience for them. The following, from KUB 
17.10 i 17, narrates the analogous height of calamity: 
DUMU.LÚ.U19.LU.MEŠ DINGIR.MEŠ-ša ki-iš-ta-an-ti-it ḫar-ki-ya-an-zi 
Men and gods are dying of hunger.54 
Perhaps owing to its general concision, the Hittite myth does not connect mortal hunger 
and divine hunger as causally related, but the details of the h. Dem. suggest that the 
situation could be read as “men are dying of hunger, and are therefore not sacrificing to 
gods, who in turn are dying of hunger.” Evidence from Hittite ritual, especially blood 
ritual, suggests that a human intermediary was required to provide the appropriate divine 
portions to the gods—“the victim’s heart, its liver, and a cut or two of its meat”55. Thus 
while both narratives have an angry god bring the cosmos to the edge of catastrophe, just 
below the surface these myths acknowledge that the divine exists by virtue of the 
attentions of the mortal. 
But how can the golden mortal, who is no different from the divine other than by 
his being overcome by somniform death, recognize the divine? This sleep-like death, 
more than just demonstrating the extent to which the golden men know no κήδεα, fails to 
distinguish sufficiently the golden race from its makers. For either the race dies en masse 
and is thus not witness to death at all, or, as is more likely since θνῇσκον (116) is 
imperfect, they are simply unbothered by the gentle demise of their congeners, since they 
have an unfailingly “care-free thumos” (112).56 So although Clay’s suggestion that the 
golden men are unbothered by women and therefore do not reproduce themselves 
                                                
54 Cf. KUB 24.3 ii 4´–17´, a plague prayer from Mursili II, and Beckman (1989:100–1). 
55 Beckman (2011:98). 
56 cf. Scodel (per litt.: ad locc.). 
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remains possible as a practical cause of their demise, Hesiod does not emphasize that fact 
as an imperfection or as the ‘failure’ of the golden experiment, as he does the idiocy and 
impiety of the silver men or the insatiable zeal for Ares of the bronze men; remember, 
too, that the logos of the progression of ages is heteros vis-à-vis the preceding logos, 
which deals with woman’s hand in man’s troubles (90–5).57 Furthermore, the example of 
Adam and Eve in Genesis 2–3 shows a cosmos in which men and women live together 
but are not compelled to procreate until they have eaten of the Tree of Knowledge of 
Good and Evil and are punished.58 As will be discussed later, it turns out that ‘Good and 
Evil’ is not purely a moral merism, but generally an aesthetic capacity to discern good 
from bad. Given YHWH’s reaction to Adam and Eve’s achievement of this knowledge, 
we might even suggest that “knowledge of good and evil” indicates omniscience in this 
case. 
 
1.10 / Ἄµουσον γένος 
Hesiod does, however, use language that indicates that the golden race is 
problematically similar to the divine as well as preclusive of the Muses’ function. To 
begin with, Hesiod summarizes the logos he is about to deliver thus: ὡς ὁµόθεν γεγάασι 
θεοὶ θνητοί τ’ ἄνθρωποι (108). I take this controversial line to mean that Hesiod intends 
to divulge the extent to which men have become separated from gods after being in a 
                                                
57 Furthermore, this account of Pandora is much less invested in gender commentary than the parallel 
account in the Theogony (521–616). 
58 Procreation is part of God’s instruction to the couple at Genesis 1:28, but the Eden myth is generally 
considered to be isolated from the creation account of Genesis 1. 
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state of communion and ontic closeness.59 At line 112 he tells us that they “lived like 
gods, possessed of a heart unafflicted by κήδεα.” Proclus comments on ὥστε θεοὶ δ’ 
ἔζωον as follows:  
εἰκότως οἱ παντὸς καθαρεύοντες πάθους καὶ τῷ χρυσῷ διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἀσήπτῳ καὶ 
καθαρῷ ὁµοιωθέντες ὁµοιότατοι τοῖς θεοῖς λέγονται εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ 
πρώτως εἰσὶν ἀπαθεῖς, αἱ ψυχαὶ δὲ κατὰ µίµησιν ἐκείνων ταύτης τυγχάνουσιν τῆς 
εὐδαιµονίας.60 
 
Ostensibly, since they (the golden men) are clean (καθεύροντες) οf all suffering, 
and being like incorruptible and pure (καθαρῷ) gold by virtue of this, they are 
said to be most like (ὁµοιότατοι) the gods; for the gods are also principally 
(πρώτως) unsuffering, and in line with their imitation of the gods, the lives [of 
the golden men] hit upon this very happiness. 
 
The adverb πρωτώς indicates that, for Proclus at least, the gods’ apatheia is their 
principal identifying feature. (Of course, as this dissertation shows, gods can be made to 
suffer, but their zero-state is to be free from it.) The golden men’s enjoyment of such a 
state, namely their possession of an untroubled heart (ἀκηδὴς θυµός), brings them into 
direct conflict with the principal purpose of the Muses: to be a “means of forgetting ills 
and a respite from cares” (Th. 55).61 Clay is onto something when she wonders under 
what circumstances the gods, who have an easy life, might be in need of musical therapy. 
Her answer is “perhaps only once, after the defeat of the Titans, when the other gods had 
to become reconciled to Zeus’s rule, as their next song (71–74) indicates.”62 The 
goddesses’ remaining function, Clay observes, is to ply their healing powers in the 
                                                
59 Cf. West (1978:178 ad loc.); for a discussion of the interpretive history of the line and its status see 
Carrière (1991), Ercolani (2010:167 ad loc), and most recently Van Noorden (2015:69–71), whose reading 
accords with mine. There is no text-critical reason for regarding the line as spurious, and many of those 
who would excise it base their readings on a rather restricted reading of ὡς ὁµόθεν γεγάασι, and seem to 
overlook the appropriateness of the tense of the verb to the myth of races. The perfect is not the aorist, 
especially for a lexeme like γίγνοµαι, which often functions as a copula. 
60 Pertusi (1955:50–1). 
61 In fact, the Muses are described at Th. 61 as ἀκηδέα θυµόν ἔχουσαι. The only other figure in Hesiod (or 
Archaic epos) besides the Muses and the golden race thus described is the race of heroes once they have 
been relocated to the Isles of the Blest (WD 170). 
62 Clay (2003:68). 
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human realm. Ostensibly, these healing powers are channeled through ἄνδρες ἀοιδοί (Th. 
98–103): 
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδέϊ θυµῷ 
ἄζηται κραδίην ἀκαχήµενος, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὸς 
Μουσάων θεράπων κλεῖα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων         100 
ὑµνήσει µάκαράς τε θεοὺς οἳ Ὄλυµπον ἔχουσιν, 
αἶψ’ ὅ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ τι κηδέων 
µέµνηται...  
 
For if someone has even grief in his mind, a mind 
freshly beset with care, and groans as he aches at heart, 
and a bard, the henchman of the Muses, will sing of the 
famed exploits of earlier men and the blessed gods who 
hold Olympus, straightaway this man will forget his 
angst and will not remember his cares. 
 
A world with a golden race does not require, or at least limits, the offices of the Muses, at 
least as Hesiod sees them. Alongside this issue one might argue that the golden men do 
not produce any κλέα; what would their stories be like? That the golden men are alive 
during Cronus’ reign and before the birth of the Muses, far from troubling this point, 
confirms it. These men are alien to a cosmos which knows of fierce struggle and 
reconciliation; if Zeus’ violent ascent to sovereignty is envisioned as taking place during 
the era of the golden men, the poet passes over it in silence, maintaining the 
anthropocentricity of the narrative and isolating the serenity of the golden men from any 
divine strife. When a Zeus-ruled cosmos is in place, the advent of the Muses is at hand.63 
Such a teleological reckoning of the golden age aligns with the form and content of the 
myth as a whole. 
Hesiod provides another detail on the golden men’s carefree life: that far from 
being victims of wretched old age, the golden men αἰεὶ δὲ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁµοῖοι / 
τέρποντ’ ἐν θαλίῃσι κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν ἁπάντων (114–5). One is reminded of the activities 
                                                
63 See the discussion of Clay (2003:645) of Pindar fr. 31 (Snell-Maehler), a scrap from the Hymn to Zeus. 
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of the apotheosized Heracles, who αὐτὸς δὲ µετ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι / τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς 
καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην (Od. 11.602–3), though his wraith can still be viewed armed 
and glowering among the shades.64 With these lines and the ὁµόθεν of 108 in mind, it is 
enticing to read a double entendre in ὁµοῖοι at 114: the golden men are “always the same 
with respect to their arms and legs” and “always the same [as the gods] with respect to 
their arms and legs”.65 All the same, the vision of the golden race seems to be connected 
with a time before the dissolution of divine–mortal communion at Mekone.  
One final, yet important, point about the golden men will lead us into our analysis 
of Genesis 2:25–3:24. No explicit mention is made of the intellectual activities or 
capabilities of the golden men, although one might suggest that their generally being at 
ease (ἐθεληµοί / ἥσυχοι 118–9) approaches such a statement, nor is this reticence 
particularly meaningful to the reader until he reads about the silver men, who differ from 
the golden men with respect to their φυή and νόηµα. This particular pairing of nouns is 
rare enough in Archaic epos to mark it. Thus we can retroject some sort of latent, and 
better, νόηµα onto the golden men; it is likely that the statement that “they lived like 
gods” (112) accommodates, but does not emphasize, their being endowed with some sort 
of divine intellect in addition to being granted access to the limitless sustenance that is 
normally reserved for the divine. But it is complicated. An examination of Genesis might 
compels us to conclude that the silver race, as a correction to the failed ‘experiment’ (to 
                                                
64 On the scholarly debate over these lines, namely over the apparent incongruousness of Heracles’ having 
an ἔιδωλον and being immortal on Olympus, see Heubeck (1989:144 ad loc.). Similar phrasing is used of 
the Muses at Th. 65; see West (1966:177 ad loc.). 
65 The phrase is somewhat strange, despite its clarity. The lexeme ὁµοῖος and its congeners appear to be 
used more often in Homer and Hesiod in negative statements and in comparisons of distinct persons. 
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use Clay’s term)66 of the golden age, is deliberately made stupid, because that is one 
mode of disjoining them from the divine. On the other hand we ought not equate Adam 
and Eve’s coming to self-awareness with the golden noêma. 
 
1.11 / Adam ὁ χρύσεος? 
 It has long been suspected of Genesis 2:4b–3:24, which describes the story of 
man’s short life in and expulsion from Eden, that its author, whom we will call the 
‘Yahwist’ in keeping with current majority practice, incorporated traditional data which 
go back to the “oldest cultural stratum of Mesopotamia.”67 The passage further bears a 
number of striking resemblances to Hesiod’s account of the golden men as well as to the 
Odyssey, from individual images and motifemes to the psychological infrastructure that 
we began to detail above. This infrastructure defined the cosmological antinomy between 
mortal self-awareness and immortality.  
Of course, early Greek material has its origins in the East as well. In the end we 
can only guess as to whether redactors of Genesis ever handled Hesiodic material or 
heard the Odyssey, or whether Homer, Hesiod, and the redactors of Genesis mutually 
handled the same Near Eastern traditions, but it remains useful to demonstrate how much 
the myths align with one another, especially when we keep in mind that Greeks and the 
land of Israel had frequent and widespread contact during the Persian period,68 the most 
likely era for the redaction of materials and episodes that are set in Eden.69 If Genesis 
                                                
66 2003:86. 
67 Speiser (1964:19). 
68 See the volume A Time of Change, edited by Levin (2007), especially the articles by Ambar-Armon and 
Kloner, Faust, and Eshel. 
69 See Van Seters (1992). 
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appropriated material from Hesiod and Homer, in addition to the Mesopotamian tradition, 
of which the Greeks, too, made use, then the chronicle of the golden men and similar 
Greek visions of especially blessed men served the redactors’ vision of man’s origins first 
and foremost. 
 
1.12 / Geo- and anthropocentricity 
 If WD is the anthropocentric counterpart to the theo- and cosmocentric vision of 
the Theogony, the account of the beginnings of the world in Genesis 2–3 focuses on 
man’s first experiences, rather than his being merely consequential to a series of divine 
acts. Speiser’s summary is fitting:  
The contrast [between Genesis i and Genesis ii 4b] is immediately apparent from 
the respective initial sequences. The first account starts out with the creation of 
“heaven and earth” (i 1). The present narrative begins with the making of “earth 
and heaven” (ii 4b). The difference is by no means accidental. In the other 
instance the center of the stage was heaven, and man was but an item in a cosmic 
sequence of majestic acts. Here the earth is paramount and man the center of 
interest.70 
 
Likewise, Hesiod wants to tell us what the state of man is vis-à-vis the gods (108), not 
how the cosmos at large has taken shape, which is the purview of the Theogony. 
 Furthermore, man as a literal product of the earth is emphasized: “God Yahweh 
formed man from clods in the soil and blew into his nostrils the breath of life. Thus man 
became a living being.”71 The word for man, ᾿ādām, is clearly playing on the consonance 
and assonance of the word for soil ᾿dāmā. The Yahwist may be engaged in folk 
etymology, but his readers will no doubt understand that man (Adam) is an earthling.72 
                                                
70 1964:18. 
71 Gen. 2:7. Translation by Speiser (1964:14). All translations of passages from Genesis are his, unless 
otherwise noted. 
72 Speiser (1964:15), Driscoll (1907:s.v.). cf. Latin homo–humus. 
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While the Myth of Ages does not offer the same etymological play, and the obscure 
derivations of ἄνθρωποι and µέροπες (109, 143) are not likely to yield any help, man 
does enjoy etymological association with earthly material elsewhere, namely rocks.73 
Furthermore, the hiding of the golden, silver, and bronze ages by the earth (κατὰ γαῖα 
κάλυψε[ν])74 looks a lot like the ‘return to materies’ that God posits for Adam (3:19):  
 “…Until you return to the ground, 
 For from it you were taken: 
 For dust you are 
 And to the dust you shall return!” 
 
The first three metallic races do not become dust or earth, and we might hesitate to 
understand them as relinquishing their respective raw materials to a state of latency 
within the earth, but Hesiod might have imagined the metals, if not necessarily in terms 
of their existence, at least in terms of their technological viability, as symbolic reliquiae 




                                                
73 Ehoeae (ff. 2–6, 234 M-W); ( λᾶας–λαός) Pi. Ol. 9.46-56; cf. Scodel (1982:43). 
74 WD 121, 140, 156. 
75 Hesiod’s explanation as to why the Bronze men use bronze for everything (151: µέλας δ’οὐκ ἔσκε 
σίδηρος) confirms that the actual existence of the various metals is at least in part envisioned, although 
Ruth Scodel (per litt.: ad 151) argues that “Hesiod does not mean that iron ores were not in the earth, but 
that the Bronze Men did not use iron.” Although Hesiod might not himself think that, discovery of the 
metals and making them technologically usable must have been thought as synonymous with their coming 
into existence. There is something tantalizing, too, about the personification of bronze in Homer as νηλεής 
(cf. the admittedly different personification of gold as ἄφθιτος or ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήραος). Although Hesiod 
does not call the bronze men “pitiless”, he does say the have a “heart of adamant” (147) and that they are 
“unapproachable” (148), and from the other side we see the metallization of ruthless hearts (σιδήρεος, 
χάλκεος) all over Homer (and cf. Patroclus’ complaint to Achilles about his pitilessness (16.33–5), where 
he both calls Achilles νηλέης and alleges that the “sun-beaten rocks” fathered him). So although good 
Bronze Age heroes fight with bronze rather than iron or steel, one cannot help but wonder whether the 
pitilessness of the bronze they use is meant on some level to index the ruthlessness of their forebears. After 
all, heroes are essentially Bronze Men with moderation. 
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1.13 / Tending the earth that needs no tending 
 One of the more remarkable features of the chronicle of the golden men is the 
seeming anachronism of their actions at 118–119: οἵ δ’ ἐθεληµοὶ / ἥσυχοι ἔργ’ ἐνέµοντο 
σὺν ἐσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσιν. As West and Ercolani have noted, the idea of ‘tillage’ or 
‘working’ the field is not apt for Hesiod’s golden men, because the earth gives them 
‘bounteous’ and ‘unstinting’ fruit αὐτοµάτη (117–118).76 Ercolani suggests that 
ἐνέµοντο, in accordance with Homeric usage, must mean ‘to portion out’ (‘spartivano’), 
and that ἔργα are the ‘prodotti’ of the earth, but the comparanda that he adduces do not 
support this reading. I suggest that the golden men are to be understood as going about 
their work, but that it has no bearing on the earth’s productiveness; perhaps their work is 
merely to reap. Thus they can be ἐθεληµοί and ἥσυχοι. The application of a phrase for 
agricultural labor to a context where labor in the modern sense is utterly alien strikes us 
as paradoxical, and it is hard to expect Hesiod did not recognize this. 
 Though less pointedly than Hesiod’s golden world, Eden also involves man’s 
tending the earth that appears to provide for him automatically. At 2:9, “God Yahweh 
caused to grow various trees that were a delight to the eye and good for eating, with the 
tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of knowledge of good and bad.”77 
Although the passage does not explicitly designate the trees as automatically giving their 
fruit, the description of them as a ‘delight to the eye and good for eating’ indicates that 
they were fully fruiting purely as a consequence of God’s having caused them to grow. 
                                                
76 West (1978:181) and Ercolani (2010:171) ad loc. Ercolani’s reading aligns with Σ and Tzetzes. 
77 The translation of kol as ‘various’ is perhaps better replaced with ‘every’ or ‘every kind’, though the 
sense of variety is not absent. LXX has πᾶν ξύλον ὡραῖον. 
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This phrase calls to mind the vision of Alcinous’ garden in Od. 7,78 where, after the short 
catalogue of the types of trees growing within the garden—pears, pomegranates, apples 
‘with splendid fruit’, sweet figs, and olives (115–6)—we are told that these trees are 
always fruiting, irrespective of the season (117–9):  
τάων οὔ ποτε καρπὸς ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ ἀπολείπει 
χείµατος οὐδὲ θέρευς, ἐπετήσιος· ἀλλὰ µάλ’ αἰεὶ 
ζεφυρίη πνείουσα τὰ µὲν φύει, ἄλλα δὲ πέσσει. 
 
Never does the fruit of these trees perish nor abate, neither in 
winter nor summer; it is present all year round. Instead [of the 
normal seasonality], ever does a blowing westerly cause some 
fruit to grow, and others to ripen.79 
 
In Genesis, the infinitive absolute construction of God’s command to Adam ‘to eat 
freely’ of the trees of the garden (except of the tree of knowledge of good and bad) 
(2:16–7) suggests that the licit trees provide fruit without end. Yet God puts Adam in the 
garden to ‘work it and watch over it’ (2:15). The details of these tasks are obscure and 
unstressed; in like fashion human labor in the garden of Alcinous is unmarked, 80 though 
it specifically involves reaping and trampling the fruit (Od. 7.124). The idea seems to be 
that, although Adam and those who tend Alcinous’ garden are performing labor by 
making it accessible or culinarily usable, they can do it without worrying about any 
insufficiency of produce. Adam collects the bounty and maintains the regulations of the 
garden, namely abstinence from tasting of the tree of knowledge. 
                                                
78 As Louden (2011:125) notes, the four rivers of Eden accord well with the four fountains on Ogygia 
(5.70–1), as does the rest of the vision of the Ogygian landscape. While I do not necessarily agree with 
Louden on the extent to which Book 5 therefore “creates” (quotation marks are Louden’s) Odysseus within 
the Odyssey, Odysseus does ‘fall’ it seems, upon leaving Ogygia, from proximity to immortality; one might 
say that because he is πολύµητις/πολύτλας, Odysseus, as we know him, is deactivated in the Ogygian 
paradise. 
79For the comparison of this passage with WD 172–3, the description of the Isles of the Blest, cf. Garvie 
(1994:188 ad 117–21) and S. West (1988:227 ad Od. 4.543ff.). In the next section I will discuss the 
watering of the garden. 
80 See Garvie’s note ad loc. (1994:189). 
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1.14 / Features of paradise and the specter of the flood 
 Connected with this peculiar plenitude is another marked feature of the garden: its 
abundance appears without rain. There are no green, crop-bearing fields because there is 
no precipitation (2:5), but for the garden “a flow would well up from the ground and 
water the whole surface of the soil…” (2:6).81 Besides the inapplicability of agriculture to 
Eden, the absence of rain entails the absence of the peril of flooding of the type that we 
see at 6:5–8:22. Thus, while the ‘Flood’ narrative in Genesis, especially those parts 
ascribed to the Yahwist, demonstrates its closest affinities to the Gilgamesh Epic,82 the 
absence of rain as an explicit feature of a paradisiacal locale appears in early Greek epic, 
though not in Hesiod. The most explicit and famous passage is Od. 4.563–8, where 
Menelaus recollects Proteus’ words to him indicating the special afterlife that awaits him: 
ἀλλά σ’ ἐς Ἠλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης 
ἀθάνατοι πέµψουσιν, ὅθι ξανθὸς Ῥαδάµανθυς, 
τῇ περ ῥηΐστη βιοτὴ πέλει ἀνθρώποισιν·  
οὐ νιφετός, οὔτ’ ἂρ χειµὼν πολὺς οὔτε ποτ’ ὄµβρος,  
ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ζεφύροιο λιγὺ πνείοντος ἀήτας 
Ὠκεανὸς ἀνίησιν ἀναψύχειν ἀνθρώπους…  
 
But the deathless ones will send you to the Elysian plain and the 
edges of the earth, where tawny Rhadamanthys is. There men 
have the easiest lifestyle. There is no snow, no excessive winter 
storm, never any rain; rather Ocean ever sends up the gales of 
clear-blowing Zephyrus to cool men. 
 
While rain is not the only climatic phenomenon absent from Elysium, its absence is 
emphasized by the absolute temporal modality of οὔτε ποτ[ε]. The special thicket in 
Scheria in which Odysseus hides himself at the end of Book 5 is likewise impervious to 
                                                
81 Alcinous’ garden has two springs, which appear to take care of the watering needs of the orchard and the 
citizens (Od. 7.129–31); as Louden (2011:125) notes, Ogygia’s four fountains (Od. 5.70–1) parallel those 
in Eden. 
82 See Van Seters (1992:160–71). 
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the rain (and the wind and the sun) (474–82).83 In addition to providing an important 
contrast with Odysseus’ most recent hardship, escaping the violent sea after two-and-a-
half days of near-drowning, the lair’s imperviousness to the elements recollects Proteus’ 
description of Elysium a book earlier and anticipates Alcinous’ garden in Book 7. It is no 
coincidence that Menelaus learns of his special dispensation from the Old Man of the sea 
in the midst of his vexed nostos. Thus, it is by way of these affinities that the nexus of 
mythic material that includes the ‘Flood’ in the capacity of an annihilating catastrophe 
and the features of Paradise is woven. With that in mind, we might suppose that the fair 
climes of Paradise are understood as cosmic remuneration for destruction via deluge, at 
least in the Greek material.84 On the other hand, for the redacted Hebrew bible the 
compensatory value of clement weather attaches itself to the lapsarian myth, which is 
considered chronologically prior to the Flood. Alternatively, one might say that the 
Hebrew material repurposes a vision of Paradise for the lapsarian myth. 
                                                
83 The same temporal modality that applied to the rain’s absence from Elysium (οὔτε ποτ[ε]) is applied to 
the shining of the sun here (479). The adverbial διαµπερές modifies the rain’s inability to penetrate 
Odysseus’ lair (480). It probably goes with περάασκε here (διαµπερές < *περ-) (‘The rain does not make it 
all the way through [the canopy]’), although it can carry temporal modality either alone (cf. Od. 8.245) or 
in combination with other temporal adverbs (cf. Il. 15.70). The absence of sunshine is recollected by the 
description of the Cimmerians (11.15–6), who have strong chthonic affinities (cf. Frame 1978), and the 
Nekyia in general. This lair, like the Phaeacian episode as a whole, functions as a threshold separating 
destruction from salvation: Odysseus has not been revived fully, but he has for the time being escaped a 
watery obliteration. Furthermore, as Hainsworth (in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth, 1988:287 ad 478–80) 
notes, these same lines are used at 19.440–2 to describe a wild boar’s lair and may amplify Odysseus’ 
bestial nature here. 
84 Theocritus’ vision of the nymphs consoling Hylas after pulling him into the water consolidates this 
notion poetically and lexically (13.53–4): Νύµφαι µὲν σφετέροις ἐπὶ γούνασι κοῦρον ἔχοισαι / 
δακρυόεντ’ ἀγανοῖσι παρεψύχοντ’ ἐπέεσιν· (“The nymphs held the weeping boy on their knees and tried to 
console him with gentle words.”) Hylas, teary though he may be, has drowned, and the nymphs literally 
‘cool him with tender words’, just as Zephyrus cools (ἀναψύχειν) men in Elysium. The Idyll’s coda tells us 
that the preceding account conveys how Hylas µακάρων ἀριθµεῖται (72), and I suspect that the nymphs’ 
breath is central to his becoming makar. Cf. h. Dem. 238, where, in addition to anointing Demophoön with 
ambrosia, the disguised Demeter “breathes sweetly down upon him” (ἡδὺ καταπνείουσα), one which see 
Richardson (1974:239 ad 238). 
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 Without suggesting any direction of influence, I should close this section with one 
other tantalizing connection between Elysium and the Garden of Eden. After God 
banishes Adam and Eve “he stationed east of the Garden the cherubim and the fiery 
revolving sword, to guard the way to the tree of life” (3:24). Both the cherubim and the 
fiery revolving sword have garnered much attention: in the 1950s and 1960s scholars 
were divided between naturalistic interpretations—the fiery revolving sword is 
lightning—and folkoristic interpretations—it is a magical weapon and many Near Eastern 
gods have magical weapons.85 Hendel, however, was disturbed by the asymmetry 
between the guardians of the Garden, and he concludes from comparanda that the “flame 
of the whirling sword” is a minor deity, just like the cherubim, who themselves might be 
fire deities. What I suggest here, however, is that irrespective of their godhood, we should 
still imagine both the cherubim and the fiery whirling sword as weapons of Yahweh, like 
the lightning and thunder of Zeus. In fact, over a century ago Foote concluded that the 
cherubim were essentially the storm cloud in both its benign and terrifying capacities, 
upon which Yahweh was sometimes said to fly (Ps. 18:10, cf. Is. 19:1).86  Zeus, we 
recall, not only plied thunder and lightning, but he also rode the storm-wind or storm-
cloud, known as the aigis.87 
 Far more vexing than the identity of the guardians of Eden, but perhaps connected 
with them, is the etymology of Ἠλύσιον.88 Irrespective of the ultimate derivation of the 
word, the connection of an alternative afterlife (apotheosis) with places struck by 
                                                
85 Hendel (1985:672). 
86 1904:282. 
87 See West (1978) on αἰγίοχος. His choice to translate the epithet as ‘goat-rider’ in his Loeb of the 
Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer (2003), is pretty abstruse (see Janko 2004:283–4). 
For fuller discussion of the epithet, see Janko (1992:48 ad 13.43–5, 230 ad 15.18–31, 261 ad 308–11). 
88 See Burkert (1960/1961), Beekes (2013 s.v.). On a potential Semitic etymology, see Cocco (1955). 
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lightning, which are ἄβατος, is already ancient, although not in our earliest sources.89 
That the connection is omitted in Homer is unsurprising. In any case, it is not difficult to 
understand Eden as a pedon made abaton by virtue of God’s striking it with lightning. 
 
 
1.15 / Living like gods, thinking like gods? 
 Above we spoke of the ontological problems involved in the golden men’s 
similarity to the divine. Here we can refine our terms by bringing in the expulsion from 
Eden and the explicit awareness of such problems, which that episode seems to have. The 
first acknowledgment of the reason for God’s barring Adam and Eve from eating of the 
tree of knowledge comes at 3:5. In response to Eve’s announcement that eating of the tree 
entails death (3:3), the serpent responds, “You are not going to die. No, God well knows 
that the moment you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be the same as God 
in telling good from bad.” Thus comforted, the woman eats and gives some to Adam, and 
he eats (3:6). Their eyes are opened and they become aware of their own nudity (3:7). 
Then, after indicating to the snake, the woman, and the man their respective punishments, 
and making clothing for the man and his wife (3:14–21), at 3:22 God says to some 
unidentified heavenly retinue, which is possibly the rest of a henotheistic pantheon, “Now 
that the man has become like one of us in discerning good from bad, what if he should 
put out his hand and taste also of the tree of life and eat, and live forever!” 
                                                
89 See Burkert (1960/1961). A couple of Attic inscriptions (IG II2 4964, 4965), likely in reference to the 
adytum (see LSJ s.v. ἄβατος), very intimately connect that capacity of Zeus to lightning and the 
untroddability of the place. 
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 As Speiser signals in his comment on the ‘Fall’, the stem ydʻ (‘telling’ at 3:3 and 
‘discerning’ at 3:22) does not just signify ‘to know’, but more especially ‘to experience’ 
and thereby ‘to come to knowledge’;90 the lexeme in LXX is γινώσκω ‘recognize’, not 
οἶδα ‘know’. Furthermore, ‘good and bad’ ought not be thought of as restricted to moral 
matters. Speiser compares 2 Samuel 3:36, where Barzillai confesses that his capacity to 
appreciate ‘good and bad’ vis-à-vis physical and aesthetic pleasure has been dulled by his 
age.91  
 As we discussed above, Hesiod does not describe the golden men’s intellectual 
condition in precise terms, but one might suspect that in living like gods they possess a 
νόηµα similar to that of the gods. So, even though they exist νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνου καὶ 
ὀïζύος (113) and enjoy themselves in festivities and good cheer κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν 
ἁπάντων (115), they do not, on the surface, seem to bear the same ignorance that is 
emphasized in the case of Adam and Eve; Hesiod does not make the golden men into 
primal ingénués, as the Yahwist does Adam and Eve, who come to divine knowledge and 
then must be expelled from the garden lest they also achieve immortality by tasting of the 
tree of life (3:22–3). Instead, Hesiod seems to underscore the golden race’s almost total 
ontological closeness to the divine. But the golden men are ignorant in a way—of 
suffering, of ponos. Their ἡσυχία—their being ἐθεληµοί—seems to be creepily innate, 
unchangeable, slavish. As discussed above, even though they die, whereas the gods do 
                                                
90 1964:26. 
91 1964:26. Clark’s statement on ‘Good and Evil’ (the traditional translation of the pair) is likewise apt: 
“Man takes upon himself the responsibility of trying apart from God to determine whether something is 
good for himself or not” (1969:277); cf. Van Seters (1992:133 n.71), who quotes Clark. 
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not, it is a death that does not cause ὀϊζύς for them.92 So we might maintain that their 
better noêma is divine in a way: it accords with the will of the gods and the nature of the 
cosmos. So then we can be more precise about the silver men: their noêma is worse than 
that of the golden men in that they are thoroughly οὐκ ἐθεληµοί. 
 I think we can be even more precise about Genesis, and perhaps about the golden 
men. At 3:22 God seems to connect logically the knowledge of good and evil with the 
impulse to gain immortality: before eating from the Tree of Knowledge, man had no 
awareness of his mortality, or at least did not know enough to decide that innate mortality 
is a bad thing. Although Eve explains the prohibition to the Serpent and seems to 
understand the concept of death, her modification of the instruction (“neither shall ye 
touch it”, 3:3) and her use of the conjunction pen suggest that she thinks that the fruit 
itself will kill her. God’s injunction depends on her misunderstanding, and the Serpent 
plays on it. But now that Adam and Eve have tasted of the fruit, God fears that they will 
be dissatisfied with natural process of dying and eat of the Tree of Life. In other words, 
Adam and Eve are no longer ἐθεληµοί and ἥσυχοι. Thus we have a sort of catch-22 
situation across texts: on the one hand, self-awareness and the ability to determine that 
mortality is bad—and presumably the ensuing disquiet—result in the removal of access 
to immortality, expressly because knowledge and immortality equal divinity; on the other 
hand, unflappable contentment with mortality, perhaps because it is painless, seems to 
muddy the distinction between mortals and immortals. 
 
 
                                                
92 Ruth Scodel (per litt.) points out to me that ἥσυχοι and ἐθεληµοί appear to mean that the golden men are 
content with the status quo, are content to reap the unstinting harvest, and are content to die peacefully. 
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1.16 / The fruits of life and death 
 The notion that intellectual autonomy, or at least the conceit of self-awareness, is 
a principal feature of mortality that impedes the attainment of immortality seems to be 
part of a larger system of thought regarding the place of death in the cosmos: death is a 
cosmic constraint, the inalienable counterpart to life, a sort of architectural tool which 
builds and maintains cosmic structure, enables change, and thereby indicates the 
changeless. This project cannot explore the epistemological ramifications of such an idea, 
nor can it practically tackle the convoluted history of engagement with that notion for 
even a relatively circumscribed group, notwithstanding the problems of such a 
circumscription, like the ‘pre-Socratics’. Its purview must instead be constrained to 
detailing the early mythological outcomes of the conceptual framework, outcomes which 
automatically establish what we might term ‘the poetics of mortality’. This poetic 
configuration can be used in conjunction with broader comparative work to supply us 
with a hermeneutic tool for certain remarkable passages in early Greek literature, 
specifically Iliad 5, where Aphrodite is wounded by Diomedes. 
 Before we come to one of the more matter-of-fact visions of the ‘indispensability’ 
of death to the cosmos, found in the Ugaritic Ba’al Cycle, we will catalogue and 
comment briefly on a few models from early Mediterranean literature that posit death as a 
price for immortality. From Homer, two expressions of this concept stand out, the one in 
part because of its relevance to both Indo-European studies and formulaic analysis, the 
other in part because of its rich reception history: 1) Achilles’ recognition and acceptance 
of his allotment at Il. 9.413 (losing his νόστος is the price of ‘imperishable fame’); and 2) 
the loss of a dove, which Zeus has to replace with a new one, during the acquisition of 
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ambrosia (Od. 12.61-5).93 In the first instance, the only imperishability that is available to 
the heroes of the Iliad emerges through the report of their glorious deeds, and it turns out 
that one pays for the realization of that kleos by facing and succumbing to mortal peril.94 
In the second example, immortality qua immunity to the processes of decay costs life.95 
 We see transactions of this type elsewhere in early Greek poetry; while the 
economy is not explicitly zero-sum, there does appear to be a balancing of ontological 
ledgers. For example, we are told that not only did Tantalus suffer punishment, according 
to Pindar, for stealing ambrosia and nectar from the gods and distributing them to his 
ἅλικες συµπόται (Ol. 1.60–3), but also, his son Pelops, who had received immortality on 
much the same terms as Ganymede (40–5), also suffered by being sent back to be 
“among the swift-fated tribe of men”  (65–6). While this story serves in part to account 
for the tomb of Pelops, which was close to the altar of Zeus at Olympia (93),96 it also 
solidifies Pindar’s epinician poetics, whose value is predicated on the intractable 
economy of immortality and mortality in the cosmos. The gods punish Tantalus, but they 
do not rescind his immortality; instead, in order to account for Tantalus’ unlawful 
distribution of the materials that made him imperishable (οἷσιν ἄφθιτον θῆκαν, 63-4), the 
gods make Pelops θνητός once more. As with Zeus and the ambrosia-fetching doves in 
the Odyssey, the responsibility for maintaining the economy of immortality and mortality 
is diffused. 
                                                
93 See Clay (1983:112–7) for a discussion of the larger poetic context. 
94 To be sure, the Odyssey does not overturn this economy fully, but it does adjust it so that nostos is 
facilitated by kleos, and kleos is preserved by a successful nostos: the kleos Odysseus himself generates and 
sings of among the Phaeacians also teaches the Phaeacians how to be good hosts, namely by not eating him 
and sending him quickly and safely on his way (on which, see Most 1989); presumably, for this same kleos  
to reach Ithaca, Odysseus has to survive, since Poseidon has guaranteed that the Phaeacians will no longer 
have contact with men. 
95 Clay (1983:112–7). 
96 Kirkwood (1982:56 ad loc.). 
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 This economy plays out in conceptions of seasonality, too; the reckoning of time 
itself is predicated on the alternation of life and death, of bloom and decay.97 Deities who 
are associated with seasons, like Persephone and Dionysus, participate in these cycles by 
being subject to violent experiences like forced katabases and sparagmoi. These violent 
experiences impel the accounting of time and define death as something unfailingly 
consequential to life. The regulatory function of the seasons, of cycles, and more broadly 
of the alternation between life and death, even presents itself in some of the smaller 
‘arithmetical’ details of the rape of Persephone. For example, while the Hymn to Demeter 
mentions only that Persephone ate a single pomegranate seed (371–2, 411–2), thereby 
symbolically accepting Hades’ hospitality,98 in later accounts she eats a number of seeds, 
a detail that somehow corresponds to her seasonal sojourn to the Underworld.99 
Persephone and Dionysus, then, by virtue of their associations with the Underworld and 
with the King of the Underworld, underscore the indispensability of death to mortal 
intellectual activity.  
The advent of intellectual activity, of self-awareness, as we saw in the case of 
Adam and Eve, renders unavailable a cosmos that was devoid of death, or, perhaps more 
precisely, devoid of the emotional anxieties and traumas that death naturally generates; 
knowledge of Good and Bad presupposes the experience of their diametric opposition. 
For much of the literature that we have thus far discussed, the broad identifying feature of 
the visions of paradise is timelessness, which is by itself nonsensical to the cognitive 
framework of mortals; limits, peirata, and their apprehensibility by the faculty of 
                                                
97 On lines 124–9 of fr. 204 M-W, I agree with Clay (2003:173), contra West (1961:133), that it does not in 
fact detail the advent of seasonality, which he sees as having been absent from heroes’ lives till then.  
98 Foley (1993:56). 
99 Ovid Met. 5.534ff., Fasti 4.607-8; cf. Foley (1993:56 ad 371–3). 
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discrimination constitute ‘intelligibility’. The limitless only becomes intelligible insofar 
as it constitutes what is beyond the discernible or measurable, as that which does not 
participate in or fails to be discerned by our critical faculties. It is telling that the 
paradisiacal locales in the Greek material and the Hebrew alike are circumscribed; the 
unavailable other requires containment at the outset, and is hardly sustainable thereafter, 
except as part of the cosmic structure. This is proved by how the activities that take place 
in Alcinous’ garden are detailed. Replete with vague, largely deictic (ἔνθα at 114, 122, 
127), topography and activity that must be unceasing, as the pervasive present tense 
suggests, the description reads like an ecphrasis. That the human activity takes place 
without identified subjects maintains the sense of the timeless.100 But what if death (or 
‘Death’) were eradicated from the cosmos, and not just mitigated in specialized 
inaccessible locales? The myths that pose this possibility also give the inevitable 
response: it does not come to fruition. 
For example, at Iliad 5.395, Dione introduces Hades as the third in a trio of gods 
who seemingly suffered gravely at the hands of a mortal, namely Heracles: 
τλῆ δ’ Ἀΐδης ἐν τοῖσι πελώριος ὠκὺν ὀϊστόν, 
εὖτέ µιν ωὑτὸς ἀνήρ, υἱὸς Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο, 
ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι βαλὼν ὀδύνῃσιν ἔδωκεν· 
αὐτὰρ ὃ βῆ πρὸς δῶµα Διὸς καὶ µακρὸν Ὄλυµπον 
κῆρ ἀχέων, ὀδύνῃσι πεπαρµένος, αὐτὰρ ὀϊστός 
ὤµῳ ἔνι στιβαρῷ ἠλήλατο, κῆδε δὲ θυµόν·  400 
τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρµακα πάσσων 
ἠκεσατ’· οὐ µὲν γάρ τι καταθνητός γ’ ἐτέτυκτο.101 
                                                
100 Garvie (1994:189 ad 123-5, cf. 186 ad 112-131) recognizes the scant description of human labor and the 
‘vagueness’ of the subjects, and suggests that the passage (like the description of Ogygia) is to be 
contrasted with the description of Laertes tending his garden, in which nothing—not even ‘leek-beds’—
grows without κοµιδή (24.247). 
101 Koechly (1861) condemned ll. 398-402, and West (1998) brackets them. The text-critical argument 
against their genuineness is relatively weak. Line 401 is identical to 900, but the surrounding lines from 
each passage are different. Contra Leaf (1900:222 ad loc.) and Macurdy (1912:251), I do not think these 
lines smack of violent interpolation. Leaf’s analysis rests in part on a misunderstanding of how σχέτλιος 




Among them (i.e. the other gods who had been wounded) monstrous 
Hades suffered a swift arrow, when that same man, the son of aegis-
bearing Zeus, shot him in Pylos among the corpses and gave him over 
to pains. And Hades went to the palace of Zeus and tall Olympus 
grieving in his heart, pierced with pains; the shaft had been driven into 
his weighty shoulder, and it distressed his spirit. But Paieon spread 
painkilling drugs on the wound and cured him. For Hades was in 
nowise mortal. 
 
The passage is strange, but this strangeness accords with the considerable peculiarity of 
the broader context.102 Importantly, the son of Zeus, Heracles, wounds the ruler of the 
dead; although Hades is distinct from Thanatos in Homer, Fontenrose has argued 
persuasively that this episode exemplifies a set of myths in which Heracles fights Death; 
Hades and Thanatos are isomorphic.103 Besides the difficulty that some critics have had 
in identifying the exact nature of the reference to Pylos,104 it is convincingly pointed out 
that Pylos is the gate (pylê) to the underworld.105 
 Despite being given over to pains, however, Hades does not succumb to them; 
Paieon himself ‘kills’ his agony and cures him.106 The most surprising detail of the 
episode, that Hades makes his way to Olympus, has largely gone without remark.107 I 
propose that Dione (and therefore the poet) intends to indicate that the wounding of 
                                                                                                                                            
like νήπιος does at 406; if we read a relative clause (ὅς οὐκ κτλ.) following αἰσυλοεργός (or ὀβριµοεργός, 
as Leaf prefers), it functions rather as a predicate nominative; West’s (1998) reading ὅ τ’ (following 
Aristarchus) still allows for the same syntactic analysis, namely that the pair of nominatives that begin 403, 
rather than being exclamatory and retrospective, is predicative and hypertactic to the following clause. The 
exclamatory nominative, as at 406, may be syntactically isolated from the surrounding syntax, but one 
could make an argument for parataxis (οὐδὲ κτλ.). Heracles may be the exemplum of this type of 
wickedness, but Dione is making a general statement about any mortal who feels no compunction about 
attacking gods, and this statement sets up her specific forecast for Diomedes. Thus, σχέτλιος does not 
appear to be terribly disjoined from its referent. 
102 We will discuss some of these strange features in Chapter 3 in connection with Aphrodite’s wounding, 
the event that precipitated Dione’s muthos here. 
103 1959:323–7. 
104 See Kirk (1990:101–2 ad 396–7). 
105 Fontenrose (1959:327–30) and Janko (1986:56). 
106 See Watkins (1995:395–6). 




Hades generated even more cosmological alarm than did the wounding of Hera or the 
near-death experience of Ares. By virtue of Hades’ being permitted to mount Olympus 
and his being treated by their chief of medicine, the Iliad, which insists upon the 
distinction between mortals and immortals at the same time that it tests that distinction, 
reaffirms not only the inescapability from but also the necessity of death within its 
cosmos. As Agamemnon notes, Hades is ἀδάµαστος (Il. 9.158). 
 In similar fashion Mot in the Ba’al Cycle is incapable of being subdued, although 
this quality is put to the test by Anat, and not by a mortal.108 Watson argues that Text 6, 
column II, of the Ba’al-texts from Ugarit,109 detailing Anat’s confrontation with and 
sound defeat of Mot, the god of death and enemy to fecundity, does not in fact represent 
some fertility rite wherein Mot is connected with the fruits of the field, nor does it 
symbolize the desacralization of grain; rather, it quite straightforwardly describes Anat’s 
annihilation of Mot for his killing of Ba’al.110 The text, as Watson renders it, proceeds as 
follows: 
She seized divine Mot: 
With a sword she split him; 
With a pitchfork she winnowed him, 
With fire she burned him, 
With millstones she ground him, 
In the field she scattered him. 
His fragments the birds did eat, 
His portions the fowl did finish, 
                                                
108 See also the motivic analysis of Fontenrose (1959:13–7), where he connects the Ba’al-Mot (and Ba’al-
Yam) episodes with the Typhonomachy and its Greek congeners. 
109 He refers specifically to the Corpus des tablettes cunéiformes alphabétiques (Herdner 1963). This 
collection is generally referred to by the German abbreviation KTU (Keilalphabetische Texte aus Ugarit); 
the English abbreviation, also cited with some frequency, is CAT (Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts). The 
numbering of the texts is obviously uniform across languages. Because I will uniformly cite Hittite texts by 
the German abbreviation of their publications (KBo, e.g.), I will use KTU here. 




Piece by piece.111 
 
 Watson concludes that “it is only by actualizing a curse upon [Mot] that Anat may 
counteract his malevolence and make possible the subsequent restoration of fertility on 
the earth. In order for Life to return to Ugarit, Death must die.”112 Regardless of whether 
one is convinced of the conclusions that Watson reaches by way of his lexical analysis of 
the passage,113 which leads him to rule out the notion that Mot is being connected with 
fertility rites or grain in any way whatsoever, the cosmological symbolism attached to the 
myth remains. Death transgresses his boundaries to hunt and consume Life.114 By smiting 
Mot, Anat restores it. 
 In KTU 1.6, Ba’al is reanimated and re-ascends the throne of heaven. Soon, 
however, Mot recovers, too, and Ba’al and Mot fight like animals till exhaustion. El, who 
formerly appeared partial to Mot, finally indicates that he has withdrawn his support, and 
Mot recognizes the sovereignty of Ba’al. Although Mot is circumscribed, what becomes 
apparent, especially in KTU 1.3-4, where Ba’al calls on the gods to recognize his 
sovereignty, and Mot refuses, is that Death remains outside the purview of the heavenly, 
‘bio-centric’ realm; although he eventually recognizes Ba’al’s sovereignty there, 
something he was unwilling to do before, he remains in the underworld as the 
                                                
111 Watson (1972:61). The translation is Watson’s. On the analogy of the Homeric image of men becoming 
the ‘prey’ and/or ‘plaything’ of the birds (and dogs) (Il. 1.4, Od. 3.271), I am disinclined to accept that the 
image of Mot’s dismembering and scattering has much to do with harvesting per se, but it does lend itself 
rather easily to an allegorical reading. 
112 Watson (1972:64). 
113 Cf. the response to Cassuto by Kapelrud (1963), who anticipates in some ways Watson’s objections, too. 
114Gordon (1955, apud Cassuto) translated the relevant passage thus: “I did hunt Aliyan Ba’al, / I made him 
like a lamb in my mouth, / like a kid in my gullet”. According to KTU 1.5 Ba’al descends to the 
underworld and subjects himself to the torpor of the dead, but it does not appear that he has a choice in the 
matter. The body that is found at the edges of the earth is a ritual substitute, and appears to serve as 
evidence to the other gods of Ba’al’s demise. 
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inescapable antithesis to Ba’al. This episode demonstrates “something that everyone 
knew: even the god of life must share the universe with death.”115
                                                






Chapter 2. Divine trauma, identity theft and the poetics of ἀκοσµία 
2.1/ Introduction: From assimilation to obliteration 
In Chapter 1, we confronted the problems that arise when early generations of 
humans seem too similar to gods in early Mediterranean anthropogonic myth. One main 
issue is that narrative itself gets stunted—what can the golden men do, other than be 
blissful beneficiaries of goods that do not fail, without failing to be golden? Furthermore, 
if the golden men live like gods and die gently, can they be expected to see themselves as 
different from the gods? Or, even if they recognize this difference, does it carry any 
emotional weight for them? Why it matters how they think of the gods and their own 
mortality is indicated by the silver race’s explicit failures of piety: the silver race is 
impious, but the golden men might be pre-religious; in Genesis, Cain and Abel perform 
the first sacrifices, the worse and the better, but their parents, while in the Garden, don’t 
seem to have religion, unless we consider maintenance of the Garden itself a religious 
duty. I do not think we should, since Adam, like the golden men, probably performs his 
work free from anxiety about its efficacy. In other words, either we try to accept that 
work can be stripped of the notion of effort, or the golden men and Adam do not really do 
anything. Thus, proto-man’s paradise does not admit narrative, and the introduction into 
that world of activity, like work, ends up being either nonsensical or disruptive. 
This problem—the need to get past this fantasy in order to describe the world as it 
really is, replete with suffering, internecine strife, and sickness—requires solution, and 
 
 56 
the solution, like the problem, involves both narrative action and individual linguistic 
items and complexes of these items, what we might call poetics. In the end men get 
separated from gods, and the cosmic structure becomes stable again; das ganz Andere 
reasserts itself. Mortals116 must, by definition, die; but they must also self-identify as 
subject to mors. Fantasies about a cosmos in which the opposite would be true must 
always be measured and counterbalanced. If they are not, then the phenomenological 
cosmos of the present becomes nonsensical, since it remains recognizable and 
communicable in both literary and nonliterary speech through linguistic sêmata, 
complexes of sêmata, and oppositions among sêmata, all of which serve to parse degrees 
of difference and similarity, affinity and disjuncture: if the denotation of a sign (e.g. 
mortal/mortality) is predicated on an action (e.g., dying), and that action is obviated or 
remains unrecognized, then the sign fails.117  
In the last chapter, I dealt with the products of the tension between mortal 
yearning and a certain obsession with maintaining the fixity of the cosmos; the obsession 
is probably born of man’s tragic awareness of his mortality. In this chapter, I examine a 
different, though related, peril that the cosmos faces: its structures are in danger of being 
‘obliterated’ when a malevolent and multiform or shapeshifting agent encroaches upon 
the signifier(s) of benevolent cosmic entities. Perhaps these particular myths emerge from 
a recognition of an external disorder, the sometimes unexpected and difficult occurrences 
                                                
116 Like Latin mortales “those liable to mors,” Greek refers to humans as thnȇtoi “those liable to thanatos.” 
More precisely, it seems that both mortales and thnêtoi are dead. See de Vaan (2014) sub ‘morior’. 
117 There may be a worthwhile distinction to be made here: on the one hand, mortality still means 
something to us and to the poet, even if he imagines men as able to overcome death (or ignorant of it) or as 
living like gods, but the category suffers a set of novel contingencies; on the other hand, the golden men 
might not ever involve such a category in their own daily discourse. 
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within the topocosm,118 as well as the alternating seasonal, though probably more so the 
unseasonable, processes of array and disarray, efflorescence and decay. 
With that in mind I turn my focus temporarily from issues of theomorphization to 
a particular motif and particular poetic apparatus that point to the engagement with, 
disruption, and (sometimes) the reassertion of cosmic stability, particularly through the 
mythical personae that in many ways underpin the cosmic structure by virtue of the 
stability of their identities. By ‘identity’ I mean one’s scope of influence, one’s 
appearance and accoutrement, and certainly one’s name within the Kunstsprache. When 
the persona to whom a certain identity belongs comes under attack, the identity itself is 
subject to theft, with an array of consequences for the mythical persona as well as his 
environment. Identity theft, then, as well as the relationship of that theft to akosmia in 
ancient Mediterranean myth, is the subject of this chapter.  
The instances of identity theft that most interest me take place on the level of the 
word, the phrase, the formula; identity theft, as I see it, constitutes a linguistic and poetic 
offense in the Mediterranean koinȇ, and thus requires linguistic and poetic remedy. In 
certain cases, these linguistic offenses and remedies are accompanied by imagistic and 




                                                
118 Gaster (1961:24) defines the topocosm as “not merely the human community of a given area or locality 
but the total corporate unit of all elements, animate and inanimate alike, which together constitute its 
distinctive character and ‘atmosphere.’” 
119 Here I delineate motif from motifeme by level of specificity. If the motif is ‘identity theft’ in the larger 
context of cosmic struggle, the ‘motifeme’ could be the ‘disfigurement’ that enables the identity theft or 
even the weapon that is used in the disfigurement. 
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2.2 / Serpents as architects of identity theft 
 The most salient examples of this type of identity theft appear in a broadly 
represented myth that will be familiar to most students of ancient literature: the battle 
between the hero-god and the serpent, what we will call the dracontomachy.120 In these 
myths, with some variation but with considerable—and fortunate—continuity, a fearsome 
serpent or creature with serpentine features threatens the sovereignty of the ruling god, in 
many cases a storm deity, and the storm deity must defeat this serpent to maintain his rule 
and preserve the intelligibility of the cosmos,121 no less than its proper balance of 
mortification and reinvigoration;122 in the event that the storm deity were to be defeated 
for good, it seems that the mortification of the topocosm would not be counteracted.123 
There are examples of the cosmic serpent, as well as the dracontomachy, in Indo-
European and Near Eastern sources alike.124  
In Greek materials, Zeus’ battle with the snaky monster known as Typhon or 
Typhoeus or Typhaon125 insinuated itself into the imagination of Greek poets and 
                                                
120 This neologism is not ancient, like Titanomachia, which is attested as a title of an epic poem often 
ascribed to Eumelos (see West 2002), nor does it seem to be attested in scholarship, like Typhonomachy 
(e.g. in West 1966, Too 1998, and Goslin 2010). 
121 The most comprehensive study of this type of myth, and an indispensable foundation to motivic analysis 
of many important Greek and Near Eastern myths, is that of Fontenrose (1959). More recently, Watkins 
(1995) examined the Indo-European dracontomachies in particular. 
122 Gaster (1950 [1961]) provides a useful introduction to seasonal rituals and their literary and creative 
outcomes in myth, but he overestimates the applicability of seasonal cycles in the case of Telepinu and 
similar myths in the Near East; as Gordon (1949:4) notes, the Levant, for example, is not subject to extreme 
seasonal variation, but it is victim at times to drought. The vanishing god myth, therefore, is principally 
about the unexpected and devastating issues of the natural world. 
123 Interestingly, the utter defeat of the storm deity is always found to be close at hand, but never fulfilled. 
In Greek, as we will see this assumes the shape of a counterfactual statement. Interesting work has been 
done in recent years on counterfactuals in epic narrative. We will discuss that modality when we come to it. 
124 We maintain that these are not mutually exclusive categories as regards mythic material, but for 
convenience’s sake, we will sometimes refer to them to indicate virtual linguistic identity, although that 
categorization is not without problems. 
125 On the variety of Typhoeus’ names, Jay Fisher (2009:2) quips that “[l]ike the abnormal and indefinite 
shape of the monster himself, the name [of the monster] lacks a definite shape.” Illuyanka’s name, it turns 
out, has interesting variety, too, on which see Katz (1998). There may also be some wordplay going on 
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mythographers from the 8th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D.: Homer alludes only 
briefly to the fight, but Hesiod gives us considerable detail about both his polyphony and 
the battle itself; Pindar, in his first Pythian victory ode, for Hieron of Aetna, also known 
as Hieron of Syracuse, for the chariot race, deploys a mythic aition for the Sicilian 
volcano, the “pillar of heaven” that unfailingly restrains the monster, who occasionally 
“sends up the most terrible jets of Hephaestus”; a 2nd century A.D. mythographer, whom 
we will call Apollodorus, has it that Zeus is temporarily defeated and mutilated—Typhon 
severs Zeus’ sinews with a sickle, perhaps the same one with which Zeus’ father, Cronus, 
castrated Zeus’ grandfather, Uranus. I pass over the Prometheus Bound and the Seven 
Against Thebes and Pausanias and Rome altogether: both Virgil and Ovid mention 
Typhon. At least part of the reason why these poets and mythographers were so 
fascinated by Typhon must have been the same reason why students of comparative myth 
continue to be: Typhon closely resembles θεῶν πολέµιοι, as Pindar would have called 
them, from the Near East. The Hebrew Bible may have several: besides Yam and 
Leviathan, the serpent in Genesis may embody this motif. He certainly does threaten the 
sovereignty of the divine, as we discussed in Chapter 1. In Anatolia, we encounter 
Illuyanka and Hedammu; in Mesopotamia, we see Tiamat. Some other monsters who 
have no obvious snaky features are pertinent. Scholars have done well to point out the 
typological affinities of Typhon with these Near Eastern monsters, but one major deficit 
in the discussion has been the failure to explore his connection with Anzu, the 
Babylonian “thief of the Tablets of Destiny”. 
                                                                                                                                            
with the dragon’s name and the ‘blindness’ or ‘darkness’. Recall that Illuyanka steals the Storm-god’s eyes, 
and Ullikummi was blind. 
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Although scholars have adumbrated some of the similarities between the battle 
narrative in the Anzu myth and that in Hesiod, I argue that the connections between 
Anzu’s story and Typhon’s in general, but especially the version in Nonnus, run much 
deeper than has been previously considered. By the end of this, perhaps we will be able to 
imagine a model of cross-linguistic sharing of mythic and linguistic data that involves 
much more than a superficial reckoning of lexical items and broad narrative sequences: in 
fact, verbal artistry itself, especially etymological play, seems to have been every bit as 
salient a feature as the larger narrative structures and themes. The function of this 
etymological and other grammatical play within the individual myths was indispensable 
to the large-scale narrative of these myths throughout the Mediterranean, and this 
indispensability is in part responsible for the relative isomorphism of these myths in spite 
of the huge geographic and chronological distances among them. We have something, 
then, like a Mediterranean poetic—perhaps a metapoetic—koinê lasting maybe two-and-
a-half millennia. 
We should bear in mind here that these myths about cosmic monsters do not 
disengage entirely from the mortal–immortal issue that occupied the first chapter. For 
example, both versions of the myth of Illuyanka involve in rather poignant terms the 
tragedy of a mortal helper who comes too near to the gods in the course of aiding them.126 
We can begin to conclude that mortals in the Mediterranean mythological mind both 
                                                
126 See Beckman (1982:25). In the first version, a mortal, Hupasiya, agrees to help the goddess Inara bind 
the snake if she sleeps with him; she complies but shuts him up in a house and instructs him not to look out 
the window, lest he want to go home. As he does, the text becomes badly broken, but it is likely that he 
comes to some bad end. In the second version, the Storm-god’s son is directed to marry into the Snake’s 
family and ask for the Storm-god’s eyes and heart back. When he sees that his father means to kill the 
snake, he demands that he be killed along with him.  
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upset and preserve the divine, often simultaneously; as we will see in Chapter 3, 
Diomedes clarifies the divine in the course of disrupting it. 
 
2.3 / Anzu and Illuyanka become Storm-gods: An introduction to the etymological attack 
At the beginning of the Standard Babylonian version of Anzu, after Enlil, the chief 
of the gods, assigned the commissions of all of the gods (I.61), he “entrusted Anzu to the 
entrance of the shrine” that contained the ṭuppi šīmāti (DUB NAM.MEŠ), the “tablets of 
destiny” (I.64).127 Anzu quickly grew covetous of Enlil’s position. The text does not give 
us this emotional detail outright, but Anzu focalizes Enlil’s resplendent deeds and garb 
(I.66-7), and then “decides” to steal divine supremacy. The Akkadian for “divine 
supremacy” translates literally to “Enlil-ness”. As Brisch notes, the prologue to 
Hammurabi tells us how Anu and Enlil decided that Marduk should have this Enlil-
ship.128 So while Enlil bathes, Anzu takes the Tablets of Destiny (I.79-81), and now 
wields ellilūtu (I.82): he has become Enlil in the capacity of supreme ruler of the cosmos.  
 What happens to Enlil confirms this assessment: šuḫarrur dEN.LIL₂ (“Enlil was 
deathly still”). And he remains defunct, and silent, until Ninurta vanquishes Anzu and 
reclaims the Tablets of Destiny (III.20-1). Only then does Enlil open his mouth.129 
Furthermore, the sacred shrine of Enlil is “stripped of its awe-inspiring radiance” (I.86). 
Because of Enlil’s onomastic association with the heavenly mountain, Duranki, of which 
                                                
127 The transliterated text is that of Amar Annus (2001). This text and translation, which I modify at times, 
are to be accessed here: http://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/cams/anzu/corpus.  
128 2013 (ORACC). 
129 cf. Inanna’s temporary mortification in the Descent of Inanna in general, but also the repeated injunction 
against her “opening her mouth against the rites of the underworld.” (from ETCSL translation) 
 
 62 
the shrine is the central part, as well as the description elsewhere of Iškur/Adad,130 
another Storm-god who later gets syncretized with Teššub/Tarḫun, as namurru (“of 
awesome radiance”),131 we may understand that Enlil himself has ceased to be 
awesomely radiant and thereby deprived the shrine of its radiance; however, whether this 
particular radiance is owing to divinity in general, as with the Greek gods, or to a 
particularly stormy radiance is unclear, although a detail from later in the narrative 
suggests the latter. 
 In addition to Enlil’s becoming defunct, Anzu, whose name does not speak to his 
being stormy, appears have assimilated Enlil’s capacity for storminess, although the 
identity of Enlil as a Storm-god is oddly contentious. I find the arguments against 
understanding EN.LÍL as a “Lord of the Storm” as an extension of “Lord of the Wind” 
slightly specious:132 Enlil might not storm everywhere he shows up, but neither does Zeus 
nor Teshub for that matter. I do think, contra Stone,133 that Enlil’s “blowing an evil 
storm” in The lament for Sumer and Urim shows more than just “apposite imagery for… 
a powerful, devastating god”; he is fulfilling a specifically stormy role of his alongside a 
host of other gods who are also bringing destruction in their own ways, e.g. Enki’s 
blocking the river waters and Utu’s neglect of equity and justice. In any case, when 
Ninurta eventually comes to face off against Anzu, the hero is markedly stormy (II.28-
34): 
The hero heard the utterance of his mother. 
He writhed, he became furious, and he went off to his mountain. 
My lord seized the seven battles. 
                                                
130 Stevens 2013 (ORACC). 
131 CAD, s.v. namurru. 
132 See Jacobson (1989). 
133 2013 (ORACC). 
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The hero seized the seven destructive winds,  
the stirrer-up of dust, the seven dust storms. 
He launched a ferocious war, he initiated battle. 
The gale attended at his side for the battle. 
 
Anzu responds with some storminess of his own (II.36-7): 
 
Anzu saw him and became furious with him. 
He ground his teeth like a storm demon, and he covered the 
mountain with his fearsome radiance. 
 
The word here for fearsome radiance, melammu, is effectively synonymous with namurru 
in I.86: the two are even paired in a description of Ishtar.134 Furthermore, in Lugal-e I 1, 
melammu is used of Ninurta, specifically in the capacity of the storm!135 So although 
melammu is used of divine radiance in general, I argue that a more precise valence is in 
play here. 
Although the dramatis personae are fewer in the Hittite myths of Illuyanka, and 
the narrative is considerably more minimalist in general than in Anzu, we see the same 
basic narrative structure: the usurper, here a snake, defeats the Storm-god and 
incapacitates him, before a human agent helps the god kill the villain. Given the 
minimalism, it is striking that the Hittite myth involves the same type of wordplay in the 
defeat of the Storm-god. This defeat assumes flesh, as it were, in the Serpent’s theft of 
the Storm-god’s heart and eyes: 
The Serpent overcame (tarḫta) the Storm-god and took (dāš) [his heart and eyes].136 
I propose the following summary analysis: first, the motifeme represents the temporary 
defeat of the hero and his resultant disfigurement, if we are thinking in Propp’s terms, 
                                                
134 CAD s.v. melammu. 
135 CAD s.v. melammu. 
136 KBo III 7 iii.3′–4′ per Beckman (1982). I translate tarḫ- ‘overcome’ (rather than ‘defeat’ as Beckman) 
because it recognizes not just the outcome of the battle but the potentially shifting power hierarchy. The 
directionality of the semantics will be of use later. The ‘heart and eyes’ as the object of ‘took’ is easily 
supplied from the ensuing instruction of the Storm-god to his son. 
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which causes ‘real or potential loss of status or power’;137 moreover, it threatens to 
reintroduce the processes of the violent usurpation of heaven138 and to confound the 
ability of language to structure and engage the cosmos, as we shall see. The latter threat, 
not fully separable from the first, poses startling epistemological consequences for the 
myth’s audience. As scholars have long noted,139 “the dragon symbolizes Chaos, in the 
largest sense, and killing the dragon represents the ultimate victory of Cosmic Truth and 
Order over Chaos.”140 The Truth and Order of the Cosmos is threatened when the Storm-
god is at first overcome, because, in semiotic terms, the verum factum that the Storm-god 
is preeminent is unsettled and the signifiant of his everlastingness as King of Heaven 
changes hands. 
If, as Watkins cleverly noticed, we read out the Storm-god’s Hittite name, which 
is hidden beneath the shorthand Sumerogram dIM-an, we pronounce a clever and 
troubling etymological figure, Illuyankaš Tarḫunnan (or Tarḫuntan) tarḫta. The Serpent 
of Chaos (Illuyankaš) has overcome (tarḫta) the Overcomer (Tarḫuntan).141 We should 
compare the death of the minor character Iliadic character, Damasus (“The Subduer”), at 
Il.12.183–6 (δουρὶ βάλεν Δάµασον… δάµασσε δέ µιν µεµαῶτα); Louden, in his remarks 
on this figure, points out that Damasus’ name “exists solely for the sake of wordplay.”142  
But in the myth of Illuyanka the etymological figure accomplishes more than a coy poetic 
                                                
137 Watkins (1995:443). 
138 For example, those seen in the Song of Kumarbi; cf. also the Hittite version of the Hurrian Song of 
Ullikummi, text by Güterbock (1951, 1952), where the Stone usurper temporarily causes the Storm-god to 
abdicate. Many have noted the similarities between the Song of Ullikummi (the entire Kumarbi Cycle, 
really) and Hesiod’s Theogony. West (1966), Bernabé (2000), and López-Ruiz (2010) are a few of the more 
recent ones. 
139 Watkins (1995:299), who follows Fontenrose, Ivanov, and Toporov.  
140 Watkins (1995:299). 
141 Watkins (1995:324, 343 inter al.).  
142 Louden (1995:29). 
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flourish. It enacts a semiological violation of the Storm-god, which is then vivified by his 
mutilation:143 because of the verb’s particular semantics and the effectively agentive 
nature of the Storm-god’s cognate name, one could say that Illuyanka has become 
Tarḫun, and the Storm-god—like poor Damasus—now both having failed to live up to 
and having lost his namesake, also can no longer be expected to do the sorts of things the 
Storm-god used to do, like provide life-giving rain.144 As it stands, the Babylonian myth 
does not seem to stress the problems of etymology, and the Hittite material is scant on 
detail, so we must look elsewhere for explicit recognition of the threats that etymology 
poses.145 
 
2.4 / Ishmael’s crime: The power of names in Genesis 
An episode from the first book of the Hebrew Bible lends force to our 
interpretation of the Hittite myth. Despite the fact that no snakes are involved in 
Ishmael’s perceived crime and subsequent expulsion, the episode is germane to the 
dracontomachies that we are investigating because it involves succession myth; in 
morphological terms Ishmael turns out to be a ‘usurper’ or, to be more precise, a 
‘pretender’. More importantly, Ishmael’s action is entirely borne out by an etymological 
figure, owing to the characteristic minimalism of the Bible. Furthermore, depending on 
                                                
143 Watkins (1995). Chapters 7–10 discuss the verbal art of Greek, Vedic, Irish, and Latin, including 
exempla of figurae. 
144 Zeus in Nonnus’ Dionysiaca, treated below, recognizes raining as one his main functions while 
commenting pointedly on what the ultimate success of Typhoeus/Typhon would mean. 
145 Beckman (per litt.) has cautioned that it is impossible to know how salient such etymological figures 
would have been to the average hearer or reader of this text, but I insist that 1) there is no dearth of 
evidence of marked etymological figures from the ancient Mediterranean, which explicitly call attention to 
themselves, and 2) it is beside the point whether everyone would have heard this figura and ascribed the 
same meaning to it that I do, since the poetic phenomenon remains across languages. The question of 
consciousness, while important to think about, seems to have no bearing on what I am treating as part of the 
deep structures of these types of myths. It must certainly have been shifting. 
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the original text, the figure may have been syntactically identical to the figure in the myth 
of Illuyanka: the usurper performs an action cognate with the name of the object and 
victim—and threatens the proliferation of the line of Abraham and Sarah right at the start.  
At Genesis 21:9–10, Sarah observes Ishmael, Abraham’s son by Hagar the 
Egyptian, performing an action somehow related to ‘laughing’, although it is sometimes 
loosely translated ‘playing’ or faultily interpreted as ‘mocking’.146 Sarah reacts by 
demanding that Abraham cast Ishmael and Hagar out and insists, “No son of that slave is 
going to share inheritance with my son Isaac!”147 The reaction of Sarah would by all 
accounts looks like a non sequitur, if there were not more to Ishmael’s action.  
As it turns out, Ishmael’s ‘laughing’ involves a pun; this is not in and of itself 
surprising, since the OT is famous for lexical play. This particular pun, however, is 
loaded. Ishmael’s action, expressed by the Hebrew participle metsahek, is cognate with 
Isaac’s name, yitshak (‘s/he will laugh’). As Alter suggests, one could say that Sarah has 
observed Ishmael ‘Isaac’-ing.148 That metsahek ends verse 9, while Isaac’s name ends 
verse 8, confirms the connection. Sarah feels that Ishmael is infringing upon Isaac’s 
identity,149 and she fears lest Ishmael thereby displace Isaac from his role in the 
patriarchy of Israel and overturn the promissory covenant between God and Sarah that 
was articulated at 17:15–22.150  
                                                
146 See n. 35. 
147 26:10 
148 1996:98 ad 21:9. 
149 This reading is supported by Sarah’s exclamation at 21:10: “No son of that slave is going to share 
inheritance with my son Isaac.” 
150 See Alter (1996:98) for a brief summary of the interpretive history.  
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So while the traditional translation “mocking” may not be apt on linguistic 
grounds,151 a linguistic analysis still demonstrates that Ishmael has transgressed; that the 
participle is in the Piel form, which often has intensifying force, may indicate that the 
transgression is a violent one.152 Moreover, if the original text, i.e. the Vorlager to LXX, 
actually did modify the participial phrase metsahek with min yitshak “with her son Isaac,” 
which is absent from the Masoretic Text (MT) “perhaps through haplography,”153 then 
we have a comparandum that comes even closer to the etymologically mediated identity 
theft that we see in the myth of Illuyanka. If only temporarily, as the Serpent becomes the 
Storm-god, so Ishmael becomes Isaac.154  
Interestingly, for Isaac’s progeny, a play on Jacob’s name presupposes his 
usurpation of Esau’s birthright and blessing (27:36): “[Esau] replied, ‘Did they name him 
Jacob (yʻqb) so that he should cheat (wyʻqbyny) me twice? First he took away my 
birthright, and now he has gotten away with my blessing! Haven’t you saved a blessing 
for me?’ he pleaded.” Speiser notes that the verb ‘cheat’ literally means ‘be at my 
heel’.155  In this case, identity theft validates the line of Jacob rather than threatens it. As 
with Isaac and Ishmael, the covenant with the mother, implicit in the detail at 25:28 that 
Rebekah was fonder of Jacob than of Esau, is preserved. A fuller study of Biblical 
material might reveal more such parallels, but for now we have more dragons—and 
enabling mothers—to deal with. 
                                                
151 So Speiser (1964:155 ad 21:9); while “mocking” may be a fitting translation for the intensive form of 
the verb (the Piel), the absence of the preposition b- argues against it. 
152 Pratico and van Pelt (2009:§26.2). 
153 Speiser (1964:155 ad 21:9). 
154 An interesting development of the pun in chapter 21 is to be found at 28:8, where Abimelech sees Isaac 
metsahek with Rebekah, though Isaac had said she was his sister. Isaac fulfills his namesake, even if only 
narrowly, and through this act he is able to sojourn in Gerar, and Abimelech recognizes his greatness. 
155 1964:207 ad loc. 
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2.5 / From etymology to image and formula: Hesiodic Typhon 
Greek material certainly knows of a myth in which a dragon who attempts 
identity theft occupies a central role: the Typhonomachy. It details Zeus’ combat against 
the Earth-born dracontic monster known as Typhoeus, Typhon, or Typhaon. Several 
versions of this myth survived antiquity, and we will consider them before we can 
determine just how the ‘identity theft’ motif was deployed. The various accounts of 
Typhoeus and his fight with Zeus bear striking resemblances to Illuyanka and his 
struggles with the Storm-god of Nerik.156  
The oldest Greek exemplar of this myth was composed by Hesiod, although 
Homer, too, alludes briefly to the Typhonomachy (Il. 2.781–3). In Hesiod’s account, after 
Zeus drives the Titans from heaven, Gaia and Tartarus procreate Typhoeus, a frightful 
snaky beast and an elemental nightmare. At this point in the poem, Hesiod has already 
told us that Typhaon [sic] is said to have slept with the “baneful Echidna” (306–7); the 
Echidna, as we noted in Chapter 1, was confined to a hollow cave because her hybridity 
required that she be situated outside the world of men and gods (302). Thus, long before 
the Typhonomachy takes place, we know that Typhoeus will be some sort of cosmic 
abomination.  
But Typhoeus proves to be more dangerous than a simple hybrid: he is a 
shapeshifter.157 At 825 Hesiod describes him as having a “hundred heads of a snake, a 
terrible serpent” (ἦν ἑκατὸν κεφαλαὶ ὄφιος δεινοῖο δράκοντος). One wonders whether 
                                                
156 Fontenrose (1959) discusses a number of the motivic resemblances that these myths share on both 
Thompson’s index and his own supplementary one. My discussion, like Goslin’s (2010), is interested in the 
narrative and poetic result of some of these results. Unlike Goslin, I focus on the poetic-linguistic apparatus 
that the various author-redactors use to indicate that the instability of identity is a semiotic problem. 
157 West (1966:386 ad 831–5). 
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Hesiod’s calling Typhon an ophis-drakōn could be a calque on Illuyanka, which Jay Katz 
argues is a compound of the IE ‘snake’ and ‘eel’ words and with which he compares 
Latin anguīlla.158 Furthermore, at 826 the heads are said to be “licking with murky 
tongues” (γλώσσῃσι δνοφερῇσι λελιχµότες), while at 826–7, his eyes are said to “sparkle 
fire” (ὄσσε… πῦρ ἀµάρυσσεν). This juxtaposition of Typhon’s fearsome radiance and his 
darkening apparatus recalls Anzu, who, as we saw above, both darkened the sanctum of 
Enlil and shed radiance on the mountain to which he absconded with the kingship (II.36–
7); furthermore, after Ninurta answers Anzu’s question about who the hero-god is (II.44–
7, see below §2.7), “darkness was established and the face of the mountain was covered 
as the sun, the light of the gods, grew dark” (II.50–1).  
But Hesiod’s Typhon is also polyphonic. He sequentially (ἄλλοτε µὲν... ἄλλοτε δ’ 
αὖτε) emits a number of different voices (bull, lion, dog, serpent).159 Of particular import 
here is the description of his first φωνή “voice” (830–1): ἄλλοτε µὲν γὰρ / φθέγγονθ’ ὥς 
τε θεοῖσι συνιέµεν... (“At one time [the heads] gave voice as if for the gods to understand 
it”). Although he is making the same kind of noise as the human larynx (φθόγγος), the 
language he speaks is “of course that of the gods.”160 It is specifically the primary 
emission of this voice that anticipates an attempt on Olympus: Typhoeus is a god who 
                                                
158 Katz (1998), but see de Vaan (2011) s. ‘anguīlla’. Richard Janko per litt. reminds me that ὄφις is 
cognate with anguis. 
159 As regards Typhon’s polyphony, Too (1998) and Goslin (2010) discuss these thematic elements with 
great sensitivity, although Too’s project at large suffers from a number of problems, some rather grave, as 
Halliwell’s review (2001) details. 
160 West (1966:387 ad 831). Also, as Goslin (2010: 356) tells us, citing Collins (1999), “only when the 
Muses convert their divine ossa into audē are they able to communicate their knowledge to Hesiod.” 
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knows and can use the gods’ language. During (perhaps in spite of) his more bestial 
soundings he displays Zeus-like elements in particular.161 
For example, the second voice that Typhoeus emits signals his infringement upon 
Zeus’ identity and province: ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε / ταύρου ἐριβρύχεω µένος ἀσχέτου ὄσσαν 
ἀγαύρου (831–2) “again at another time / [the heads sound] the voice of a loud-bellowing 
bull, unrestrained in fighting spirit, proud.” Though the line is syntactically somewhat 
awkward, the identity of the animal and the direct object of φθέγγον[ται] “they emit as 
sound” (831) can stand comment: the bull (especially a stately one) has connections with 
the Storm-god in the Near East and among the Hittites, as well as with Zeus; thus, in 
Nonnus’ version of the Typhonomachy, Zeus, after asking Cadmus for help and 
instructing him, turns into a bull and flees the scene (Dionys. I. 408–9). Although one 
may object that these lines merely catalogue a series of noisy, potentially fearful animals 
in the poet’s mind, the lexeme ὄσσα for “voice” must be marked, since it recalls that very 
voice of the Muses in the hymn that Hesiod sings to them at the beginning of the poem 
(10, 43, 65);162 I would add that in the Homeric world ὄσσα denotes both “rumor”, which 
Zeus dispatches, as well as his personified messenger (Ὄσσα).163 Thus Typhoeus has 
taken the Zeus-issued report and made it bestial. 
The next indication that Typhoeus threatens to break into Zeus’ domain and usurp 
his dominion also bears the closest ‘poetic’ resemblance to the etymological play that we 
observed in the Hittite and the Hebrew. Following the description of Typhoeus, Hesiod 
                                                
161 Too (1998:20) interprets Typhoeus as offering a “simulacrum of the divine”, while Goslin (2010:353) 
focuses on the disorderly nature of Typhoeus’ vocality. It is clear, though, that the two interpretations are to 
be taken as coordinate threats: on the Storm-god, King of Heaven, AND on the order that has emerged 
from Chaos. As it stands, the two are mutually codependent.  
162 Collins (1999), Goslin (2010). 




introduces the battle with a past counterfactual statement at 837-8: καί κεν ὅ γε θνητοῖσι 
καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἄναξεν, / εἰ µὴ ἄρ’ ὀξὺ νόησε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (“And 
[Typhoeus] would have lorded over mortals and immortals, had not the father of men and 
gods sharply noticed.”). This couplet involves two formulae and a syntactic pattern that 
will be quite familiar to the reader of archaic epic. The syntactic pattern, which comprises 
both lines, is a standard Homeric counterfactual in which the non-fulfillment of the non-
action of the protasis (“if X had not done Y [but s/he did]”), confounds the potential of 
the apodosis.164 While καί νύ κεν ... εἰ µὴ serves as a common epic pattern,165 if we limit 
to the verb νοέω “notice, understand, plan” the action of the protasis that prevents the 
fruition of the apodosis, some interesting results emerge: the formula καί νύ κεν... εἰ µὴ... 
[ἐ]νόησε[ν], occurs four other times in the Iliad, once in the Odyssey, and once, in a 
statement of crisis similar to this one, in the Hymn to Demeter (310–3), on which we 
remarked in Chapter 1:  
καί νύ κε πάµπαν ὄλεσσε γένος µερόπων ἀνθρώπων 
λιµοῦ ὕπ’ ἀργαλέης, γεράων τ’ ἐρικυδέα τιµήν 
καὶ θυσιῶν ἤµερσεν Ὀλύµπια δώµατ’ ἔχοντας, 
εἰ µὴ Ζεὺς ἐνόησεν, ἑῷ δ’ ἐφράσσατο θυµῷ.  
 
And now the entire race of mortal men would have died 
from painful hunger and would have deprived those who 
hold Olympian homes of the glorious honor of gifts and 
sacrifices, had not Zeus thought, and planned in his 
heart. 
 
The resemblance to the Hittite Telepinu myth suggests that the threat of the apodosis in 
the hymn is cosmic: besides the annihilation of the human race, deprivation of the gods’ 
                                                
164 See Louden (1990:passim; 1993:181–198) on counterfactuals in Homer. 




θυσίαι might be devastating for them.166 Although it is true that ambrosia and nectar 
function as the gods’ principal preservatives, maintaining their immunity to age and 
decay,167 the savor of sacrifices probably held a broadly analogous function in ritual; if 
ambrosia and nectar serve to insulate the gods from men with regard to their 
invulnerability to φθίσις “decay”, then sacrifices can be understood as binding the gods to 
men à propos the same. The “suspended animation” (κακὸν κῶµα) that Hesiod envisions 
for divine forswearers of oaths (Th. 793–8), the result of being punished with deprivation 
of ambrosia and nectar,168 might supply the appropriate horror at the idea of being bereft 
of θυσίαι .169 
 The next formulaic element that Hesiod employs at Th. 837–8 comprises (from 
the trithemimer onward) the apodosis of the counterfactual statement and redeploys one 
of the ‘polar’ idioms that describe Zeus’ dominion over the entire cosmos ([ὃς] θνητοῖσι 
καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει / “[who] lords over mortals and immortals”). Although this 
particular ‘dynastic’ formula appears less frequently than the ‘paternal’ one that describes 
his omnipotence, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε,170 even in its rarity171 it ought to be 
considered formulaic, given the simple morpho-syntactic shift of the verb ἀνάσσω (“rule, 
lord”) from present indicative in a relative clause to the modal aorist indicative in a past 
                                                
166 Cf. KUB 24.3 ii 4´–17´. As Beckman (1989:100) notes, “The gods were literally dependent on the 
offerings presented by humans, who, conversely, could only thrive when the deities who controlled the 
basic processes of nature were well-disposed toward the agriculturalists and stock-breeders.” 
167 Clay (1983:147). She notes that “[t]he original efficacy of ambrosia and nectar lies in their powers as 
preservatives and age retardants rather than as agents of immortality.” She points out that Hebe, one of 
whose duties in Olympus is οἰνοχοεία, is not simply “Youth”, but “the flowering or peak of the process of 
growth.” 
168 The translation of κακὸν κῶµα is Clay’s (115). 
169 cf. also the Hittite Hahhimas myth with the discussion by Fontenrose (1959:125–6). The text and a 
discussion of it are to be found in Gaster (1961:283–294). 
170 Nineteen times between Homer and Hesiod, not including the Scutum. 
171 Only once in Homer (Il. 12.242), twice in Hesiod (Th. 506, and modified at 837, as discussed), and once 
in Mimnermus fr. 7. 
 
 73 
counterfactual apodosis. Thus, what the Dichtersprache maintained as one of the 
identifiers par excellence of the lord of men and gods becomes apodotic potential for 
Typhoeus in the event that Zeus’ “intellect” fails.172 
 As I mentioned above, the other threat that is given flesh and voice in Typhoeus is 
a return to Chaos, the undifferentiated gap. Many have commented sensitively on this in 
the past fifteen years, but a rough summation of the argument is that Typhoeus presents 
himself as ἀκοσµία incarnate in general, and as a polyphonic, polymorphic mess in 
particular, whose victory and consequent supremacy over the universe would both 
invalidate man’s location in the cosmos and enfeeble his ability to communicate with the 
divine.173  
What is important here, however, is that Zeus does take notice of the threat, and, 
before overcoming Typhoeus in the ensuing battle, is resituated into his role of 
preeminence by way of the abovementioned formula that describes his paternal 
dominion; or rather, we might say that the poet recognizes the threat that he has posed to 
his own poetic idiom and avails himself of that idiom’s other constituents to allay the 
threat. The deployment of this formula here is critical because of its non-transferability; 
although kingship can be usurped, as earlier the period of heavenly succession showed, 
Zeus’ role as progenitor cannot plausibly be transferred to a usurper. As Ruth Scodel 
points out to me,174 the formula strikes one as even more pointed when one remembers 
that Zeus is not the biological father of all the gods, nor is he precisely the father of men; 
                                                
172 Zeus’ capacity for νοεῖν perhaps represents both the potential and an absolute and abiding paradigm for 
the human technical acumen that emerges as a result of Typhoeus’ defeat. On ‘Typhon’s defeat and the 
imposition of civilizing order’ see Goslin (2010:366–70). 
173 See Collins (1999), Clay (2003), Goslin (2010) (to whose bibliography on discussions of the 
Typhonomachy I am indebted), Lopez-Ruíz (2010), among others. 
174 per litt. 
 
 74 
his appellation as πατήρ then probably points to his perceived psycho-social roles as 
cosmic protector, provider, and lawgiver.175 We might even add that the dynastic idiom is 
demonstrably not a foregone conclusion in the context of the myth, whereas the paternal 
idiom is backward-looking and presupposes the reality of the dynastic one as it applies to 
Zeus. The poet may even, if only unconsciously, have availed himself of the aforenoted 
disparity of frequency between the two formulae. In other words, the stability of Zeus’ 
‘paternal’ identity as it is achieved in formula, as well as its preeminence over his 
dynastic identity, is upheld by statistics. In any case, Typhoeus in all his lawlessness 
could not fill the role of πατήρ, even if he should become ἄναξ.  
 
2.6 / Weapons as vehicles of transference in ps.-Apollodorus  
 Another account that bears on the the etymological figure in the Illuyanka myth, 
while at least fifteen hundred years younger than the Hittite text in terms of date of 
composition, must have been colored by the same very old material.176 The prose version 
of the Typhonomachy that was ascribed to Apollodorus describes for Zeus a fate similar 
to Tarḫun’s (Bibl. I.6.3). In contrast with how Hesiod shows Zeus making short work of 
the monster, ‘Apollodorus’ recounts how Zeus wounds Typhon with the Sickle of 
Succession, but the snaky pretender overpowers Zeus, severs his νεῦρα “sinews” with 
that very sickle and hides them in the Corycian cave.177 Hermes and Aigipan then 
                                                
175 He is not even peculiarly unimpeachable in those capacities. 
176 See Lane Fox (2008:299–318) for the relationship of the Hittite materials to the Greek, especially as 
regards the geography, landscape, and local cultic history. Lane Fox demonstrates how the prose version 
(as well as the poems of Oppian and Nonnus) has “much more authority than the late date of their authors 
suggests” (302). 
177 Puhvel (1987:29). 
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manage to sneak past Delphyne, whom Typhon has stationed at the cave to guard the 
stolen goods, and recover the sinews for Zeus. Zeus eventually defeats Typhon.  
Although this version approaches the minimalism of the Hittite version, the detail 
of the sickle stands out. It plays a central motifemic role, not in the Illuyanka myth, but in 
a similar succession story, the Kumarbi Cycle. Hoffner describes the sickle as “the 
primeval copper cutting tool with which they cut apart heaven and earth.”178 This echoes 
Puhvel’s colorful summary of the solution to the thitherto ineluctable Ullikummi: “So the 
primeval cutting tool is dusted off, and Ullikummi’s base is severed.”179 As the tableau of 
traditions behind the Bibliotheca takes on more and more detail, the fact that ps.-
Apollodorus accepted this primeval cutting tool as an accretion to Zeus’ weaponry means 
that when Typhoeus wrests it from him and injures him with it, Zeus’ quintessential role, 
that of the ultimate Usurper, becomes part of the Serpent’s identity. Moreover, we may 
infer that the theft of Zeus’ muscles, which are analogous to the heart and eyes that the 
Hittite god loses,180 results in his inability to ply his usual weaponry: weaponless Zeus is 
no Zeus at all, as Nonnus confirms in scintillating detail in the 5th century C.E. Before 
looking forward to the Dionysiaca, however, we must not let the concision of ps.-
Apollodorus suffice for comment. 
By outfitting Zeus with the sickle at the beginning of the episode, the 
mythographer turns him into a usurper in parallel with the Cronus of Hesiod and the 
Tarḫun of the Ullikummi myth; by way of the sickle the Storm-god can be dispossessed 
of his identity in addition to his sovereignty, the two being intimately connected. Because 
                                                
178 Reference to Hoffner (1998:64) in Lopez-Ruíz (2010:94 and note). 
179 1987:6. 
180 Lane Fox (2008:203), but earlier noticed by Vian (1978). 
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of the abovementioned reticence of ps.-Apollodorus, as well as the symbolic potency of 
divine equipment in general, it follows that the tool that we have dubbed the ‘sickle’ is 
symbolically empowered by its tradition and its semantic range. The word that ps.-
Apollodorus uses for this sickle is ἅρπη. Proposed IE cognates include Latin sarpio/sarpo 
‘to cut off, prune, trim’ (from root *sṛp-).181 While this falls in line with the use of the 
Greek sickle in general and its use in Hesiod in particular, I contend that its Greek 
cognates add breadth to the semantic field of the tool, making it not just the archetypal 
castration tool, but the implement for usurpation via identity theft.182 After all, in the 
Theogony Gaia fashions a δρέπανον “reaping hook” (161–2), not a ἅρπη,183 for the 
castration of Cronus, nor does Gaia indicate exactly what “repaying [Uranus’] sin” 
(τεισαίµεθα λώβην, 165) involves. Yet Hesiod later specifies that the δρέπανον of 162 is 
a ἅρπη when Cronus accepts it at 175 and uses it to castrate Uranus (179, although at 
188, the tool is simply referred to as ἀδάµαντι).184 I argue that Hesiod means to indicate 
before the act itself that the reaper’s ‘scythe’ becomes the usurper-identity thief’s 
‘sickle’; the lexical shift is marked. 
                                                
181 See Beekes (2010) s.v. ἅρπη. 
182 For the fortuitous resemblance of the West Semitic word ḥrb ‘sword’, see West (1997:291), Burkert 
(1992:39, 85–7). If the resemblance reflects either etymology or ancient perception, then the destruction 
and dismemberment of Mot, which was discussed in Chapter 1, comes into play: Anat uses a ḥrb. But for 
an analogy of a weapon whose name is invested with a particular function in the context of succession 
myth, cf. Baal’s battle with Yam, the dragon. There, as Gaster (1961:116) notes, Koshar, who is analogous 
to Hephaestus, supplies Baal with “two divine bludgeons, Aymr and Ygrsh, which possess the magical 
quality of being able to spring from his hand automatically.” Gaster further explains that Koshar “speeds 
[the bludgeons] on their mission by playing on their names. Since that which is called YGRSH at once 
suggests the Semitic root g-r-sh, “expel,” it is urged to ‘expel Yam from his throne, Stream from the seat of 
his dominion.’ Similarly, that called AYMR suggests a Semitic word, m-r-y, meaning ‘drive.’ It is therefore 
urged to “drive Yam from his throne, Stream from the seat of his dominion.’” 
183 In Pindar and afterward, the verb δρέπω is used of ‘gaining possession of’, ‘enjoying’ and the like, with 
objects like τιµάν and ἥβαν. See LSJ s.v. 
184 Though the particulars are beyond the scope of the present study it is worth suggesting here that, in line 
with objects of other precious or rare metals we see in Homer, the “adamantine” δρέπανον becomes 
possessed of the divine will, transcending its formal function to take on a particularly theological one. One 
thinks of Hephaestus’ automata, both sets of Achilles’ armor, the electrum dogs of Alcinoos, and perhaps 
Agamemnon’s scepter. See also Watkins (1995:429–38) on ‘Thor’s Hammer and the mace of Contract’. 
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The delimitation of ἅρπη to a usurper’s tool in early epic must have taken place 
because of the frequent use of the related verb ἁρπάζω (derived from ἁρπαγή, which is 
first attested in Solon), which describes the violent appropriation of people, animals, and 
things. Things that are snatched with the verb ἁρπάζω in the Iliad include, but are not 
limited to, the following: Helen (3.444); (in a simile) cattle and sheep (5.556, cf. 12.305, 
13.199, 17.62, where the simile of the lion ‘snatching’ the best heifer is adduced to 
describe Menelaus’ stripping (ἐσύλα) of Euphorbus’ armor); the dead Ascalaphus’ 
shining helm (13.528); the ashen spear with which Euphorbus strikes the dazed Patroclus 
(16.814); the whelps of a lioness to which Achilles, groaning in lament over Patroclus’ 
death, is compared (18.319); and the lamb or hare snatched by an eagle, to which Hector 
is compared in his duel with Achilles (22.310). These all seem to be things that either 
belong to another or are being snatched from their normal spheres of existence 
(sometimes simply life).185 
The enriched semantic range of the ἅρπη is further confirmed by the epithet 
applied to it in the two places in which it appears in the Theogony (175, 180): 
καρχαρόδους “sharp-toothed”. Elsewhere in Hesiod (WD 604, 196) and the Iliad (10.360, 
14.198) the adjective describes not just dogs in general, but hunting dogs in particular; we 
are no longer dealing with an implement from agricultural vocabulary,186 but the perfect 
                                                
185 The other objects of ἁρπάζω in the Iliad include a stone that Hector, in an exceptional display of 
strength, picks up (12.445) and Achilles’ spear, which misses Hector, but is snatched up and returned to the 
thrower by Athena (22.276). These objects can also be understood in terms of their being wrested from one 
sphere of possession or operation for the enjoyment of the snatcher (or him whom the snatcher matronizes). 
To these objects we can add the persons of Ganymede, Halcyone, and Sarpedon on the verge of being slain 
by Patroclus. 
186 West (1966:218 ad 175) warns against inferring from the weapon a harvest origin for Cronus. In Oppian 
(H. 5.257), the ἅρπη, as West (1966:218 n. 1) notes, is a whaling tool. 
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instrument for rapacity and usurpation.187 If the ‘copper’ cutter from The Song of 
Ullikummi is endowed with an expansive mythic history, being empowered by its former 
use as the tool for severing heaven from earth,188 then the ἅρπη in ps.-Apollodorus, 
following its use in Hesiod, carries the force of a similar, albeit much lengthier and more 
diversely executed, process of mythologization; ps.-Apollodorus shows how thematic 
material (the heavenly usurpation) has come to be concentrated on a particular motifeme 
(the heavenly usurpation tool); Hesiod shows how etymology and epithet, in addition to 
mythic collocation, accomplish this concentration of tradition onto a single item. 
To confirm the nature of the broader thematic material, we can look again at 
Illuyanka, where the Serpent takes (Hitt. dā-) the Storm-god’s eyes and heart as well as 
his namesake “the Conqueror” without the use of a tool, to ps.-Apollodorus, where the 
tool is present, is itself taken, and is used against Zeus. Perhaps without understanding it 
but nonetheless interestingly, ps.-Apollodorus has subjected the tool of usurpation to 
usurpation itself, thereby introducing a dangerous semiotic element: the wresting of the 
ἅρπη, the tool which we have demonstrated is etymologically invested with the task of 
usurpation, is analogous to Illuyanka’s wresting of the name par excellence of the Hittite 
successor god. 
                                                
187 Matthew Cohn per litt. reminded me of an interesting passage in Aristophanes’ Wasps (1030-5), 
wherein “the adjective ‘saw-toothed’ [is applied] to the usurper, Cleon, whose polymorphism implicates 
him in typhonic monsterism, chaos, duplicity, etc.” At Knights 511, the Chorus sings of the poet who 
“boldly advance toward τυφώς and ἐριώλη”, the typhoon and hurricane being Cleon. On men being parsed 
in terms of divine monarchy and its threats, see Brock (2013:10–4). 
188 KUB 33 106 iii; ANET 124–5. Fox (2008:303) comments on the adamantine sickle thus: “surely [it is] 
the same sickle which had castrated Heaven and which the Hittite gods were to use in their next round of 
battles.” Although cherts and flints must have been one of the original materials for sickles in the Aegean 
and “Cypriot flint knappers were still making chipped-stone blades for threshing sledges in the 1950s” 
(Kardulias and Yerkes 2011:108), in southern Mesopotamia, “little stone was available on the floodplain”, 
and by the Ur III period, copper was the standard material for tools, including sickles (Trigger 2003:280). It 
is thus unsurprising to have the sickle represented by diverse materials in these myths.  
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The consequences of this danger for ps.-Apollodorus’ Zeus is that his sinews are 
severed and hidden in a bearskin (ἐν ἄρκτου δορᾷ) by Typhoeus,189 while he is deposited 
in the Corycian cave in Cilicia, until Hermes and Aigipan,190 escaping the notice of the 
Delphyne, the serpentess whom Typhon placed there to guard the bagged νεῦρα,191 steal 




                                                
189 Scarpi (2001) does not remark on the detail of the bearskin, and Fox (2008:303) says that the detail is 
unique to ‘Apollodorus’. I wonder whether it is meant to be a countermeasure to the aegis, which, Ben 
Fortson per litt. reminds me, Watkins (2000) argues was originally a hunting-bag. As Betz (1992:64 n. 184 
ad PGM IV.1380-4) notes, the association of Typhon with the constellation of the Bear is Egyptian; the 
Bear represents the soul of Typhon, who murdered Osiris (see Plutarch De Is. et Os. 21, 359D); Scarpi 
(2001:450 ad I.6.3 [39-44]) does note that “del resto il combattimento di Zeus e Tifone può trovare un 
ulteriore parallelo nel conflitto per la successione dinastica tra Osiride e Seth, interpretato dai Greci come 
Tifone.” Zeus remarks on the insufficiency of the aegis at Dionysiaca (380-1): αἰγὶς ἐµοὶ µούνη 
περιλείπεται· ἀλλὰ τί ῥέξει / αἰγὶς ἐµὴ Τυφῶνος ἐριδµαίνουσα κεραυνῷ; (I have only my aegis left; but 
what will my aegis do contending against Typhon’s bolt?). There is also the very strange fragment of 
Heraclitus (Kahn 45, D. 120, M. 62) from Strabo (I.1.6): ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρµατα ἡ ἄρκτος καὶ, ἀντίον 
τῆς ἄρκτου, οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός. (“The limits of dawn and evening are the Bear and, opposite the bear, the 
Warder of shining Zeus.”) Kahn (1979:161–2) interprets this “as a commentary on” D. 94 (Ἥλιος οὐχ 
ὑπερβήσεται µέτρα· εἰ δὲ µή, Ἐρινύες µιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν), arguing that “Arcturus is 
presented here as the guardian of the Bear… because the Bear stands for the pole and hence for the fixed 
regularity of solar and astral cycles. Its stellar guardian will preserve the measures of cosmic justices after 
the sun has set.” 
190 This is a very interesting set of details. The Kôrykion antron was famously a grotto dedicated to Pan on 
the south-west side of Parnassus above Delphi (Paus. 10.32.7), but there were others, namely in Cilicia and 
Caesarea, on the latter of which see Berlin (1999). The Cilician Kôrykion antron is known from Strabo 
(14.5.5). He tells us the following: µετὰ δὲ τὸν Καλύκαδνον ἡ Ποικίλη λεγοµένη πέτρα κλίµακα ἔχουσα 
λατοµητὴν ἐπὶ Σελεύκειαν ἄγουσαν. εἶτ’ Ἀνεµούριον ἄκρα ὁµώνυµος τῇ προτέρᾳ, καὶ Κράµβουσα νῆσος 
καὶ Κώρυκος ἄκρα, ὑπὲρ ἧς ἐν εἴκοσι σταδίοις ἐστὶ τὸ Κωρύκιον ἄντρον, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀρίστη κρόκος φύεται. … 
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄντρον αὐτόθι ἔχον πηγὴν µεγάλην ποταµὸν ἐξιεῖσαν καθαροῦ τε καὶ διαφανοῦς ὕδατος, εὐθὺς 
καταπίπτοντα ὑπὸ γῆς· ἐνεχθεὶς δ’ ἀφανὴς ἔξεισιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν· καλοῦσι δὲ Πικρὸν ὕδωρ. (“And after 
the Calycadnus, there is the so-called Poecile rock, which has a staircase hewn out of it leading to Seleucia. 
Then the Anemurium, a promontory with the same name as the former, and to the isle of Crambusa and the 
promontory of Corycus, above which, within twenty stades, is the Corycian cave, wherein the very best 
crocus grows… And there is another cave right there possessed of a great spring that sends forth a river of 
pure and transparent water, which falls down beneath the earth. And carried on invisible it issues into the 
sea. They call it Bitter Water.”) 
191 See Scarpi (2001:451 ad I.6.3 [42]). Cf. the nameless serpentess in h. Ap. 300–55, the Δέλφυνα of 
Callimachus fr. 88, and the Δελφύνη of Arg. 2.705–8. 
192Bibl. I.6.3 [42–3]. 
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2.7 / More simulacra and metepithesis: Nonnus 
If the Near East, Hesiod, and ps.-Apollodorus offer us minimalist narratives, then 
Nonnus picks up the slack: his Typhonomachy spans nearly two books and some 
thousand or so lines of his admittedly monstrous Dionysiaca. Although Typhon attacks 
the entire cosmos, his ultimate quarry is Zeus himself. Below, I will discuss further the 
theft of Zeus’ weaponry and his neura, since those details more closely recall Anzu’s 
engagement with Ninurta than his original theft of the Tablets of Destiny. The process of 
transmission involves elaboration, compression, and redistribution of narrative data. 
Here, I will just point out Nonnus’ use of the identity theft motif. In beseeching Cadmus 
to come to his aid and “play the syrinx” (1.378), the Storm-god voices his fears (1.379–
87): 
…ἡµετέροις γὰρ 
τεύχεσιν οὐρανίοις κεκορυθµένος ἐστὶ Τυφωεύς.         380 
αἰγὶς ἐµοὶ µούνη περιλείπεται· ἀλλὰ τί ῥέξει 
αἰγὶς ἐµὴ Τυφῶνος ἐριδµαίνουσα κεραυνῷ; 
δείδια, µὴ γελάσειε γέρων Κρόνος, ἀντιβίου δὲ 
ἅζοµαι αὐχένα γαῦρον ἀγήνορος Ἰαπετοῖο· 
                          δείδια µυθοτόκον πλέον Ἑλλάδα, µή τις Ἀχαιῶν                 385 
ὑέτιον Τυφῶνα καὶ ὑψιµέδοντα καλέσσῃ 
ἢ ὕπατον, χραίνων ἐµὸν οὔνοµα… 
 
For Typhoeus is helmed with my heavenly weapons. All I’ve left 
is my aegis. But what will my aegis do contending against the 
bolt of Typhon? I fear lest old Cronus should laugh, and I 
shudder at the haughty neck of manly Iapetus. Even more I fear 
myth-birthing Hellas, lest any of the Achaeans call upon 
“Typhon the Rainmaker,” and “Typhon who Watches on High,” 
or “Typhon Most Lofty,” thereby defiling my name. 
 
The nature of Zeus’ fear is patent. In the first place, he doubts the power of his aegis 
against “Typhon’s bolt”, a pointed inversion of Iliad 20.400–1, noticed by Piccardi as 
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well,193 where “Ares stabbed the tasseled / awful aigis, which not even the bolt of Zeus 
overpowers” and recalls the transference of storminess in Anzu. Other than Nonnus’ 
opportunity to turn Homer on his head, why does Zeus doubt the efficacy of aegis? After 
all, the aegis, besides being a hunting bag, is essentially the storm-cloud, fringed as it 
were with Zeus’ lightning. Perhaps its inefficacy now is the direct result of its being 
stripped of its awesome radiance, which arises from Zeus’ control of lightning. Of course, 
the thunderbolt is not analogous to the Tablets of Destiny, in that it is not a text, but the 
thunder and the lightning do communicate divine will and index Zeus’ power.  
In addition to thinking himself not up to challenging Typhon in battle, Zeus fears 
the laughter and mockery of those whom he himself had deposed.194 Most importantly, 
however, he fears being displaced from his epithets, and thereby being bereft of his 
offices. More precisely, Zeus shudders at the idea of Typhoeus replacing him with 
respect to these epithets and offices in Greek myth and, perhaps crucially, cult;195 
Nonnus’ Zeus knows that his existence depends upon the µῦθοι to which Hellas gives 
birth. The idea that his name might no longer be uttered in the contexts in which it 
usually would be might recollect the silence of Enlil after Anzu’s theft, and more clearly 
it mirrors a trope in the Lugal-e, where, to paraphrase Selena Wisnom, rebel lands start 
worshipping Ninurta’s stone enemy, Asag, instead of him, and the insistent description of 
this stone monster in stormy terms reflects Asag’s usurpation, not just of Ninurta’s 
                                                
193 Piccardi (2006:166 ad 381–2.) 
194	  This	  may	  recollect	  the	  deposed	  Kumarbi’s	  rôle	  in	  Ullikummi’s	  attack	  on	  heaven.	  	  
195 As Piccardi (2006:166 ad 386) points out, “L’epiteto [ὑέτιος]… è l’unico dei tre ad essere attestato 
anche nel culto.” 
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power, but of his attributes, “right down to his epithets”:196 once again, the Storm-god’s 
sovereignty is imperiled by an attack on his signifiants.  
 
2.8 / Synthesis: Re-writing the cosmos from Anzu to Nonnus 
After Anzu finishes blustering about, he identifies himself by his recent (mis)deed 
and poses to the hero a question (II.40–2): 
“I have taken away all of the divine powers, and I assign 
the commissions of the gods. Who are you who have come 
to battle with me? Give your reason.” 
 
The lexeme for power in the Akkadian is parṣum, which functions here as Sumerian ME 
can.197 As an example, the MEs are what Inanna absconds with in Inana and Enki, and 
the ME of the underworld is what Inana illicitly covets during her katabasis, on which 
see Chapter 3. It is important that Anzu also says that he assigns the divine commissions. 
The Akkadian for commission or office is têrtu (cf. Hebrew tôrāh < yrh). This lexeme 
also denotes verbal reports, and so we might easily identify têrtu and Latin fatum: what 
Anzu pronounces will hold sway over the cosmic order. And this is exactly what happens 
when Ninurta makes his first attack (II.60–7): 
From the handhold of the bow he launched an arrow. The arrow 
did not approach Anzu, but returned. Anzu called out to it: 
“Arrow that has come, return to your reed-bed; frame of the 
bow, return to your forest; bow-string to the ram’s tendon, arrow 
flight to the bird.” Carrying the tablet of destinies of the gods in 
his hand, the bow-string and the bow launched an arrow, but it 
did not approach his body. 
 
In essence, Anzu has rendered Ninurta’s attack inert by verbally undoing the technology 
of the champion’s bow and arrow. All of the components of the bow and arrow are 
                                                
196 Wisnom per litt. 
197 CAD s.v. parṣum. 
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disintegrated from one another. But I contend that Anzu has inadvertently undone himself 
with this curse, which I will discuss in the next section. 
In the case of Illuyanka, there is no indication that the snaky usurper has any 
designs on the rest of the cosmos; other than the mutilation of Tarhun, Illuyanka seems 
relatively benign. Hesiod’s deployment of the formula, discussed above, may index Zeus’ 
role as distributor and maintainer of the gods’ timai. Ps.-Apollodorus does not give 
Typhon a chance to do anything besides mutilate Zeus. 
In Nonnus, however, a good portion of the episode is taken up with Typhon’s 
recasting the cosmos in his image. Here Nonnus involves exceptionally intricate and 
subtle verbal artistry to “undo” the older cosmos and rewrite it as Typhon’s. Moreover, 
that Nonnus presents Typhon’s assault on heaven as an attack on heavenly identities is 
borne out in some of the details of his violence against the constellations. His violation of 
the ‘twin fishes’ and the ram is telling (1.180–3): 
καὶ διδύµους ἐπὶ πόντον ἀπ’ αἰθέρος Ἰχθύας ἕλκων 
Κριὸν ἀνεστυφέλιξε, µεσόµφαλον ἄστρον Ὀλύµπου, 
γείτονος εἰαρινοῖο πυραυγέος ὑψόθι κύκλου 
ἀµφιταλαντεύοντος ἰσόζυγον ἦµαρ ὀµίχλῃ. 
 
And dragging the twin Fish from the upper air and flinging them 
into the sea, he beat up the Ram, the star that acts as navel of 
Olympus, above the fire-sparkling orb of its springtime neighbor, 
as it balances day yoked-in-equal-measure to darkness. 
 
Typhoeus “arrête le cours du temps”198 and furthermore, at least as far as the Pisces are 
concerned, explicitly bereaves the signs of their identity as heavenly fixtures. 
 Typhoeus goes on to deploy his “crooked snaky army” (ὀφίων σκολιὸν στρατόν) 
against other astral bodies (187), in a way stealing the identity of each; each snake 
                                                
198 Vian (1976 [2003]:147 ad 183). 
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duplicates a marked feature of the constellation that it attacks, mostly in binding or 
poisoning terms.199 One of Typhoeus’ ὄφις-appendages “gamboled over the spine of the 
heavenly Serpent (Δράκων), hissing war” (189–90); another “bound tightly (σφήκωσατο) 
with a chain [already] enchained (δέσµιον... δεσµῷ) Andromeda” (192); another, 
specified as a δράκων κεράστης “horned snake”, “encircled the forked horn (κεραίης) of 
Taurus the same shape as his own (ἰσοτύπου)” (193–4); the same one “tormented the 
similarly shaped (ἀντιτύπους) Hyades, the form of the crescent Moon, with open jaws” 
(195–97);200 “the venom-shooting baldrics of interlacing serpents girdled (ἐµιτρώσαντο) 
the Ox-drover” (197-8); attacking another astral serpent (Ὄφις), one of Typhoeus’ snakes 
“frisked around the viperous (ἐχιδήεντα) arm of Ophiuchus” (199–200) and “twined a 
second garland around the Garland (Στεφάνῳ στέφος) of Ariadne” (201).  
 The grammar of two of these encounters requires a closer look, since we are after 
all invested in how both language—by which I mean the lexicon, the grammar, and their 
products (e.g. epithets and formulae)—and image accomplish the totality of the identity 
theft. Nonnus describes the attack on Taurus and the Hyades thus (193–7):  
...ὁ δὲ γλωχῖνι κεραίης 
ἰσοτύπου Ταύροιο δράκων κυκλοῦτο κεράστης, 
οἰστρήσας ἑλικηδὸν ὑπὲρ βοέοιο µετώπου 
ἀντιτύπους Ὑάδας, κεραῆς ἴνδαλµα Σελήνης, 
οἰγοµέναις γενύεσσιν.  
 
One, a horned snake, entwined itself on the fork of the horns of 
Taurus, the same shape [as its own], and revolving in a circle 
above the ox’s forehead, threatened with opened jaws the 
Hyades resembling [it?], [a cluster in] the shape of the horned 
moon. 
 
                                                
199 Cf. 2.42–52, where Typhoeus’ various animal forms devour the self-same animals on the earth, and 
2.281–313, where Typhoeus threatens to overturn the identities of the Olympians. 
200 Presumably mimicking the crescent moon formation of the Hyades. 
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Although the snakes are mimicking the constellations, the morpho-syntactic status of 
ἰσοτύπου (194) and ἀντιτύπους (196) effect a startling hypallage. The constellations 
become the representations, the µιµήµατα; at the very least the original and the impostor 
are confused. That the Hyades are further described as an ἴνδαλµα “likeness, phantom” of 
the crescent moon further complicates the direction of mimesis.201 Here the chaos, the 
ultimate threat that Typhoeus poses against the cosmos, is directly connected with 
problems of identity. 
 The Moon, however, refuses to yield to the monster’s onslaught (219). She rallies 
the astral troops, and Typhoeus decides to turn his attention towards the seas and 
commits his first identity theft, to be distinguished from the abovementioned identity 
thefts that his snaky appurtenances accomplish. Having made the waters essentially 
uninhabitable with his girth (263 ff.), he rends an island and hurls it (287–90): 
καὶ βυθίου τριόδοντος ἔχων µίµηµα Τυφωεύς, 
χειρὸς ἀµετρήτοιο ταµὼν ἐνοσίχθονι παλµῷ 
νῆσον ἁλικρήπιδος ἀποσπάδα πέζαν ἀρούρης, 
ῥῖψε παλινδίνητον ὅλην σφαιρηδὸν ἑλίξας. 
 
And Typhoeus, wielding an imitation of the abysmal trident, 
with the Earth-shaking palm of his immeasurable hand cut away 
an island, the torn-off coastline of plow-land that borders the sea, 
and hurled it whirling back on itself, the whole thing, causing it 
to spiral like a ball. 
 
While it is true that Typhoeus becomes connected with Poseidon through their shared 
role as “déclenche[ur] de le cataclysme”, Typhoeus’ taking on “l’aspect du dieu” is not 
really “assez naturelle.”202 In fact, Typhoeus has accomplished something quite 
                                                
201 It is possible and perhaps preferable to understand the appositive κεραῆς... Σελήνης as describing the 
shape of the snakes with their gaping jaws, but its closeness to Ὑάδας cannot be ignored. Both Rouse 
(1940) and Vian (1976 [2003]) take the phrase as being in apposition to the Hyades. This conforms with the 
V-shape (the horns and nose of Taurus) formed by the brightest stars in the Hyades. 
202 Pace Vian (1976 [2003]:153 ad 290). 
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remarkable here, for nowhere outside of Nonnus is ἐνοσίχθων applied to anyone but 
Poseidon. The god of the sea is called ἐνοσίχθων because “he moves the immovable 
earth.”203 But here he is nowhere to be found, and Typhon has taken his place, even 
though he only wields a simulacrum of Poseidon’s equipage. But Typhoeus’ ultimate 
quarry is Zeus himself.  
 Just as Hesiod’s Zeus can retain his identity against the onslaught of Typhoeus 
because of his ‘paternal’ identity (Th. 838), which was affirmed by a formula whose 
connotations cannot be solely literal, Nonnus’ Zeus avails himself of his bloodline. After 
he describes what is at stake for the cosmos, Zeus implores Cadmus to bewitch Typhoeus 
with his shepherd’s pipe, appealing to the hero’s stock (393-5): 
εἰ δὲ Διὸς λάχες αἷµα καὶ Ἰναχίης γένος Ἰοῦς, 
κερδαλέης σύριγγος ἀλεξικάκῳ σέο µολπῇ 
θέλγε νόον Τυφῶνος. 
 
If you’ve got the blood of Zeus and the stock of Inachian Io, 
charm the mind of Typhon with the protective strain of your 
tricky syrinx. 
 
Zeus is referring to his being the great-grandfather of Cadmus, through Epaphus, Belus, 
and Agenor.204 Furthermore, Cadmus refers in Book 3 to Belus as the Libyan Zeus, by 
which he means Zeus-Ammon205 (292–4): 
καὶ Διὸς Ἀσβύσταο νέην ἀντίρροπον ὀµφὴν 
Χαονίῃ βοόωσι πελειάδι διψάδες ἄµµοι 
µαντιπόλοι· 
 
And the parched, oracular sands shout the new song of Zeus 
Asbystes, a counterpoise to the Chaonian dove. 
 
                                                
203 Plut. fr. 106 (Sandbach). 
204 Cf. Cadmus’ account of his line (3.257-98). Rose (1940:31 ad 393) is mistaken to show Libya as 
Epaphus’ wife and not his daughter, as Cadmus himself tells Electra. 
205 Note the clever use of the rare lexeme for sand ἄµµος. See LSJ s.v. 
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Thus, by invoking his genetic connection to Cadmus, which is not subject to the same 
confusion that the throne of heaven and the heavens themselves are, Zeus, on the one 
hand, indicates to the audience, since Cadmus does not yet know his destiny, that the 
threat to Zeus’ sovereignty is a threat to Cadmus’ eventual claim to Zeus-born, Zeus-
directed sovereignty; in a sense the founding myth of Thebes stands to be obliterated. On 
the other hand, as someone whom we might call διογενής “Zeus-born,” Cadmus is 
expected to live up to his pedigree. In other words, the overwhelming presence of Zeus’ 
name in the heroic vocabulary, which presumes Zeus’ ability to fill the role of nurturer of 
hero-kings and therefore presumes his own sovereignty, counterbalances the startling 
epithetic and etymological play that attends Typhoeus’ attack. The order here is 
important: just as in Hesiod, ‘Zeus ἄναξ’ or ‘βασιλεύς’ gets plausibly destabilized, but 
then ‘Zeus πατήρ’ provides the protection against this destabilization. Moreover, Zeus is 
able to erect another lexical defense by describing, albeit proleptically, Cadmus’ strain as 
ἀλεξίκακος  “warding off evils”, thus aligning Cadmus’ salvific function with that of 
Heracles,206 Hermes,207 and Zeus himself.208 
 
2.9 / A telling slip: Zeus’ neura in Nonnus 
So how does Cadmus help Zeus out? As we noted above, Zeus doubts that his 
aegis will avail him appropriately against the bolt that Typhon stole from him at the 
beginning of the poem (Zeus is occupied with raping Europa): 
Καὶ παλάµας τανύσας ὑπὸ νεύµατι µητρὸς Ἀρούρης 
                                                
206 Hellanicus (fr. 109, Jacoby 4), Lucian Gallus 2. 
207 Aristophanes Peace 422. 
208 Directly in epigraphic evidence, by hypallage in Nonnus (Dionys. 5.275), where it describes the winds 
Zeus sends, and obliquely in Homer, where it describes µῆτις (Il. 10.19-20). 
 
 88 
ὅπλα Διός νιφόεντα Κίλιξ ἔκλεψε Τυφωεύς, 
ὅπλα πυρός. 
 
And with a nod from Mother Earth, Cilician Typhoeus stretched 
out his hands and stole the snowy weapons of Zeus, the weapons 
of fire. 
 
The juxtaposition of the odd “snowy weapons” with “the fiery weapons”, as well the 
mention of Cilicia, must point to Pythian 1 specifically, where “l’immagine dell’ Etna 
freddo e bianco di neve prepara il contrasto con la policroma descrizione dei torrenti di 
fucio, fumo e lava,”209 and ps.-Apollodorus more loosely, where Zeus’ neura are 
mentioned as severed, but no mention is made of his weaponry. 
 But when Cadmus, Zeus’ shepherd helper, charms Typhon with his syrinx-
playing, the monster is convinced to give him Zeus’ neura (1.511–2): 
νεῦρα Διὸς δολόεντι πόρεν ξεινήια Κάδµῳ,   
νεῦρα, τά περ χθονὶ πῖπτε Τυφαονίῃ ποτὲ χάρµῃ. 
 
[Typhon] gave the sinews as a guest-gift to tricky Cadmus, the 
sinews that fell to the earth once in a Typhomachy. 
 
There has yet been no mention of such a battle in the poem, and this has puzzled 
everyone. While ps.-Apollodorus is the most obvious forerunner of this strange detail, I 
think Nonnus’ ποτέ is looking past Apollodorus to Anatolia—the detail of the neura 
being a guest-gift looks like Illuyanka giving Tarhun’s heart and eyes to the Storm-god’s 
son with similar generosity—and to Babylonian Anzu, and the ram’s tendon. This 
accounts for ps.-Apollodorus’ failure to mention Zeus’ usual weaponry and Zeus’ 
seeming bodily integrity in Nonnus. In fact, Zeus is seen to be re-possessed not of 
musculature but weaponry.  
                                                
209 Cingano in Gentili, Bernardino, Cingano, and Giannini (1995:14). 
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 Just as Cadmus charms Typhon into self-destruction, Anzu is undone by words—
his own. After Ninurta’s initial failure, the hero instructs Sarur, his numinous mace and 
messenger, to bear the bad tidings to Ea, the god of wisdom and magic among other 
things. Ea, having heard the story in full, prescribes how Ninurta will be able to defeat 
Anzu (II.106-12): 
“Tire him out so that he may let fall his wing tip in the opposing 
of the storm wind. O Lord, take hold of your arrows towards the 
rear. Cut off his wing tips and strike them off left and right. Let 
him look at his wings so that they take away the utterance of his 
mouth. He will call out ‘wings to wings’; you must fear him still. 
Draw from the handhold of your bow, let the arrow go like 
lightning. Let wingtip and wing play like butterflies.” 
  
Although the instructions are murky in translation, Ea’s prediction that the wounded 
Anzu will call out kappa ana kappi (“wing to wing”) is crucial. I disagree with Reiner 
that Anzu’s cry (“My wing! My wing” in her reckoning) is simply ineffective 
nonsense.210 Rather, I think Ea has realized that Anzu’s own faculty of speech is the 
means to his undoing. Just as Anzu had uttered to Ninurta’s weaponry in their first 
encounter kappu ana issuri [GUR-MEŠ] at line 65 of the second tablet, instructing the 
“wing” of the arrow to return to the bird, by chanting “wing to wing”, he has made the 
arrow that Ninurta presently shoots effective again! This is confirmed by the fact that 
when Ninurta carries out Ea’s instructions, abru kappu ušebira šukuda (“He made the 
arrow pass through wingtip and wing”).211 
 
2.10 / A brief look forward: the tragic consequences of wordplay 
 In this section we refocus our investigation from broad-scale identity theft to the 





accrual of identifying features of vanquished foes, and the effects of exerting that identity 
in subsequent violent encounters. Furthermore, this accrual of identity appears to occur in 
conjunction with the enhancement of the victor’s weapon by the victory, and the 
problematic outcomes involve etymological figures to no small degree. Issues of 
language and order are to the fore. 
 Unsurprisingly, we still encounter allusions to cosmic battles and succession 
myth, but our focus falls upon the outcomes, anticipated or real, of plying appropriated 
identities. Here it is the hero-gods who take over identities. Of course, we will also 
continue to deal with snakes, since they seem to be ubiquitously implicated in identity 
theft. 
 
2.11 / An Erinyomachy in Aeschylus? 
 It was none other than Fontenrose, whose monumental study of Indo-European 
and Near Eastern snakes Python (1959) has yet to be surpassed in terms of sheer 
exhaustiveness, who noticed Aeschylus’ predilection for snaky images in the Oresteia. In 
an article entitled “Gods and Men in the Oresteia” Fontenrose argues against previous 
scholars’ assumptions that Zeus wants Agamemnon and Orestes to be punished in the 
trilogy, and asserts that the Erinyes, whom Zeus can send after criminals, act on their 
own in the Choephori and the Eumenides. 212 He goes on to parse the intimate verbal 
relationship between Clytemestra’s character and the vision of the Erinyes, noting the 
heavily serpentine language that both Cassandra and Orestes use to describe the former: 
for example, when Orestes notes that his father died “in the coils and convolutions / of 
                                                
212 1971:86 (Ag. 55–9). 
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the dread Echidna” (Ch. 248-9), he has identified her with a species of Κήρ; the Erinys of 
course is another species of death spirit.213 Although Fontenrose does not push the point, 
he does recognize the affinities between the Aeschylean cosmic struggle, wherein the 
Olympians are pitted against chthonic ‘older’ deities, and Chaoskämpfe like the 
Typhonomachy and Pythonomachy.214 I will be a little less subtle than Fontenrose here, 
and suggest that Aeschylus has fully assimilated and thereby preserved many of the 
images and much of the language of older dracontomachies, including the etymological 
figures that function as one of the main modes of violence in these myths. Aeschylus’ 
modification of this etymological component in particular is splendid, in that it gets 
turned back on the transgressing deity, in this case the Erinyes. Thus I will focus on the 
Erinyes as they appear in the Eumenides in particular, since it is in this third play of the 
trilogy that the action comes closes to a full dracontomachy. 
 Before discussing the climactic etymological moment, I will suggest that 
Aeschylus’ vision of the Erinyes not only aligns them with cosmic serpents in general, 
but emphasizes their unclassifiable nature in particular. They are wholly other than the 
world of men and gods, and as such they thwart the language of men and gods, when it is 
applied to them. 
 We first become aware of the Erinyes when the Pythia staggers out of Apollo’s 
temple, unable to hold herself up (34–8):215 
                                                
213 1971:98. 
214 1971:98 n. 29. 
215 Podlecki (1989: 132 ad 36) notices that Aeschylus uses two extremely rare words and suggests “that the 
poet has the Pythia lapse into a formal, even antiquated, mode of expression to mark her discomposure.” 
Groeneboom (1952: 95 ad 34-8) discusses the relationship of σωκεῖν to Hermes’ epithet (Σῶκος) at Il. 
21.72. If these words are religiously marked in any way (are the Pythia’s movements are somehow inspired 
during the normal course of her carrying out her duties?), then we might suggest that she is indicating that 
the Erinyes’ transgression into the temple of Apollo has disrupted her normal priestly state. Νeither the M 
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ἦ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ’ ὀφθαλµοῖς δρακεῖν, 
πάλιν µ’ ἔπεµψεν ἐκ δόµων τῶν Λοξίου,  
ὡς µήτε σωκεῖν µήτε µ’ ἀκταίνειν στάσιν· 
τρέχω δὲ χερσίν, οὐ ποδωκείαι σκελῶν· 
δείσασα γὰρ γραῦς οὐδέν, ἀντίπαις µὲν οὖν. 
 
Terrible things to tell! Terrible things for the eyes to see sent me 
back out of the temple of Loxias, such that I have no strength nor 
can I stand up straight. I run with my hands—there’s no 
footspeed in my legs. An old woman who’s afraid is nothing, 
barely a child. 
 
The Pythia presents herself as having been utterly enfeebled by what she saw, and 
introduces her affliction by noting that her faculties of speech and sight have been 
assailed. The neuter plural substantive δεινά both semantically and morphologically 
indicates something that is difficult or impossible to express with accuracy. On the one 
hand, δεινά could refer to the entire sight within the temple, both Orestes the gory 
suppliant and the Erinyes who surround him; on the other, the priestess’ description of 
Orestes at 43–4 (“[holding] a lofty-born (ὑψιγέννητον) branch of an olive tree / garlanded 
chastely (σωφρόνως) with bright (ἀργῆτι) fleece”), seems measured, admiring,216 as if in 
spite of his bloody hands. It is likely then that δεινά is appropriate only because the 
Erinyes are present.217 
 The Pythia goes on to describe the Erinyes first as women (46–7), but then recants 
that description (48). Next she “striv[es] to make the unparalleled somehow more 
comprehensible, [and] grasps at a comparison ready-to-hand”218 in the Gorgons (48) 
before recanting that, too (49); she tries once more by comparing them to the Harpies, but 
                                                                                                                                            
scholiast’s nor Hesychius’ gloss on ἀκταίνειν (κουφίζειν or µετεωρίζειν, respectively) is particularly 
helpful. 
216 Cf. Podlecki (1989:133 ad 43), who remarks on the solemnity of the image, and Sommerstein (1989:89 
ad 43–5) who asserts that σωφρόνως “suggests that, polluted though he is, Orestes does belong to civilized 
humanity.” 
217 Cf. Sommerstein (1989:87 ad 34). We discuss the collocation δεινὰ... δρακεῖν below. 
218 Podlecki (1989:133 ad 48ff.).  
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finds that association, too, unapt, seeing as the Erinyes are “wingless” (51). Finally, she 
stresses that in addition to their ghastly snoring (53) and the awful drip from their eyes 
(54), they bear a get-up (κόσµος) that is “not lawful to bring before the images of the 
gods nor into the homes of men” (οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν ἀγάλµατα / φέρειν δίκαιος οὔτ’ ἐς 
ἀνθρώπων στέγας) (55–6). Podlecki recognizes that this statement issues a note that 
resounds throughout the play: the Erinyes are wholly separated from the Olympian gods 
as well as from humans.219 We can say more: although with much more specificity than 
Hesiod, Aeschylus echoes here the Archaic poet’s description of the Echidna, on whom 
we remarked above. To reiterate, because the Echidna “is not at all like mortal men or 
deathless gods” (Th. 295–6) in her monstrosity, the gods apportioned her a famed 
dwelling “far away from the deathless gods and mortal men” (Th. 301–3). Also, as 
Fontenrose notices, Orestes’ imagination of Agamemnon as having died ἐν πλεκταῖσι καὶ 
σπειράµασιν / δεινῆς ἐχίδνης (Ch. 248–9) echoes Aegisthus’ triumphant observation of 
Agamemnon ὑφαντοῖς ἐν πέπλοις Ἐρινύων… κείµενον (Ag. 1580–1).220 
 Noting one further connection of the Erinyes with their snaky congeners will 
prepare us to comment on the startling etymological element of Apollo’s threat to the 
dread goddesses at 181–3. As Illuyanka took the eyes and heart of Tarhun, and ps.-
Apollodorus’ Typhon took Zeus’ sinews, each rendering his victim temporarily defunct, 
the Erinyes drink the blood of their victims to similar effect. Furthermore, while neither 
the Hittite snake nor Typhon consumes the stolen bodyparts, the effect of the corporeal 
injury is to empower the assailant. Likewise, the Erinyes’ own language suggests that 
they sustain themselves by drinking the blood of their victims: at 263–6 (in an astrophic 
                                                
219 1989:134 ad 56. 
220 1971:98.  
 
 94 
portion of the second parodos) the Erinyes tell Orestes, who is embracing the βρέτας 
(259), that he “need[s] to grant us in exchange [for his mother’s spilt blood] drink / the 
ruddy claret (πελανόν) from your living limbs; from you / I hope to have the meal 
(βοσκάν) of an ill-to-drink draught (πώµατος δυσπότου)”; then, in the introduction to the 
choral ode (299–306), the chorus-leader tells Orestes that he will go to perdition (ἔρρειν) 
(301), “a bloodless feast for divinities” (ἀναίµατον βόσκηµα δαιµόνων) (302), and that 
while yet alive he will feed them, despite the fact that he has not been slaughtered at an 
altar, seeing as he was nurtured for and consecrated to them (ἐµοὶ τραφείς τε καὶ 
καθιερωµένος) (304). It is clear from the Eriny(e)s’ language that they envision Orestes’ 
blood as their sustenance, which is disturbing enough, but the Erinyes parse their 
expected feast in terms of a sacrifice that does not fit the bill of a sacrifice since Orestes 
is οὐδὲ... σφαγείς (305), and they describe the result for Orestes in equally ambiguous 
language. The ode that follows these lines clarifies that the Erinyes see their function as 
in part waging psychological warfare on their victim, withering him (ἰσχνάνασ[α] in 267 
and αὐονά in 333) by means of derangement (παρακοπά, / παραφορὰ φρενοδαλής in 
329–30; ὑπ’ ἄφρονι λύµᾳ in 377); the fate that awaits a victim of the Erinyes is 
monstrous, anathematic to the normal order of things. 
 Thus in the end, although the Erinyes may rightfully claim that it is their λάχος 
(334), which “Moira spun out for them to have securely” (335), to harry evil-doers until 
death, the issue at hand is one of conflicting jurisdiction (as well as interpretation). Thus 
until the matter is settled in the Areopagus, at which point the Erinyes become the 
Eumenides, we observe a Chaoskampf-on-the-brink, during which the powers of Night 
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threaten to infringe upon the powers of the Olympians, namely Apollo (and coordinately 
Zeus), as well as their sense of order, language, and music.221  
The situation in which the element of infringement is clearest comes very early, 
when the Erinyes are seated in Apollo’s temple. After instructing Hermes to conduct 
Orestes safely to Athens (89–93), Apollo threatens the Erinyes with violence, if they 
should not leave his temple. The language of his threat is remarkable (179-84): 
ἔξω, κελεύω, τῶνδε δωµάτων τάχος 
χῶρειτ᾿, ἀπαλλάσσεσθε µαντικῶν µυχῶν, 
µὴ καὶ λαβοῦσα πτηνὸν ἀργηστὴν ὄφιν 
χρυσηλάτου θώµιγγος ἐξορµώµενον 
ἀνῇς ὑπ’ ἄλγους µέλαν’ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀφρόν, 
ἐµοῦσα θρόµβους οὓς ἀφείλκυσας φόνου. 
 
Get out! I order you, quickly leave this temple, get out of this 
oracular sanctum, lest you meet with a winged, bright snake, 
rushed on from this string of beaten gold, and in your pain send 
up the black foam from men, vomiting up the clots of gore that 
you drew off.222 
 
Watkins, in his chapter on “Hermes, Enualios, and Lukoworgos: The Serpent-slayer and 
the Man-slayer”, begins with the anonymous tragic fragment TrGF 2, Adesp. 199: ἀργῆν 
ἔπεφνεν (“he slew the snake”).223 He recalls how Hayden Pelliccia pointed out to him that 
this formula, with the obscure word for snake ἀργῆς, must explain the epiclesis 
Ἀργεϊφόντης. This epithet is most often used of Hermes, and rarely of Apollo, as Watkins 
                                                
221 As Halden (1965:39) notes, “Again and again we hear of songs which are no songs, music which is no 
music and songs of joy which turn into lamentation.” Cf. Podlecki (1989:156 ad 308–9 and 158). 
222 A secondary sense of θρόµβους... φόνου could be “which you drew off from the slaughter,” indicating, 
in addition to the material of the thromboi, the source of their gory sustenance.  
223 1995:383. For the fragment and ancient discussion of ἀργᾶς, see Nauck (1964:746 Achaeus  fr. 1, and 
880 Adesp. fr. 199), from whose apparatus we learn the following: Harpocration, the Alexandrian 
grammarian, relates that Aeschines on the definition of ἀργᾶς says that “it is rather credible to say that the 
Dorians, especially the Argives, called the ὄφις the ἀργᾶς, as Achaeus does in the Adrastus.” Hesychius 
does not mention Achaeus, but defines it similarly: ὄφιν. ἔστι δὲ ἐπίθετον δράκοντος. Ulrichs conjectured 
that ἀργῆν ἔπεφνεν were Achaeus’ words. 
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notes, and was already explained in antiquity as ‘serpent-slayer’.224 Pelliccia also 
adduced the above lines, which have all of the elements of the basic formula (in bold), 
even if they have been disjoined somewhat.225 Here we can add to the observations of 
Pelliccia and Watkins and enrich our sense of the force of basic formula even more. 
 First we emphasize what Apollo’s threat means for the Erinyes. Having been 
struck by his arrow, they would vomit up their sustenance, their βοσκή as they call it. 
Although Apollo does not elaborate on what would follow upon the disgorging of their 
meal, we can easily conclude that they would be deprived of it. Therefore, on the analogy 
of the gods and their thusiai as well as what results from their being deprived of 
ἀµβροσία/νέκταρ according to Hesiod (see above §2.3), we can say that the Erinyes, if 
they were to be struck by Apollo’s special arrow, might suffer something functionally 
similar to a κακὸν κῶµα or worse; in line with the broader vision of the cosmic struggle, 
it is worth expressing that the Erinyes seem to be sustained on that from which the gods, 
in order to be ἀναίµονες and thereby deathless, abstain. 
 Second, Apollo’s weapon is more than just a “kenning”,226 “oracular 
circumlocution”, or “bombast”;227 rather it involves a stunning etymological figure that 
functions as a quasi-magical verbal attack. On the one hand, by referring to his arrow as 
an ὄφις Apollo could be playing with the homonymy and homophony of the Homeric 
lexeme ἰός ‘arrow’ and the tragic word ἰός ‘poison’, often of snakes.228 I do think that 
poison is in play here, given the symptoms that Apollo envisions for the Erinyes. In this 
                                                
224 Watkins (1995:383) cites Eustathius 183.12 who glosses the epiclesis as ὀφιόκτονος. 
225 Cf. Watkins (1995:384–5): “We can observe in this magnificent inversion of the basic formula the same 
elements in collocation, reinforced by the framing verse-final focus position (and the intervening 
homoeoteleuton -ον ... -ον preparing φόνον).” 
226 Pace Sommerstein (1989:114 ad 181). 
227 Pace Podlecki (1989:144 ad 181). 
228 Of the Erinyes themselves at Eu. 478. 
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case there are two latent etymological figures achieved by ὄφις alone: first, Apollo is 
threatening to shoot a snake with a snake; second, the god is threatening to poison them, 
which brings his threat securely into the realm of magic to which the Erinyes’ own 
δέσµιος ὕµνος (306) belongs. 
 It is the first latent etymological figure that is of more interest here because it 
belongs to the same category as ‘Tarḫuntan tarḫta’ and the pun in Genesis. At least 
verbally, naming the arrow an ὄφις is important because it enables the type of affliction 
that Apollo envisions, namely being bereft of sustenance and thereby vanquished. I argue 
further that both πτηνόν and ἀργηστήν enhance this sense. Although it is natural to refer 
to an arrow as winged, it is marked that Apollo is using a winged snake to attack 
“wingless” (ἄπτεροι in 51) snake-like creatures; his threat emphasizes their deficiency. 
Second, although ἀργηστής can mean something like “bright” or “swift” here,229 I 
contend that Apollo means something much more insidious. If Aeschylus felt the full 
strength of the collocation that Pelliccia and Watkins recognized, and if Hermes’ 
presence in the immediately preceding lines is any help, ἀργηστής could mean something 
like “snake-eating” here, thereby solidifying the potency of the verbal weapon. That the 
second element of the adjective could have been felt to have come from the ἐδ-root here 
is upheld both by Aeschylus’ own use of ὠµηστής (Ag. 827) to describe the metaphorical 
lion that leapt over the Trojan walls and “lapped up its fill of royal blood” (828) as well 
as Hesiod’s use of ὠµηστής at Th. 300, which locally modifies ὄφις (299), to describe the 
                                                
229 Or white as at Sept. 60 (cf. the ἀργῆς µαλλός of Eu. 44). 
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Echidna.230 What Apollo threatens to do, then, is to give the Erinyes a taste of their own 
medicine, as it were, to disrupt their identity and render it defunct by replicating it, 
modifying it, and attacking them with it, just as Nonnus’ Typhoeus sends out his snaky 
appurtenances to supplant the constellations with µιµήµατα of them. 
 Two questions remain: 1) how does the image of the Erinyes laying siege to a 
suppliant at Apollo’s temple fit into the play’s opening as well as Apollo’s mythic history 
as the play acknowledges it, and 2) why should Apollo possess snake arrows in the first 
place?231 Answering the first question should indicate the answer to the second as well. In 
the her opening soliloquy, the Pythia recounts in brief how Apollo came to possess the 
‘mantic seat’ of Delphi, a seat which changed hands from Gaia the πρωτόµαντις (12) to 
Themis (2–4), to the Titaness Phoebe (4–7), and finally to Apollo (‘Phoebus’ 8) himself 
as a birthday gift (7) from his grandmother. The Pythia emphasizes the non-violent, 
willing transfer of sovereignty over Delphi down the line of chthonic deities to Olympian 
Apollo.232 Nowhere is the Pythonomachy mentioned. And although it is likely, if 
mythological chronology were to be extracted from the Apollonian myth complex, that 
Apollo here is understood to have already defeated the Python, such an episode would 
perhaps be extraneous to a hymnic proem (φροιµιάζοµαι 20). It would not however be 
extraneous to the hymn’s narrative content. Thus the very first line the priestess utters 
following her conclusion of her hymn, her first line since observing the Erinyes alludes to 
the Pythonomachy (34): 
                                                
230 ὠµο- + εστο-  (*ed-to) > ὠµηστής; as Sihler (1995:82 § 87) explains, “[w]hen neither vowel [i.e. neither 
the vowel ending the first ingredient nor that beginning the second ingredient in a compound] is high the 
first vowel is without effect and the second is replaced by its long counterpart.” 
231  I thank Matthew Cohn per litt. for posing these as worthwhile questions as well as for pointing out the 
lack of mention of a Pythonomachy. 
232 [Θέµιδος] θελούσης οὐδὲ πρὸς βίαν τινός (5) according to the Pythia. 
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ἦ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ’ ὀφθαλµοῖς δρακεῖν 
Truly terrible to tell! Terrible for the eyes to see! 
 
The pair δεινὸν δερκοµ°, present participle paired with cognate accusative, begins three 
lines in the Iliad, and seems to indicate something like “looking terrible” or “having a 
terrible look [to one’s eyes]”, while here the cognate verb δρακεῖν is epexegetic of the 
exclamatory substantive δεινά. I propose that, in addition to the surface resemblance of 
the verb δρακεῖν to the noun for snake of the same root, i.e. δράκων, the collocational 
history of the latter with δεινός anticipates the snakiness of the Erinyes in general and 
associates them with Typhoeus and the Typhonomachy in particular. 
 To begin with, while two of the three instances of δεινὸν δερκοµ° in the Iliad 
modify warriors about to engage in single combat, Paris and Menelaus (3.342) in the first 
instance and Ajax and Diomedes (23.815) in the second, the third instance modifies the 
intricacy on Agamemnon’s shield at 11.37: 
τῇ δ’ ἐπὶ µὲν Γοργὼ βλοσυρῶπις ἐστεφάνωτο 
δεινὸν δερκοµένη, περὶ δὲ Δεῖµός τε Φόβος τε. 
 
And on the shield the grim-looking Gorgon was wreathed, 
looking terrible, and around her were Fear and Flight. 
 
The Gorgon has snaky affinities, which are suggested here by the parallelism between her 
presence on the shield and the “blue-black δράκοντες stretching toward the neck” on 
Agamemnon’s breastplate several lines earlier (26).233 But this connection is tendentious 
on its own. 
 The pair δεινὸς δρακ° yields firmer results. After Apollo entrusts Hermes with the 
conveyance of Orestes to Athens, Clytaemestra’s ghost appears to the chorus of sleeping 
                                                
233 In fact, the description of the snakes on the breastplates, “three of them like rainbows, which Zeus 
establishes in cloud as a sign to mortals” (27–8), calls the aegis to mind. 
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Erinyes and begins to harangue them for falling asleep on the job. When the Erinyes 
respond only with µυγµοί and ὠγµοί, Clytaemestra discerns that they are sleeping and 
diagnoses what has happened to them (127–8): 
Ὕπνος Πόνος τε κύριοι συνωµόται 
δεινῆς δρακαίνης ἐξεκήραναν µένος. 
 
Sleep and Toil, those master conspirators, enfeebled the fighting 
spirit of the terrible dragoness! 
 
Thus, although the Pythia has a difficult time likening the Erinyes to any creatures with 
which she is familiar, without meaning to, she already identifies their typology in her 
exclamation at 34.234 
 For although δράκοντες are not uncommon in early Greek, δράκαιναι, when 
referred to as such, appear with less frequency. The only extant δράκαινα that appears in 
in earlier Greek literature is the dragoness of the ‘Pythian’ Hymn to Apollo, who must 
refer to the Python, although she is not named thus in the Hymn itself.235 Τhe Hymn 
contains the detail that the dragoness nurtured the δεινόν τ’ ἀργαλέον τε Τυφάονα πῆµα 
βροτοῖσιν (301). So, although she is not δεινή herself, she is the τροφός of a δεινὸς 
δράκων. After all, Hesiod knows Typhoeus as exactly that (824–5):  
καὶ πόδες ἀκάµατοι κρατεροῦ θεοῦ· ἐκ δέ οἱ ὤµων 
ἦν ἑκατὸν κεφαλαὶ ὄφιος δεινοῖο δράκοντος... 
 
And he had the indefatigable legs of a mighty god. And out of 
his shoulders issued a hundred heads of a terrible serpent. 
 
Thus, we might conclude that the Pythia’s and Apollo’s opening encounters with the 
Erinyes serve as a doublet to a subsumed reference to the Pythonomachy (and 
                                                
234 Podlecki (1989:140 ad 128) suggests that the singular δράκαινα “may show that Clytemnestra is also 
hinting at herself, for at Cho. 249 Orestes calls her a ‘dread viper’.” 
235 Janko (1982:77; 1986:43) dates the Pythian hymn (179–end) to c. 586 BCE, and West (2003:10) 
similarly dates it to “shortly after the First Sacred War, when the Delphic sanctuary was wrested from 
Crisa’s control by an alliance of Phocians and others and Crisa itself was destroyed (591/590 BC)…”.  
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secondarily to the Typhonomachy); this fits well with the broader vision of Chaoskampf 
that Aeschylus puts on display. Note well that it is important for answering the second 
question, why Apollo avails himself of snake-arrows, to understand that Aeschylus has 
not merely replaced the Pythonomachy with an Erinyomachy in Apollo’s mythic history. 
Rather, he has compressed the former into collocations, typological resemblances, and, I 
contend, Apollo’s weaponry. 
 One the one hand, we might say that ἀργηστής, if it is a pun meaning something 
like ‘snake-eating’, refers backward to Apollo’s defeat of the δράκαινα. In this line of 
thought, ἀργηστής could come to modify an arrow of Apollo’s owing to the success of 
the encounter or could signal the arrow’s prior and inherent potency. On the other hand, 
ἀργηστής could function more anticipatorily than retrospectively, and could refer to the 
present potency of the arrow that Apollo threatens to shoot. In this line of thought, again 
the epithet could be proleptic (“by virtue of what it is going to do to you, Erinyes, the 
arrow is thus ἀργηστής”), or it could refer to the arrow’s inherent capabilities. The 
possibilities here are not mutually exclusive, nor have I exhausted all potential 
permutations of the reference. But if we keep in mind that ἀργηστής modifies ὄφις and 
adduce a striking comparandum, then we can reasonably speculate as follows: 1) the 
arrow indicates the subsumed tradition about the Pythonomachy, and 2) its potency 
against the Erinyes is evidenced by this tradition and possibly secured by it; the arrow is 
empowered as a snake because Apollo slew a snake, thereby becoming Pythios and 
perhaps appropriating special features from his vanquished foe. 
 The Greek mythic tradition includes a number of cases like this, wherein a 
divinity comes to bear both the name and a feature of a vanquished foe as part of his or 
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her martial equipage, although sometimes only one or the other. Above we noted the case 
of Ἀργεϊφόντης, however the first element is to be understood; to that we may add, on 
Watkins’ passing suggestion, Bellerophontes, the first element of whose name is 
etymologically all but intractable,236 but could be snaky.237 As regards the acquisition of 
special equipment from a vanquished foe, we recall the case of Athena, who flayed an 
array of vanquished foes and subsequently wore their skin; one of them was Pallas, which 
provides one etymology for her epithet.238 We also know of Heracles and the Nemean 
lion. Another of Heracles’ feats, however, at least as Sophocles deploys it in the 
Trachiniae, may clarify what seems to be going on with Apollo and his ὄφις-arrow in the 
Eumenides: that feat is the killing of the Lernaian hydra. 
 
2.12 / Precocious mortals: Sophocles’ Trachiniae 
 Deianeira’s tale of receiving Nessus’ dying gift, in addition to bearing on the 
nature of the mythic material that is wrapped up in Apollo’s threat to the Erinyes, 
introduces another issue of pragmatics that is closely related to identity theft: the 
consequent absorption of identity. This is an important process to consider, since symbols 
whose scope becomes enlarged abut and infringe upon neighboring symbols. In the case 
of Heracles, who absorbs the Hydra, one of his cosmic antagonists, into his armament, 
the effect is dire. Apollo suffers no such effect, and this is a point of distinction between 
the divine and the heroic.  
                                                
236 The bT scholia (ad Il. 6.155) tell us the following (odd) origin for his name: Λεωφόντης πρότερον 
ἐκαλεῖτο. Βέλλερον δὲ ἱππικῇ φονεύσας οὕτως ὠνόµασται (“He was formerly called Lion-slayer, but since 
he slew Belleros with horsemanship, he is thus called [sc. Slayer of Belleros]”).  
237 As he notes (1995:385 n. 4), Zenodotus preferred a byform, Ellerophontes, for Bellerophon’s name in Il. 
6; the first element could somehow be related to the biform of Illuyanka, Elliyanku, which fits with the 
Chimaera’s being partly a snake, as Janko (per litt.) reminds me 
238 See Henrichs (1977) on the various versions. 
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The passage under investigation has been much discussed because of the 
difficulty of the details in 572–4, although the lines are “clear in general terms.”239 After 
summarizing the context, I will briefly refer to the status of the problem before proposing 
an alternative reading. A successful philological reckoning of the passage requires that 
we keep in mind the purposeful ambiguity of Nessus’ words. 
At 555–581, Deianeira recounts to the Trachinian women how she came to 
possess the κηλητήριον “love-charm” (575) with which she thinks she can prevent 
Heracles from loving any other woman in her stead (576–7). Nessus, she recalls, 
attempted to rape her while ferrying her across the river Evenus (565), only to be shot by 
Heracles (566–7), who was employing arrows dipped in the Lernaian Hydra’s poison. As 
Nessus lay dying, he advised her to collect the blood from around his wounds, where it 
had commingled with the Hydra’s poison. Deiaineira thinks that this philter should serve 
as an effective love charm, but Nessus knew that he was prescribing a fatal poison; this 
bivalence is built into the language. As Easterling notes, “In each case [where oracular 
language is involved] the implication is that the knowledge exists—the message is there, 
available and unchanging—but it only becomes intelligible in the light of events.”240 To 
be more precise, the knowledge only becomes intelligible to the characters in the light of 
events; surely, the audience member, who is no doubt familiar with the tale, 
acknowledges the true meaning almost instantly.  
In the case of Nessus’ ambiguity, the false meaning and the true are wrapped up 
in what is best described as a (nearly intractable) grammatical difficulty beyond the 
                                                
239 Easterling (1982:144 ad 572–5). 
240 1982:3. “Only when Heracles is gripped in the torment of the robe can the Chorus see that ‘release from 
toils’ meant death (821–30).” 
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double meaning of the τρεφ- root here. The problem lies in the details Nessus gives about 
his wounds and the Hydra’s poison (572—4): 
ἐὰν γὰρ ἀµφίθρεπτον αἷµα τῶν ἐµῶν 
σφαγῶν ἐνέγκῃ χερσίν, ᾗ µελαγχόλους 
ἔβαψεν ἰοὺς θρέµµα Λερναίας ὕδρας, 
ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον 575 
τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε µήτιν’ εἰσιδὼν 
στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον. 
 
I defer translating these lines, since the syntax of the phrase ᾗ… ὕδρας is under question, 
but Easterling’s reckoning of the general sense is tentatively useful:  
‘If you take the coagulated blood from my wound, darkened by 
the Hydra’s poison on Heracles’ arrow, you will have a charm to 
win your husband back.’241 
 
I should also note that whereas the MSS agree on the text here, modern editors have 
offered emendations to a couple of words: Page suggested ᾧ in place of ᾗ (573); Madvig 
and Dobree conjectured µελάγχολος... ἰὸς (573–4), and Wunder µελαγχόλου... ἰοῦ. All 
three of these proposed emendations appear to be generated by the difficult syntax of 
572–4. The syntax and therefore the sense are difficult; but they are not intractable. 
First of all, we should recall that Deianeira later realizes that the Hydra’s poison 
remains pernicious despite being carried in blood (714–8): 
τὸν γὰρ βαλόντ’ ἄτρακτον οἶδα καὶ θεὸν 
Χείρωνα πηµήναντα, χὦνπερ ἂν θίγῃ 
φθείρει τὰ πάντα κνώδαλ’· ἐκ δὲ τοῦδ’ ὅδε 
σφαγῶν διελθὼν ἰὸς αἵµατος µέλας 
πῶς οὐκ ὀλεῖ καὶ τόνδε; 
 
For I know that the arrow that struck Nessus was one that beset 
even the god Cheiron with pain, and it destroys any of the whole 
host of wild creatures that it touches. How won’t this black 
poison from Nessus’ wounds, which coursed through his blood, 
kill even Heracles? 
 
                                                
241 1982:144 ad 572–5. 
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Thus, Deianeira must have been deluded to think that Nessus’ blood would somehow 
lessen the perniciousness of the Hydra’s venom. With that in mind we can go back and 
disentangle many of the grammatical knots and account for Nessus’ deceptive ambiguity, 
which caused Deianeira’s deadly misunderstanding. 
The first grammatical difficulty is one about which scholars have disagreed for 
some time: both the internal sense and external syntactic function of θρέµµα Λερναίας 
ὕδρας (574).242 Many understand this phrase as a periphrasis for the Hydra herself, based 
on the analogy of phrases in Homer with βίη, ἴς, µένος, σθένος + gen. of the person.243 
Importantly, Long challenged the identification of θρέµµα κτλ. as periphrastic, 
demonstrating that the parallel examples given for periphrases with θρέµµα either do not 
stand up to close analysis or consist in a descriptive genitive (τὰ νεογενῆ παίδων 
θρέµµατα, Plato Lg. 790D).244 I contend further that, while all the periphrases in Homer 
refer to a characteristic heroic vigor or strength, and are thus synecdochic, by contrast, 
θρέµµα, if periphrastic, would serve no metonymic function; nowhere does one find 
something like ἀνὴρ Τελεµάχοιο.245 Long argues that θρέµµα... ὕδρας clearly means the 
‘Hydra’s poison.’246 Davies concurs.247 For one understanding of the lines, I agree. 
Yet Long omits to parse how the phrase functions in the rest of the clause, and 
leaves West bemused and suggesting a rather perplexing grammatical analysis: West 
wants θρέµµα Λερναίας ὕδρας to be understood as in apposition to an understood χολήν 
                                                
242 This summary of the differing views is paraphrased from Easterling (1982:144 ad 572–6). 
243 Going back to the scholiast (περιφραστικῶς ἡ ὕδρα). Cf. Jebb (1892) and Kamerbeek (1970). 
244 Long (1967:276). He also rightly rejects as irrelevant the parallels from the Trachiniae of φάσµα ταύρου 
from line 509 and φάσµα ὕδρας from line 837 (275, 277). 
245 Furthermore, although Heracles calls the Nemean lion a θρέµµα “creature” at 1093, at 1099 he refers to 
the “three-headed dog of Hades” (1098) as δεινῆς Ἐχίδνης θρέµµα. 
246 Long (1967:275). 
247 1991:159-61 ad 572ff. 
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(implicit in µελαγχόλους).248 Easterling (like West) is not convinced that θρέµµα, if we 
accept Long’s understanding of it as ‘poison’, could be the subject of ἔβαψεν. Davies 
adopts Dobree’s (and Hermann’s) emendation to µελάγχολος... ἰὸς, circumventing that 
difficulty.249 I am hesitant to emend the text given the “striking homogeneity of the 
tradition,”250 nor is θρέµµα likely to be part of some double accusative.251 Excepting the 
special cases in Aristophanes, modification of βάπτω is carried out by datives of material 
or prepositional phrases with ἐν or εἰς. 
 As Long notes, θρέµµα in 574 clearly picks up on ἀµφίθρεπτον in 572 (and is 
possibly recalled at 834).252 I propose that the unparalleled adjective ἀµφίθρεπτον must 
indicate more than coagulation, but only after we come to θρέµµα and figure out the 
double entendre. Thus we need to take θρέµµα first as a ‘coagulated liquid’ in parallel 
with the coagulated blood of Nessus. The subject of ἔβαψεν, a verb used elsewhere of 
stabbing,253 is an understood Ἡρακλέης or οὗτος,254 and θρέµµα is therefore in apposition 
to ἰούς: thus we read, “… where Heracles dipped his black-galled arrows, the coagulated 
                                                
248 1979:111. Davies (1991:160 ad 572ff.) notes that none of the parallels West cites “presents us with an 
understood word in apposition to an extant word or phrase, and such a construction I find very strained.” I 
have to admit that I would be equally nonplussed by West’s reckoning, even if the construction were 
paralleled. 
249 1991:161 ad 572ff. Segal (1975:612) has no problem with it. 
250 Easterling (1982:248). 
251 See West (1979:111). He rightly points out that the two exempla of the double accusative with βάπτω 
are not parallels for our construction here.  
252 See below, n. 145. 
253 West (1979:111) cites S. Aj. 95, [Aesch.] P.V. 863, and E. Ph. 1577-8. 
254 So West (1979) and Long (1967). Davies (1991:161) prefers to read µελάγχολος... ἰός, making it the 
subject of ἔβαψεν and understanding θρέµµα as in apposition to it. The object, on his reckoning, is an 
understood ‘blood.’ Although Davies approximates the kenning I understand to be in place, his reading 
strikes me as less natural. Supplying ‘blood’ as the object (from σφαγῶν in 573) seems strained any way 
you look at it: there is no parallel double accusative construction with βάπτω, as West (1979:11) notes; nor 
is it likely, as Davies seems to take it, that Nessus is specifying the blood that the arrow/poison (he rightly 
says that the difference in context is likely very great) has dyed or imbued. Either way, he comments no 
further on the circumlocution. 
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liquid of the Lernaian Hydra.”255 This of course makes no sense as it is, and we are 
forced to take ἰούς as ‘poison[s]’: “…where Heracles dipped the black-galled poisons, the 
coagulated blood of the Hydra.”  It is this primary reading that deceives Deianeira; she 
believes that Nessus is saying that his blood has mitigated the danger of the Hydra’s 
poison. 
But if we take θρέµµα likewise as ‘growth’ or ‘nursling’, since that is its usual 
usage, then we can understand the deceit; whether the primary referent of θρέµµα is the 
poison product or some metaphoric nursling, it hardly makes sense in the context of the 
myth to say that the ‘θρέµµα of the Hydra dipped its arrows’ anywhere.256  
But what does this mean? I propose that the phrase µελάγχολοι ἴοι (573–5) 
secures the sense that the arrows are to be envisioned as a mimêma of the Hydra, and a 
foreboding one at that. Just as Aeschylus does with ὄφις in the Eumenides, Sophocles is 
playing on the homonymy/homophony of ἰός ‘arrow’ and ἰός ‘[snake] venom’. Heracles’ 
arrows, endowed as they are with poison, are the θρέµµα resultant from Heracles’ 
violence and the Hydra’s virulence. The difference in number between the plural ἰούς and 
θρέµµα is appropriate given the Hydra’s nature. That we are to see Heracles’ arrows as 
snakes, the likely brood of a draconic monster,257 is supported further by the noise the 
arrow makes as it pierces Nessus’ lungs: διερροίζησεν (568). Before the 1st century CE, 
the verb διαρροιζέω is unattested outside of this line. The verb ῥοιζέω, on the other hand, 
is better attested, being the noise of whistles (Il. 10.502, Od. 9.315), whizzing arrows (Il. 
                                                
255 West (1979:11) also takes θρέµµα as appositional, but to an understood χολήν: “Sophocles now wants to 
remind us why Heracles’ arrows were µελάγχολοι...”. I find this to fall short of the full force of the image, 
and to be just as unwieldy as the unlikely double accusatives against which West argues.  
256 This is West’s (1979:11) finding as well.  
257 Although cf. 1098–9, which recognize Cerberus as the δεινῆς Ἐχίδνης θρέµµα. 
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16.361), and snakes hissing (Th. 835 of Typhoeus, A.R. 4.129);258 certainly the flying 
arrows’ sound and probably the whistles of men are theriophonic. 
 But whistles and hisses are not decisive on their own. Luckily, the words of the 
chorus itself in all likelihood confirm the identity of the poison-tipped arrows and the 
θρέµµα (831–4): 
εἰ γάρ σφε Κενταύρου φονίαι νεφέλαι 
χρίει δολοποιὸς ἀνάγκα 
πλευρά, προστακέντος ἰοῦ 
ὃν τέκετο θάνατος, ἔτρεφε259 δ’ αἰόλος δράκων... 
 
For if the treacherous duress of the Centaur anoints his sides 
with gory cloud, as the poison that Death fathered and the 
spangled snake nurtured260 clings fast…  
 
As Easterling summarizes, “[t]he Chorus trace the disaster to its sources, Nessus and the 
Hydra, metaphorically representing Heracles’ violent struggle in the robe as a physical 
encounter with these two monsters.”261 She notes further the “faint foreshadowing” of 
Hyllus’ words at 770–1 (εἶτα φοινίας / ἐχθρᾶς ἐχίδνης ἰὸς ὣς ἐδαίνυτο).262 At this point, a 
translation seems called for:  
ἐὰν γὰρ ἀµφίθρεπτον αἷµα τῶν ἐµῶν 
σφαγῶν ἐνέγκῃ χερσίν, ᾗ µελαγχόλους 
ἔβαψεν ἰοὺς θρέµµα Λερναίας ὕδρας, 
ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον 575 
τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε µήτιν’ εἰσιδὼν 
στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον. 
 
                                                
258 Later (i.e. in LXX), of birds and streams.  
259 The MSS read ἔτεκε here, but most commentators prefer Lobeck’s ἔτρεφε for a number of philological 
reasons. See Jebb (1892:125 ad 834), and Long (1967:277–8), who argues for θρέµµατι instead of φάσµατι 
in 837 (cf. Jebb 196), and Easterling (1983:177–8 ad 834–5). West (1979:11) also accepts Lobeck’s 
conjecture without comment. Even if ἔτεκε were correct, there is little practical difference between a τέκος 
and a θρέµµα. 
260 Or “clotted”, as Janko per litt. reminds me. 
261 1982:177 ad 831–40. 
262 Easterling (1982:177 ad 831–40). 
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For if you carry in your hands the clotted blood from my 
wounds, where he dipped his black-galled arrows, the nursling of 
the Hydra, you will have a charm for the mind of Heracles, such 
that, even if he sees another woman, he will not love her more 
than he loves you. 
 
 Conquering heroes and divinities, it seems, have the power to appropriate the 
essence of their vanquished foes into their armament, into their own identities. In the case 
of Heracles, by using the Hydra’s poison he has enabled the slain monster to confer her 
dangerous identity upon his weaponry. This transference of identity is facilitated by the 
verbal link between the word for ‘arrow’ and the word for ‘[snake] venom’. When 
Heracles then uses this modified weapon against Nessus, the dying Centaur seizes on the 
opportunity to engender a retributive weapon that will arise from and in the form of the 
very two creatures, the Hydra and Nessus, that Heracles slew. Nessus presages the nature 
of this weapon in his use of derivatives of τρέφω. Finally, we can point out the pernicious 
ambiguity of lines 575–6 (ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον / τῆς Ἡρακλείας...), the 
apodosis of the condition. What Deianeira hears is “you will have this philter as a charm 
over Heracles’ mind”, but the proximity of the dative σοι to φρενός and the delay of τῆς 
Ἡρακλείας suggests a second reading: “Your mind, Deianeira, will be deluded [viz. into 
thinking that this is a benign love charm].” This is the nature of verbal art. This is 
sympathetic magic at its most devastating.263  
As Faraone rightly comments on Heracles’ pleas for pity (1070–75), “Heracles, 
who elsewhere in the play is called the greatest and best of men… has been reduced to a 
weak… maiden. He also makes it clear that this transformation was the work of a 
                                                
263 A “failed φιλτροκατάδεσµος”, as Cohn per litt. tells me. It does appear to share some elements with 
PGM IV 296ff. Cf. Graf (1997:95–9). 
 
 110 
female.”264 Deianeira, who is ἄνανδρος (1062),265 has caused Heracles to become a 
παρθένος (1071), θῆλυς (1075). Regardless of the question of intent, Deianeira has lived 
up to her name, and has joined the ranks of destroyers, appropriators, and stealers of 
identity. As Heracles refers to her, she is Hyllus’ πατροφόντης µήτηρ (1125), or perhaps 
simply, Πατροφόντης.266 
 
2.13 / Preliminary conclusions 
 Over the course of these first two chapters, I have argued that poetics and 
grammar itself are implicated in a broad spectrum of mythic narratives. Problems of 
language and problems of classification disrupt the cosmic structure, and often the power 
of language and the reassertion of its classificatory ability serve to set it aright. 
 In this chapter specifically I have demonstrated that attempts on the heavenly 
throne or on a place in the line of succession many times involved unsettling the 
namesake of the victim of the attack. In extreme cases, such as that which Nonnus 
composed, the cosmos was literally replaced by the snaky minions of chaos, while the 
prime assailant took over the epithetic complexes of his victims (Poseidon and Zeus). In a 
few of these cases, a poetic countermeasure like a non-transferable formula, or an appeal 
to unassailable patrilineage, was deployed. 
 Finally, I examined a related mythopoetic phenomenon: the assumption and 
redeployment of an identity that was appropriated from a foe who was vanquished in the 
                                                
264 1991:126. 
265 κοὐκ ἀνδρὸς codd. See Easterling’s note (1982:207 ad loc.) 
266 cf. S. O.T. 1440–1: ἀλλ’ ἥ γ’ ἐκείνου πᾶσ’ ἐδηλώθη φάτις, / τὸν πατροφόντην, τὸν ἀσεβῆ µ’ ἀπολλύναι 
(“But the oracle’s pronouncement of that [sc. instruction] is completely manifest, that I, the father-slayer, 
the impious one, be damned.”) Though the evidence is scant, it might not be inappropriate to say this 
byform of πατροφόνος is specialized. 
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prehistory of a current myth. In some cases this accrual of identity enabled the victor-god 
to lord his enhanced, identity-disrupting weaponry over an antagonist; in one case, the 
conquering hero unwittingly fashioned his own demise by preserving the essence of a 
noxious enemy that he had previously overcome. 
 The results of our inquiry thus far have suggested that the narratives of many 
myths are fueled by issues of categorization, of sphere of action, of naming and 
transgressing the limits imposed and regulated by nomina. Mortals pretending to 
immortality upset a central organizing feature of the cosmos. Snaky monsters, which are 
understood in many cases as a priori unclassifiable, attempt to displace the Storm-god 
from his throne. In so doing they threaten the life-giving powers attached to the names no 
less than the mythic functions of the god.  
If the habits and systematic associations which provide a symbol with its sign-
action are called into question by a new and antithetical action or association, not only 
does the symbol start to collapse, but the system of associations, which obtains a 
posteriori, get called into question. Can Tarḫun ever rightly be known as the 
‘Overcomer’ if he is overcome by Illuyanka? Does a binary opposition of mortals to 
immortals mean anything, if mortals accede to the lifestyle or the freedom from cares (at 
least the ones Greeks might have classified as θυµοβόρος) that only immortals are 
supposed to know? These questions, among many other versions of them, indicate that, 
even before the pre-Socratics asked what, if anything, subsisted beneath names, even 
before Parmenides assigned a binary classification to deceptive doxa, story-tellers, myth-
givers, and communities were troubled by the seeming arbitrariness of signage, by the 
absence of an identifiable a priori justification for any immutable cosmology.  
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Men may come to expect to die because that is what they witness without fail, 
generation after generation, but other realities can be imagined and versified. Yet against 
this fantasy experience persists, and the integrity of some unchanging other is given 
preference over the fantasy. For as long as there exists an Inaccessible and a Not-us, then 
men can continue to fantasize about participating in it and can ask it, rationally or not, for 
some symbol, some instance of its eternity, as a token of its benevolence. And by this 






Chapter 3. The dangers of (being) Aphrodite 
 
 
3.1 / Introduction and synthesis 
 
 In the first two chapters we examined how the ancient Greeks and their 
Mediterranean neighbors imagined the organization of the universe as well as the perils 
that the organization faces. In Chapter 1, I detailed how anthropogonic narratives present 
man’s onetime nearness to the gods as eventually unsettled, perhaps because the notion 
itself is disruptive; we determined that the very language of such anthropogonies 
demonstrates that the divine stands in danger of being rendered meaningless if men are 
subject to the same goods, the same automatous environment, the same freedom from 
anxiety about death that the gods enjoy. Narratives about the Fall highlight the 
incompatibility between mortal fantasy and the ability of language to describe the 
structure of the cosmos, between what we might call mortal yearning for immortality and 
the very impulse of narrative and story-telling: lack, conflict, and distance impel narrative 
movement.  
 In the second chapter, we observed another imagined threat to the cosmos. This 
threat presents itself and is eventually overcome in Chaoskämpfe, battles between the 
forces of disorder and the champions of stability. These forces of disorder often show up 
as snakes, the natural world’s shape-shifter par excellence. Nonnus certainly makes it 
clear why snakes are appropriate polymorphs, when he shows the snaky appurtenances of 
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Typhon coiling themselves into all sorts of shapes in order to mimic and effectively 
replace the constellations.267 
 We determined, then, two fronts on which the battle for cosmic stability gets 
waged: on one side, the division between men and gods, which is a prerequisite for 
mytho-religious communication, threatens to dissolve when narratives bring men and 
gods into close contact; on the other side, agents of chaos also threaten to upset the 
meaningfulness of the language that determines the ordering of the universe and man’s 
place within it. These are not envisaged as purely intellectual threats: on the first front, 
myths show in sometimes stark detail the violence that breaks out among men who aspire 
to immortality; on the second front, the natural world, the relative predictability of whose 
cycles and internal boundaries allows men make use of its life-giving properties and 
avoid its death-dealing ones, becomes confounded, unpredictable, and sometimes fully 
pernicious. 
 It becomes apparent in a couple of cases that these two fronts were not totally 
isolated from one another: for example, in the two versions of the Hittite myth that details 
the battle between Tarhun and the serpent Illuyanka, the mortal helpers of both versions 
die, probably because, in the course of helping the Storm-god, they have transgressed the 
boundary between mortals and immortals, a fascinating tragic detail in an otherwise 
minimalist account.268 
 In this chapter we explore the coalescence of these two cosmic issues further in 
the strange case of Aphrodite of Book 5 of the Iliad: there, she appears to threaten cosmic 
                                                
267While gods have been known to metamorphose into all sorts of things, sometimes to nefarious ends, I 
should think that the snake is a different, more illicit, kind of shape-shifter in that he or she has no form 
except for what shape it decides to coil itself into. 
268 As Beckman (1982) points out. 
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stability on both fronts simultaneously. This vision of her as such a formidable threat to 
the order of the universe emerges in part out of her complicated genetics: even if she 
resembles Indo-European Dawn goddesses,269 she bears even more striking 
correspondences to Near Eastern270 goddesses of love.271 It is these Near Eastern 
goddesses in particular who themselves bear troubling features for the kosmoi in which 
they operate. 
 
3.2 / Aphrodites: Apostasis and syntasis 
 In this section I do not try to add much to the discussion of Aphrodite’s origins: I 
concede that, especially on matters of this goddess’ mythic history, diachrony remains 
elusive.272 This unapproachability does not mean that the question of her origins is not a 
worthwhile one for trying to elucidate some of the interfaces within the complex of those 
origins; it is rather to say that the question is largely useless if it is aimed at locating a 
simplex ‘Aphrodite’, especially since Aphrodite’s relationship with the Eastern goddesses 
with whom she is thought to have syncretized is variable within the Greek land- and 
seascape. As Budin has argued, on Cyprus Aphrodite and Ashtart were identified (a so-
called interpretatio), whereas in the rest of Greece Aphrodite slowly became 
orientalized.273 I would add, however, that in Homer it may be the case that the 
                                                
269 See Boedeker 1974. Her connection of Aphrodite with IE Dawn goddesses is useful; her vexed 
etymology for Aphrodite’s name is less so. 
270 I stress again that categories like Indo-European and Near Eastern, when considered as mutually 
exclusive, are virtual at best. It is of course apparent that the Greeks recognized themselves as opposed to 
an array of ‘Others’, incorrectly at times, but on the ground it is much more likely that a cultural-linguistic 
koine is responsible for the sharing of literary and intellectual artifacts of diverse origin.  
271 While eroticism is part of these goddesses’ domain, it is not always fronted to the extent that it is for 
Aphrodite. 
272 Budin (2003) does, however, do some good work for diachrony with the archaeological evidence. 
273 2004:95, 101–2 et passim.   
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interpretatio of ‘Aphrodite’/Ashtart, whom we will call Cypriot Aphrodite, gets 
amalgamated with the Inanna-Ishtar that the Lycians must have known about from 
Hittite- and other Luwian-speaking peoples; after all, Cypriot material on its way to Ionia 
likely passed along the coast of Lycia. 
In short, Homeric and the Hesiodic visions of Aphrodite cannot, without ceasing 
to be our earliest Greek literary Aphrodites, be stripped of their Near Eastern vestments 
(this metaphor will come to appear appropriate in the discussion of the goddess’ 
vestments). At the same time, we should not think of her as simply an Eastern import into 
a daughter pantheon of the Indo-Europeans.274  
Moreover, this issue of origins is by no means peculiar to Greek Aphrodite among 
the Mediterranean/NE host of ‘Aphrodites’. As Rivkah Harris notes, “[t]he history of the 
syncretism and fusion of the Sumerian Inanna with the Akkadian Ishtar is complex and 
problematic.”275 Harris’ article discusses Inanna-Ishtar as paradox on a “fundamental and 
irreducible” level, even as regards the spectrum of order–chaos or structure–antistructure.  
I suggest that the diachronic snarl we encounter for Aphrodite is perhaps owing to 
the synchronic one already present in the role of Inanna(-Ishtar). I am not alleging that 
some conscious confusion of origins for Aphrodite took place (although why not?); 
rather, I am positing that the synchronic set of problems expected of Inanna-Ishtar, her 
innate contradictoriness, more precisely her considerable multiplicity, made her 
especially prone to movement into Greek myth and especially apt for attachment to 
                                                
274 Summaries of attempts to distill an origin for Aphrodite, etymologically, cultically, etc. can be found in 
Boedeker (1974), Friedrich (1976), West (2000), Budin (2003, cf. 2004), Beekes (2010). The communis 
opinio, at least regarding her name, is that it is of Semitic origin, although the details of sound change are 
still not agreed upon.  
275 1991:261 n. 1. 
 
 117 
native or inherited goddesses who themselves wield expansive, sometimes disruptive 
power.276 For even if we concede that Aphrodite in some ways maintains vestiges of an 
IE Dawn goddess, perhaps as a hypostasis, by the time of the Homeric poems she is 
functionally all but displaced from that role.277  
Furthermore, as we will show, there is a complex of important connections to 
Inanna-Ishtar in the Aphrodite of the Iliad, in which we find some analogs to the issues 
that the Mesopotamian goddess poses in the myths in which she features. These 
correspondences may shed some light on the cultural and theological framework for the 
wounding of Aphrodite at the hands of Diomedes in Iliad 5. First, we will engage with a 
potential connection between Aphrodite and her Near Eastern analogs from Iliad 14.  
Then we will deal with the oddities of Aphrodite’s wounding, namely the method by 
which she saves Aeneas, her wound at the end of Diomedes’ spear, and her consolation 
by Dione. Part of the discussion involves a reckoning of the passage in terms of the 
Homeric Kunstsprache; part involves contextualizing the passage in a broader linguistic 
and mythological milieu. As will become apparent, these two sides of the analysis often 
go hand in hand: the poet enriches his artistic idiom both through internal play 
(etymological, metrical, phonetic) and by opening up his lexical and mythological 
repertoire to non-native material. Given the peculiarity of the passage, it seems better at 
this point to talk of the poet recognizing and engaging with the foreignness of certain 
                                                
276 Budin (2003:282) concludes likewise: “There is ambiguity in the Greek portrayal of Aphrodite, just as, 
for the Greeks, there was perceived ambiguity concerning the origins of this goddess and her arrival into 
Greece.” 
277 The vestiges of her associations with the Dawn goddess are compelling and certainly deserve to be 
explored as germane to our discussion of the episode in Iliad 5. 
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elements rather than merely preserving an inherited tradition that had already come to 
terms with Near Eastern material. 
 
3.3 / Powerful garments, ME’s, and τιµαί: Some correspondences 
One of the more arresting correspondences between Aphrodite, as she appears in 
the Iliad, and Inanna-Ishtar involves the magical seductive garment, the κεστὸς ἱµάς in 
Homer. In his note on Il. 14.214–7, lines from the prelude to the Dios apatê, Janko 
adduces the parallel of Inanna, who is “stripped of her ‘breast decoration’ as of all else” 
in the Descent… to the Nether World (ANET 55).278 This observation hints at the 
importance of Inanna’s being stripped.  
The story goes that Inanna makes her way through the seven gates of the 
Underworld to stand before Ereshkigal, her sister, whose nature is also contradictory.279 
At each gate she is stripped of pieces of her getup, which seem to correspond to or in 
effect function as the ME’s;280 Kramer translates these ME’s as (divine) ordinances, 
elsewhere (divine) decrees.281 These are not just de facto Inanna’s birthright, the Inanna 
and Enki myth shows us. In that myth, Inanna first acquires ostensibly all of them or at 
least a great number beyond expectation, and Enki attempts but has a difficult time 
                                                
278 1992:184-5. The detail of the seven gates of the underworld is reflected in CTH 324 (A iv 14–9 = 2 §27 
Hoffner, 1998), one version of the Telepinu myth. There, as Hoffner (1998:17) translates, “The gatekeeper 
opened the seven doors. He drew back the seven bars. Down in the Dark Earth stand bronze vats. Their lids 
are of lead. Their latches are of iron. That which goes into them doesn’t come up again; it perishes therein.” 
279 Heffron (2013) notes that she is associated with both death and birth; she is both Mother Earth and a 
virgin goddess. Classicists will quickly call to mind Gaia/Gê and Nyx. And we might also keep in mind, 
that Nergal, Ereshkigal’s consort, is the god of war.  
280 West (1997:239, 383–4) notes that the clothing of gods and heroes in abstraction has NE parallels.  
281 1950:361; 1951: passim; in a note to line 14 of the text, where Inanna arrays herself in the ME’s, 
Kramer tells us they are thought of as the origin and controls of “civilization” (quotation marks Kramer’s, 
indicating that ‘civilization’ may itself be problematic). But see also Green’s review of Farber-Flügge 
(1976) and Harris (1991:267 n. 33) for bibliography on the ME’s. 
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retrieving them despite sending a platoon of monsters after her getaway boat. Suffice it to 
say for now that the ME’s seem in part to be analogous to the τιµαί of the Theogony and 
comprise the Sumerian gods’ cultic and mythic identities.282 That Inanna acquires so 
many, including “heroism, power… the plundering of cities”,283 will be an important 
point of comparison when we deal with Aphrodite’s issues in Il. 5. 
At the seventh and final gate of the Underworld, Inanna, in spite of her 
protestations, is stripped of her breastplate, which is what is usually connected 
functionally with the κεστός.284 After this pala-garment, the garment of ladyship,285 is 
removed, Inanna is killed, and her corpse is hung on a hook and has to be revived by the 
kalaturru and kurgurru, whom Enki has fashioned and endowed with the food and water 
of life. Thus it seems that Inanna is prepared for death by first being divested of her τιµαί, 
which are contained or represented in part by her breastplate. It is quite possible then that 
the breastplate, which is collocated in the Descent with other beautifying apparatus, is 
involved to some degree in the seductive elements of Inanna’s nature; that Inanna is 
collocated in Near Eastern charms involving fruit, just as Aphrodite is in Greek myth, 
either strengthens that possibility or suggests that the various associations of Inanna are 
compressed for Aphrodite.286 
If we are right that the myth of Inanna’s katabasis and death involve the idea that 
the goddess’ essence is in part connected with her apparatus, then, it seems to be mirrored 
                                                
282 As Green (1976:284) notes, what is unusual about Inanna is that she acquires so many and such varied 
powers. 
283 From Segment D of translation of the ‘Inanna and Enki’ myth from Oxford’s Electronic Text Corpus of 
Sumerian Literature (ETCSL). 
284 As Janko (1992:184–5) notes, κεστός is not a noun but a verbal adjective from κεντέω modifying ἱµάς, 
but for the sake of brevity, I will do as Callimachus does and deploy it as a substantive. 
285 ‘Inanna’s descent to the Underworld’, translated by Black et al. (2006). 
286 Faraone (1990:235–6); see below on the Old Babylonian hymn parallel. 
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by the case of Aphrodite. When Hera, apparently needing Aphrodite’s special strap in 
order to deceive Zeus in Il. 14, asks the love goddess to help her reconcile Ocean and 
Tethys, a strange but apparently effective prevarication on her part, Aphrodite accedes 
because Hera “sleeps in Zeus’ arms”; as Janko notes, the reason Aphrodite gives for 
agreeing ironically foreshadows the real reason for Hera’s request.287 At Il. 14.214–21 
Aphrodite hands over the κεστός: 
ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱµάντα 
ποικίλον, ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο·  
ἔνθ’ ἔνι µὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ’ ἵµερος, ἐν δ’ ὀαριστὺς 
πάρφασις, ἥ τ’ ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων. 
τόν ῥά οἱ ἔµβαλε χερσὶν ἔπος τ’ ἔφατ’ ἔκ τ’ ὀνόµαζε· 
“τῆ νῦν τοῦτον ἱµάντα τεῷ ἐγκάτθεο κόλπῳ 
ποικίλον, ᾧ ἔνι πάντα τετεύχαται· οὐδέ σέ φηµι  
ἄπρηκτόν γε νέεσθαι, ὅ τι φρεσὶ σῇσι µενοινᾷς.” 
 
She spoke and undid the intricate embroidered strap from her 
chest, whereupon all manners of charm are wrought for her. 
Thereupon is sex, and desire, and sweet nothings, and 
beguilement, which steals even wise wits from careful men. She 
put it in her hands and spoke and addressed her: “Now place this 
intricate strap on your bosom, on which everything has been 
wrought. I suspect you won’t come back unsuccessful, whatever 
it is you purpose in your heart.”  
 
The strap therefore contains the τιµή/µοῖρα that Aphrodite is said to receive in the 
Theogony after the story of her birth (203-6): 
ταύτην δ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τιµὴν ἔχει ἠδὲ λέλογχε 
µοῖραν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,  
παρθενίους τ’ ὀάρους µειδήµατά τ’ ἐξαπάτας τε  
τέρψιν τε γλυκερὴν φιλότητά τε µειλιχίην τε. 
And from the beginning she’s held this honor and hit upon this 
allotment among men and the immortal gods, the sweet-nothings 
of maidens, and smiles, and beguilements, and sugary delight, 
and lovemaking, and honey-sweetness. 
 
                                                
287 Il. 14.213 and Janko (1992:184 ad loc.). 
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 West helpfully adduces an Old Babylonian Ammi-ditana hymn celebrating Ishtar as 
“She of joy, clothed in love, / adorned with fruit, seductive charm, and sex”.288 There is 
yet, however, a strange disparity between how the narrator describes what is embroidered 
on Aphrodite’s strap and what the goddess tells Hera is on it. On the one hand, πάντα 
(220) could just be shorthand for θελκτήρια πάντα (215), and one could assume that Hera 
knows what “everything” consists of. On the other hand, one cannot help but think of the 
shield of Achilles, on which everything really is wrought. Furthermore, we ought to 
compare the ‘Inanna and Enki’ myth, where the goddess does acquire seemingly all of 
the habitudes of civilization.289 There is no reason to think that the Greeks of the Iron 
Age and earlier did not have to reconcile their adoption of an all-powerful goddess, and 
one who thought of herself as such, with their own theological framework. A later Orphic 
hymn is quite explicit about the extreme breadth of Aphrodite’s dominion (Orphic h. 
55.1–7): 
Οὐρανία, πολύυµνε, φιλοµµειδὴς Ἀφροδίτη,  
ποντογενής, γενέτειρα θεά, φιλοπάννυχε, σεµνή, 
νυκτερία ζεύκτειρα, δολοπλόκε µῆτερ Ἀνάγκης· 
πάντα γὰρ ἐκ σέθεν ἐστίν, ὑπεζεύξω δέ <τε> κόσµον 
καὶ κρατέεις τρισσῶν µοιρῶν, γεννᾶις δὲ τὰ πάντα,  
ὅσσα τ’ ἐν οὐρανῶι ἐστι καὶ ἐν γαίηι πολυκάρπωι 
ἐν πόντου τε βυθῶι 
Heavenly one, much-hymned, smiling Aphrodite, sea-born, 
mother goddess, lover of nightlong festivals, hallowed, nocturnal 
yokestress, wile-weaving mother of Necessity. For everything 
issues from you, and you put the cosmos under the yoke and you 
rule over the three domains, and you engender all, as many things 
as there are in the sky and on the fruitful earth and in the depth of 
the sea. 
 
                                                
288 1997:384. 
289 ETCSL: ‘Inanna and Enki’. 
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Another striking parallel between Hesiod and Homer involves the ensuing scene 
of Zeus and Hera’s lovemaking (346-53):  
 Ἦ ῥα καὶ ἀγκὰς ἔµαρπτε Κρόνου παῖς ἣν παράκοιτιν· 
τοῖσι δ’ ὑπὸ χθὼν δῖα φύεν νεοθηλέα ποίην, 
λωτόν θ’ ἑρσήεντα ἰδὲ κρόκον ἠδ’ ὑάκινθον 
πυκνὸν καὶ µαλακόν, ὃς ἀπὸ χθονὸς ὑψόσ’ ἔεργε. 
τῷ ἔνι λεξάσθην, ἐπὶ δὲ νεφέλην ἕσσαντο  
καλὴν χρυσείην· στιλπναὶ δ’ ἀπέπιπτον ἔερσαι. 
So he spoke and Cronus’ son took his wife by the arms. Beneath 
them the ground sprouted grass, newly verdant, and dewy clover, 
and crocus, and hyacinth, thick and soft, which kept them high 
aloft off the ground; on this the two of them lay, and were 
covered over in a fine, golden cloud. Scintillating dewdrops fell 
from it. 
 
As Janko and West note, the image of the grass, herbs, and flowers springing up beneath 
them, in addition to providing comfort to Zeus and Hera and fulfilling the demand of 
dignity, illustrates the concept that the activity of the love-goddess brings about 
verdure.290 Besides the close parallel at Th. 194, where grass springs up under 
Aphrodite’s first steps on land,291 Inanna is associated with a bed of flowers in a praise 
song of Išme-Dagan (100–105):292  
Inanna, the lady of heaven and earth ……, chose me as her 
beloved spouse. She put attractiveness in my waist-belt (?), 
looking at me with her life-giving look, as she lifted her radiant 
forehead to me, to make me step onto the flowery bed.  
 
Consorting with Inanna, it seems, enhances one’s beauty. Interestingly, in the Homeric 
Hymn to Aphrodite, we see the narrative details of the praise song shaken up somewhat: 
at 148, Anchises chooses the disguised Aphrodite as his spouse (… ἐµὴ δ’ ἄλοχος 
κεκλήσεαι ἤµατα πάντα); at 155–8, Aphrodite makes her way toward Anchises’ bed with 
                                                
290 Janko (1992:206); West (1997:384). 
291 I wonder, too, if the στιλπναί ἔερσαι correspond in any way with the bloody ῥαθάµιγγες at Theogony 
183. 
292 ETCSL ‘A praise poem of Išme-Dagan’ 
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eyes cast downward (… φιλοµµειδὴς δ’ Ἀφροδίτη / ἕρπε µεταστρεφθεῖσα κατ’ ὄµµατα 
καλὰ βαλοῦσα / ἐς λέχος…); she removes her jewelry, which the poet first summarizes at 
162 as κόσµον… φαεινόν (!!), after which man and goddess lie literally and literarily 
right next to each other (167: ἀθανάτῃ παρέλεκτο θεᾷ βροτός);293 and after Anchises and 
Aphrodite have sex, while Anchises is fast asleep, Aphrodite resumes her divine beauty 
and stature (171–5). 
The exceptional scene of divine sexual intercourse in the Iliad seems to be 
unparalleled, at least in Greek sources. But an almost exact parallel for this scene appears 
in ‘A balbale (?) to Inanna (Dumuzid-Inanna P)’. After Inanna encourages Dumuzi to 
“plough her genitals” before Segment B of the text breaks off, Segment C begins with 
five very fragmentary lines followed by what looks like a description of the result of 
Dumuzi and Inanna’s sexual congress: 
The holy embrace ……. Fresh fruits (?) and shoots ……. As she 
arises from the king’s embrace, the flax rises up with her, the 
barley rises up with her. With her, the desert is filled with a 
glorious garden.294 
 
I suggest that the responsive fecundity of the ground beneath Zeus and Hera occurs 
precisely because Aphrodite has been involved, not just abstractly, but by lending Hera 
the strap. Thus Aphrodite’s τιµή and her ME, both her essence and her ordinance, have 
temporarily accreted to Hera along with the garment. As we will discuss in the next 
section, it may be the case that Aphrodite’s wounding scene is connected with this motif 
as well. 
 
                                                
293 See Faulkner (2011:232–3 ad loc.) for parallels in Greek, Latin, and Vedic. 
294 ETCSL: ‘A balbale (?) to Inanna (Dumuzid-Inanna P)’ 
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3.4 / Transgression: The rescue of Aeneas 
 At this point, we turn to Iliad 5, the bulk of Diomedes’ aristeia. Inspired by 
Athena with fighting strength and rashness (1–2), Tydeus’ son goes on a rampage: he 
almost kills Aeneas, wounds Aphrodite, and later injures Ares, although Athena’s ‘hand’ 
in Ares’ injury is much heavier. We begin with his encounter with the Dardanian prince. 
Diomedes picks up a monstrous stone and hurls it at Aeneas, hitting him in the hip, 
“where the thigh turns in the hip-socket, which they call the little cup” (305–6), breaking 
the tendons and ‘shoving’ off the flesh. Aeneas falls to his hands and knees and at 310 
“dark night envelops his eyes” (ὄσσε κελαινὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψεν).295  
In commenting on the phraseology of Aeneas’ injury, Kirk compares the formula 
τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσ’ ἐκάλυψεν, which occurs eleven times in the Iliad296 and normally 
implies dying rather than fainting.297 In fact, ‘normally’ is understated: in every instance 
in the Iliad, the formula indicates someone’s dying, as do all three occurrences of the 
verse-long formula τὸν δὲ κατ’ ὀφθαλµῶν ἐρεβεννὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψεν. On the other hand, 
the specific formula that is used to indicate Aeneas’ peril, κελαινὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψεν, 
possibly recurs at 11.356, where Diomedes’ spear-cast strikes Hector in the helmet, 
which Apollo had given the Trojan prince (τήν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, 353). The 
helmet rebuffs the spear, and “black night envelops” Hector, indicating that the hero has 
been dazed, probably concussed. The formula has one more variation, which appears at 
                                                
295 For general discussion of darkness and mist covering the head of those aggrieved, asleep, or dead see 
Onians (1954:420–423). 
296 This figure does not include the close variant of 16.325: κατὰ δὲ σκότος ὄσσ’ ἐκάλυψεν. West (1998, 
2000), following the MSS, consistently prints the formula with both the ephelcystic nu and the syllabic 
augment (with corresponding elision of the accusative dual morpheme –ε). 
297 1990:92 ad 309–10. 
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14.439,298 where once again (I dare say almost laughably) poor Hector gets the worst of 
an encounter with a proxy for Achilles,299 this time Ajax, who hits him in the chest with a 
large stone. Hector’s comrades bring him to the Xanthus (i.e. the Scamander) to recover, 
and the prince “…vomited up blood / and again he sank backward to the earth, and down 
upon his eyes / black night brought her veil (νὺξ ἐκάλυψε µέλαινα), and the missile was 
yet beating down his life (βέλος δ’ ἔτι θυµὸν ἐδάµνα)” (437–9).  
Thus we have a basic formula DARKNESS COVERS EYES, which fifteen out of 
eighteen times in the Iliad indicates death or dying; two out of the three cases in which it 
does not are also the only two occurrences of the κελαινὴ νύξ subspecies of the basic 
formula. It is possible that the exceptional collocation of this subspecies with an escape 
from death determines the function of the adjective-noun pair as indicating merely the 
loss of consciousness, but unless κελαινὴ νύξ was understood as qualitatively different 
from σκότος and ἐρεβεννὴ νύξ, we should assume that the poet meant to indicate that 
Aeneas and Hector were experiencing death, just as other heroes do.300 The further 
                                                
298 We might also compare the “cyan cloud” that envelops Polydorus at 20.417 after Achilles’ spear passes 
through his belly “beside the navel” (416). The “black cloud of grief (ἄχεος)” that envelops Hector 
(17.591) and Achilles (18.22) is a variation of the motif clearly delineated from the nexus we are handling 
by the presence of the adjectival genitive. 
299 On Diomedes’ role as Achilles’ proxy, see in particular Andersen (1978). 
300 For a more conservative assessment of the formulae, see Dyer (1974:32), who overemphasizes, in my 
estimation, the episodes of fainting, and misreads the cases of Tlepolemus and Deipyrus. Aristonicus, in his 
commentary Περὶ τῶν σηµείων τῆς Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσείας, explains why the doublet indicating Hector’s 
loss of consciousness 11.356 is obelized and asterisked by Aristarchus: ὀρθῶς κεῖται, ⟨ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὔ·⟩ οὐ 
γέγονε γὰρ σφοδρὰ πληγή, ὡς ἐπ’ Αἰνείου· οὐ “θλάσσε δέ οἱ κοτύλην” (Ε 307)· πῶς οὖν ἐσκοτώθη; Since 
he did not receive quite the blow Aeneas did, there was no reason for his ‘blacking out’ (πῶς οὖν 
ἐσκοτώθη;). (Friedländer (1853) inserted ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὔ.) The apparent ignorance about head injuries 
notwithstanding, Aristonicus’ use of σκοτόω perhaps indicates an ancient understanding of the proximity or 
equivalency of the formula used to describe Aeneas’ near-death experience to that of the death experience. 
Zenodotus omitted 11.356, and both Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus athetized it. See West 
(1998 app. crit. ad loc.). 
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explication of the lines from Book 14 that the missile was “yet beating down Hector’s 
life-force” supports this assessment.301 
Moreover, the encounters of Aeneas and Hector with Diomedes are marked as 
special by the collocation in both cases of divine aid: in the case of Hector’s concussion, 
the poet recalls the divine donor of the piece of armor which saves Hector, namely 
Apollo; in the case of Aeneas’ devastating hip injury, a divinity herself rescues him and 
suffers terribly for it. I argue here that Aphrodite’s rescue of Aeneas, because of the 
hero’s being in extremis as far as the Kunstsprache is concerned (had the poet stopped 
with 310, the audience would have understood that Aeneas was dead), involves a 
theological crisis, a demonstration of the dangers, even on the level of language, of divine 
intervention in the affairs of heroes. Aphrodite, I will argue further, is peculiarly apt to be 
the offending divinity, in part because of her multiform identity and her problematic set 
of powers. 
 
3.5 / Image and echo: A verbal defense 
 The particular formula for the near-death experience (which for efficiency’s sake 
we will call the ‘veil-of-night formula’) that the poet applies to the case of Aeneas gets 
used, I argue, because it sets the poet up to counteract it on several levels of expression 
during Aphrodite’s exceptional rescue effort. We quote the scene, from night’s 
envelopment of Aeneas’ eyes to Aphrodite’s intervention (310–6), in full:  
… ἀµφὶ δὲ ὄσσε κελαινὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψεν 
                                                
301 My assessment comports with that of Katz (2000) on the *wes- root in Indo-European. To summarize, 
Katz argues that clothing root (seen in Latin vestis and Greek ἕννυµι) is connected with vesper and 
ἔσπερος—the Indo-Europeans imagined Night as donning a shroud—and that the shroud is particularly a 
funereal one. Katz (2000:76 and n. 26) discusses both the collocations of νύξ and καλύπτω in Homer. 
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καί νύ κεν ἔνθ’ ἀπόλοιτο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας, 
εἰ µὴ ἄρ’ ὀξὺ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη, 
µήτηρ, ἥ µιν ὑπ’ Ἀγχίσῃ τέκε βουκολέοντι· 
 ἀµφὶ δ’ ἑὸν φίλον υἱὸν ἐχεύατο πήχεε λεύκω,  
πρόσθε δέ οἱ πέπλοιο φαεινοῦ πτύγµ’ ἐκάλυψεν 
ἕρκος ἔµεν βελέων...  
 
And about his eyes dark night placed her veil, and now 
Aeneas, lord of men, would have died on the spot, had not 
the daughter of Zeus, Aphrodite, taken keen notice, Aeneas’ 
mother, who bore him to Anchises, [having slept with him] 
while he was shepherding. About her dear son she shed her 
two white arms, and in front she veiled him with the fold of 
her shining robe, to be a defense against missiles. 
 
 
The music as well as the grammar of the passage is critical for understanding the 
momentousness of the episode. First, the veil-of-night formula, κελαινὴ κτλ., comprises 
one version of the so-called ‘paroemiac’. This colon occurs independently in other 
meters, e.g. at the beginning of Archilochus’, Stesichorus’, and Ibycus’ strophes.302 It 
appears to be a versatile unit of composition, perhaps one of the two larger building 
blocks of the hexameter;303 the importance of this versatility will become clear when we 
detail the musicality of the rescue. Second, in terms of the death-dealing formula’s 
phonemic qualities, it involves a marked alternation of k and l sounds in the pattern k–l–
k–l. Third, the positions of ἀµφί and ἐκάλυψεν at verse beginning and end provide a nice 
word picture.304 
                                                
302 West (1982:35, 53).  
303 Cf. Janko (1992:10) for other possible combinations of building blocks. I am inclined to see the 
hexameter as emerging from paroemiac following on the hemiepes (as West, Haslam), given the prevalence 
of the latter, not only in lyric clausulae but also in the pentameter, which combines with the hexameter to 
make the somewhat obscure and demonstrably old elegiac distich. 
304 Ben Fortson per litt. reminded me of the iconic power of ἀµφί and καλύπτω surrounding the clause. 
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Aphrodite’s two-step countermeasure engages and overturns the musical as well 
as the word-image qualities of the death knell.305 At 314 the poet manipulates the 
grammar of the veil-of-darkness formula: he redeploys the adverb ἀµφί and supplants the 
dark subject of ‘covered’ with the white object (‘arms’) of ‘poured’.306 In doing so, he 
also reverses the consonantal scheme above k-l(-k-l) to a degree by using the adjective 
λεύκω, a so-called phonetic reversal. For the second step of the rescue (315), the poet 
replaces the paroemiac of ‘dark night covered’ with ‘of the shining [robe] the fold she 
covered’.  In so doing, he provides echoes of the phonetic qualities of the veil-of-night 
formula: first, the syllable following the short anceps of the paroemiac,307 φαεινοῦ 
(<*φαϝεσ-ν-οῦ)308 ‘shining’, more or less reverses the vocalism of the analogous syllable 
in the veil-of-night formula, κελαινή (*κελα-ν-ι̯ή)309 ‘dark’; second, the ‘fold [of the 
shining robe]’ πτύγµ’ (315) both occupies the same metrical position as ‘night’ νύξ (310), 
namely the princeps of the fifth metron, and echoes its vocalism, as well as the post-
vocalic velar articulation; finally, as regards the grammar, the line-ending ionic ἐκάλυψεν 
is shared by both lines, but in the rescue formula, the verb’s valence has expanded to 
include a subject agent, the object used to cover, and the dative object of the adverb.  
                                                
305 Katz (2000:76 n. 26) also noticed the “white magic” of Aphrodite’s rescue, without commenting on the 
musical features of the passage. 
306 Statistically, univerbated ἀµφικαλύπτω appears much more frequently in Homer than the verb in tmesis. 
The only two exemples of the preverb ἀµφί separated from ἐκάλυψε are the identical lines 5.310 and 
12.356, which also display the less frequent contracted biceps of the fourth foot. But these statistics cannot 
necessarily help us decide whether we are dealing with a case of genuine tmesis or an original fronted 
preverb. That καλύπτω appears both with and without preverbs in identical images (i.e. of death) only 
complicates the picture. This is all to say that it appears that the poet of these lines probably had at his 
disposal and employed the syntactic versatility of a marked verbal lexeme to highlight the exceptionality of 
this episode. On all the possibilities of constructions with καλύπτω in Homer, see Dyer (1964), who insists 
that the verb is a religious lexeme (31, 32).  
307 In terms of the whole hexameter the second half of the third biceps. 
308 Chantraine (1983), Beekes (2010) s.v. 
309 Beekes (2010) s.v. 
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 Thus the principal echoic parallels are: DARK:SHINING and NIGHT:FOLD. It is 
important to note that, beyond the antinomy between the items of the first pair, in tragedy 
κελαινός comes to qualify things specifically on which the sun does not shine,310 
especially the underworld311 and its agents, like the Erinyes,312 whereas φαεινός is used 
both of Zeus’ eyes313 and Dawn314 in Homer. Although κελαινός might not be as marked 
in Homer as it is in tragedy, its use as a qualifier of blood315 as well as of night allows us 
to imagine that Aphrodite has countered night with dawn, the chthonic with the heavenly, 
and death with new life. Although there is no inherent antinomy between night and the 
fold of a robe, one of the vehicles of Dawn’s light in Homer’s repertoire of metaphors 
involves the robe, as in Ἠὼς κροκόπεπλος;316 thus, this echoic parallel also involves 
some imagistic opposition. 
 We ought not understate the power of such an echo as we have here, especially 
because it is signposted by the repetition of ἀµφικαλύπτω. I borrow Young’s 
simultaneous defense and criticism of the 19th century Pindarist, Metzger:  
… the repetitions of words [in Pindar] (and of ideas, phrases, 
imagery, etc., which are just as important and frequent as 
recurrent words) were not mere word-play, but a real and vital 
part of the natural tools by which the poet expresses himself 
fully, consistently if he so desires, and by which ideas are 
developed and relationships between ideas are expressed.317 
 
Although this particular criticism involves Pindar and not Homer, in general “such 
resonances and echoes must have frequently influenced the direction of oral composition 
                                                
310 LSJ, Chantraine (1983) s.v. 
311 Aesch. Pers. 433. 
312 id. Ag. 462. 
313 Il. 13.3. 
314 Od. 4.188. 
315 e.g. at Il. 1.303 et alibi. 
316 Il. 8.1 et alibi. 




and oral performance… to enhance the perception of both performer and audience.”318 In 
this particular case, we perceive rather clearly that Aphrodite is in a sense mimicking 
death in order to overcome it; the poet evokes and then undermines the expectations that 
have been established by Dichtersprache.319 The rescue technique is, after all, 
unparalleled.  
The normal divine rescue involves either casting a cloud or darkness over the 
attacker’s eyes or over the rescued person’s body to make him invisible, as Aphrodite did 
with Paris at 3.381.320 The reason for the difference in technique is clear enough. First, if 
Aphrodite were to cast mist over Diomedes’ eyes, she would be infringing upon the 
clarity of vision Athena granted him at 127 (ἀχλὺν αὖ τοι ἀπ’ ὀφθαλµῶν ἕλον, ἣ πρὶν 
ἐπῆεν). It may be that part of the reason for Athena’s ophthalmic treatment is to prevent 
rescues like that of Idaeus by Hephaestus at 23 (σάωσε δὲ νυκτὶ καλύψας). Furthermore, 
an attempt on Aphrodite’s part to employ a similar tactic to Hephaestus’ or the one she 
herself uses in Book 3 might be obviated by Athena’s preeminence in battle and 
Aphrodite’s inability to affect Athena elsewhere (h. Aph. 7–8). One explanation for 
Aphrodite’s new rescue tactic is that darkness is already cast around Aeneas, and it must 
be counteracted. Admittedly this requirement could be motivated by narrative concerns 
(it would sound silly to cast darkness around a character already enveloped in darkness) 
                                                
318 Watkins (1995:33). 
319 We might compare Apollo’s coming νυκτὶ ἐοικώς at Il. 1.47. Feeney (2014:190) comments on the 
metaphor as follows: “…since he has been called Φοῖβος, ‘bright/radiant,’ only four lines before, the 
oxymoronic power of the comparison to night is chilling.” One of the primary catalytic moments in the 
Iliad involves the counterpoise between how the audience has come to think of Phoebus Apollo and how he 
appears when he is peculiarly wroth at the Greeks. 
320 1990:93 ad 314–5. It is worth noting Aphrodite’s rescue of Aeneas may highlight Aphrodite’s Dawn 
associations. Her ‘white arms’ and ‘shining robe’ echo IE Dawn’s ‘fingers/hands of light’ and the Greek 
Dawn’s ‘golden robe’  (cf. Boedeker (1974:12 n.1), who is, however, wrong to connect ἀήρ with brightness 
(1974:41)). For a discussion of Dawn and Aphrodite, besides Boedeker (1974), see West (2007).  
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rather than by concerns about the proper rescue of a hero who is shrouded in death’s veil, 
but then we would have to deem the musical and imagistic effects exceptionally 
fortuitous. That the situation requires such a tactic does not, it seems, mean that it is 
without problems for Aphrodite or the poet.  
Recall that the explicit purpose enunciated in the hemiepes-long epexegetic 
infinitive of 316, ἕρκος ἔµεν βελέων, is a practical complement to these theological and 
imagistic constraints;321 it is also the link between Aphrodite’s exceptional rescue 
technique and her equally exceptional wound. For although the garment is a viable ἕρκος 
to begin with, ostensibly because of its being ‘immortal’ (ἀµβροσίου at 338), it explicitly 
fails to protect the goddess.322 There may be a correspondence between Aphrodite’s 
violation of powers of night and Inanna’s descent to the underworld, but we will 
postpone our discussion of the nature of that correspondence until we deal Zeus’ 
consolation and admonishment of his wounded daughter. 
 
3.6 / Violating the inviolable: Wounding the goddess 
 After all, Aphrodite’s success will come at a price. Diomedes’ henchman, 
Sthenelus, mindful of his comrade’s instructions, gives Aeneas’ horses to Deipylus and 
drives his own to support Diomedes (319–30). Diomedes makes his attack (330–9): 
… ὃ δὲ Κύπριν ἐπῴχετο νηλέϊ χαλκῷ, 
γινώσκων ὅ τ᾽ ἄναλκις ἔην θεός, οὐδὲ θεάων 
τάων αἵ τ᾽ ἀνδρῶν πόλεµον κάτα κοιρανέουσιν, 
οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ Ἀθηναίη οὔτε πτολίπορθος Ἐνυώ. 
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δή ῥ᾽ ἐκίχανε πολὺν καθ᾽ ὅµιλον ὀπάζων, 
                                                
321  An explanation included among the bT scholia is that the point of the robe is to make him invisible, but, 
as Kirk (1990:94 ad 314–5) notes, ἕρκος all but assures that the robe is meant to be a protective garment. 
322 The poet could simply mean that the robe belongs to a goddess, or even that it has been spritzed with 
some divine unguent, but the point remains that divine objects are not easily compromised by natural 
forces, including the impetuousness of men. 
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ἔνθ᾽ ἐπορεξάµενος µεγαθύµου Τυδέος υἱὸς 
ἄκρην οὔτασε χεῖρα µετάλµενος ὀξέϊ δουρὶ 
ἀβληχρήν· εἶθαρ δὲ δόρυ χροὸς ἀντετόρησεν 
ἀµβροσίου διὰ πέπλου, ὅν οἱ Χάριτες κάµον αὐταί, 
πρυµνὸν ὕπερ θέναρος· 
 
And [Diomedes] rushed at Kypris with the pitiless bronze, 
recognizing that she was an unwarlike goddess, and not one of 
the goddesses who marshal men in war,323 neither Athena nor 
Enyo, sacker of cities. When he did reach her, giving chase 
through the thick fray, thereupon, the son of stout-hearted 
Tydeus stretched out and stabbed the soft extremity of her arm 
as he leapt at her with the sharp spear. At once the spear bore 
right through the skin above the base of the palm, through the 
immortal robe, which the Graces themselves had fashioned.324 
 
As the first wound a god receives in the Iliad, the poet makes it remarkable. Diomedes, 
endowed with the perspicacity Athena gave him (127) recognizes that Aphrodite is one of 
the goddesses who is ἄναλκις. By way of contrast, Anchises, when confronted by 
Aphrodite and her scintillating outfit, is able only to suggest that she is a goddess, 
“Artemis or Leto or golden Aphrodite, / or high-born Themis or owl-eyed Athena” 
(h.Aph 93-4).325 Although it is true that Anchises did not get the same ophthalmic 
enhancement from Athena, recall that Athena’s action at 5.127 is not to give Diomedes 
the ability to recognize Aphrodite specifically, but merely to remove the ἀχλύς covering 
his eyes so that he could recognize immortals as such. She does not even give him 
instructions as to how he ought to recognize her; thus Aphrodite’s ἀνάλκεια must be 
                                                
323 Kirk takes ἀνδρῶν as going with πόλεµον, but provides an unconvincing rationale as to why we ought 
not to take it with the denominative verb κοιρανέω. As early as Hesiod (Th. 330), the verb governs a 
genitive. The other examples of the use of the verb in Homer are absolute. Furthermore, there is only one 
other instance in the Homeric corpus where ἀνδρῶν could be taken as modifying πόλεµον: Il. 7.36 (where 
Athena asks Apollo, πῶς µέµονας πόλεµον καταπαυσέµεν ἀνδρῶν;). The verb καταπαύω governs an 
accusative of the person stopped and a genitive of the thing from which they are made to stop, but, given 
that Athena’s question recalls and modifies Apollo’s exhortation at 29 (παύσωµεν πόλεµον καὶ δηϊοτῆτα), 
an “effortless” variation according to Kirk (1990: 235 ad 36), there is no reason why the genitive ἀνδρῶν 
cannot be understood as a genitive of separation in some sort of hypallage (“How do you intend to get the 
men to stop from the battle?” < “How do you intend to get the battle to stop from the men?”). 
324 The arm’s extremity (viz. the hand), Kirk (1990: 96 ad 339) reminds us, is later specified as the wrist 
(χεῖρ’ ἐπὶ καρπῷ, 458). The adjective πρυµνός, he notes, is used as a noun here. 
325 In the ensuing lines Anchises includes the Graces and the Nymphs as possibilities. 
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discernible because of her unwarlike getup, and this indicates to Diomedes that it is 
acceptable to attack her. This level of inductive reasoning on Diomedes’ part is not 
problematic, but I suggest that Aphrodite’s ἀνάλκεια is contextually marked by the 
preceding rescue effort, the course of the spear, and both the synchronically broad and the 
diachronically somewhat difficult semantics of ἀλκή. 
 In the first place, we ought to remember the syntax of 5.315, where καλύπτω has 
a nominative agent subject, an accusative ‘covering’, and the person covered in the 
dative, governed probably both by ἀµφί and a sense of advantage. This syntax with the 
verb καλύπτω mirrors that of instances where Ajax covers someone in the dative with his 
tower shield in the accusative (8.331=13.420, 17.132): ἀλλὰ θέων περίβη καί οἱ σάκος 
ἀµφεκάλυψε. (Are we meant to remember the Greek protector par excellence?) 
Furthermore, we have concluded that the epexegetic ἕρκος ἔµεν βελέων (316) seems to 
make sense because of the immortal nature of Aphrodite’s garment. In the ensuing 
wounding scene, the garment is found to be imperfect in its function as ἕρκος, even 
though during this moment of deficiency—and not when she uses it successfully as a 
ἕρκος—the poet calls it ‘immortal’. Even if ‘immortal’ is not meant to call inviolability 
to mind in 338, and just refers to its belonging to a divinity, the proximity of this 
wardrobe malfunction to the robe’s earlier successful function still stands. The poet does 
not need to have Diomedes stab her through the garment; the narrative would be certainly 
less awkward if he found some uncovered part of the goddess to aim for. A pragmatic 
explanation of the course of the spear would be more tendentious than to grant that the 
detail of the spear’s course through the deathless robe is important. 
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 The concept of ἀλκή we may offer us an approach to an answer. The standard 
etymology, which is phonologically unproblematic, has ἀλκή come from the zero grade 
of the root that gives us ἀλέξω (<*h2(e)lk, *h2lek-s-)  ‘protect’.326 Our zero-grade noun 
ought to then mean something like ‘protection’, ‘defense’ or ‘defensive capability’, but 
the semantic field has increased to include ideas of ‘might’ and ‘general fighting 
prowess’, and these seem to predominate in Homer over the zero definition of ‘protective 
capability’. One can suppose easily enough that, by way of the word’s collocation with 
µένος, ἀλκή ends up having a kind of synecdochic utility when not paired, being capable 
of indicating both offensive and defensive might, and not always simultaneously, or 
sometimes more broadly than both.  
As Collins argues, ἀλκή is also associated with possession, especially by Ares. He 
suggests that Hector, having put on Achilles’ armor, which he has stripped from 
Patroclus, “does not merely feel stronger as a result of putting on the armor; rather, the 
armor acts as a vehicle for him to be possessed by Ares.”327 It also becomes clear in other 
cases that Collins explores that ἀλκή, as it is divinely proffered, is subject to economy; 
like kudos, to which it is linked, ἀλκή is dispensed ultimately by Zeus, and in a given 
situation Zeus can give it to one man and not the other, as Nestor indicates to Diomedes 
(Il. 8.139–44) in response to a stroke of thunder.328 
I suggest that this economy may be central to Aphrodite’s wounding scene, not 
least because Aphrodite is susceptible to accretions and transferences of essence; 
Aphrodite is not simply ἄναλκις, but rather becomes so in the course of protecting 
                                                
326 Beekes (2013) s.v. 




Aeneas. In other words, since the detail of the robe perhaps recalls the ἀλκή achieved by 
donning immortal armor, Aeneas is to be understood as donning not just immortal armor, 
but the garb an immortal usually wears; since the economy of ἀλκή demands that the 
protection that is afforded also induce some lack, in this case for Aphrodite herself,329 the 
goddess has made herself vulnerable. Another distinct possibility is that the function of 
the garment is internally focalized through Aphrodite; perhaps she mistakenly believes at 
5.316 that it will function as a viable “defense against missiles,” and Diomedes just 
happens to stab her instead of Aeneas. Of course, by itself this application of the complex 
of ἀλκή to this scene is speculative, nor could this economy alone explain the apparent 
theological difficulty that a bleeding god presents, which has to be resolved by the poet’s 
subsequent explication of ἰχώρ.  
 
 
3.7 / Blood that is not blood: Healing the goddess 
 
 Ἰχώρ, however, is not the first term the poet uses to describe the substance that 
flows from Aphrodite’s fresh wound. First he calls it ἄµβροτον αἷµα (339), which 
Kleinlogel renders both “unsterbliches Blut” owing to the connection to ἀµβρόσιος (cf. 
immortalis), but also, by recalling the pairing βρότoν αἱµατόεντα,330 “unbluthaftes 
Blut.”331 The reason gods do not have the same blood as men, the poet tells us, is that 
they neither eat grain nor drink wine (341): οὐ γὰρ σῖτον ἔδουσ’, οὐ πίνουσ’ αἴθοπα 
οἶνον· As Kirk describes this aetiology, the lines “are a dramatic theological innovation, 
                                                
329 Further supporting this idea of transference of essence in general and the economy of immortality in 
particular is the blackening of Aphrodite’s skin at 354 (… µελαίνετο δὲ χρόα καλόν). This staining 
accompanies the ‘pains’ she suffers. For Hades these selfsame pains need to be overcome or ‘killed’ 
themselves, as Watkins (1995: 396) indicates.  
330 Not oxytone βροτὸν κτλ., as Kirk (1990: 97 ad 339-42) or as West (1998) prints it in his text (e.g. at 
7.425).  
331 1981:269-273.  
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cast in... quasi-hieratic form, wholly in accord both with the Homeric tendency to 
minimize many of the more carnal aspects of the gods and the needs of this particular 
wounding.”332 I would add that this aetiological detail as regards divine existence seems 
to be marshalled for the sake of explaining the nature of a divine wound, specifically 
what may be a relatively recent or peculiarly Homeric vision of divine wounds. The 
comparanda that Dione adduces to console Aphrodite, which we will explore in the next 
section, seem to support this idea of a quasi-religious refashioning of the divine. 
Aphrodite’s wound, then, functions as a paradeigma of the transition from the older, 
perhaps more Near Eastern, vision of the gods to the poem’s new theology.333 
Interestingly, part of the paradigm may involve the refashioning of mythic and linguistic 
material from Anatolia, although the latter is quite uncertain; but one cannot help but 
look at the strange lexeme for divine blood and see the Hittite word for blood, ešḫar. 
  Yet Hittite ešḫar is difficult to connect with ἰχώρ, being rather the cognate of 
εἶαρ.334 Nevertheless, there remains something tantalizingly familiar about KUB 3.16+ ii 
8′–11′ (CTH 311), an excerpt from the legendary Hittite account of the campaigns that 
Sargonic king Narām-Sîn waged in Anatolia. In this excerpt (trans. Beckman) “the ruler 
commands that a scout be dispatched to perform the following test on terrifying beings 
encountered by his forces:” 
When he proceeds to pierce(!) them with a spear and cut them 
with a blade(?)—if [blood] spurts forth from them, they are 
human, and I shall go against them (in battle). If blood does not 
spurt forth from them, they are deities, and I will not go against 
them.335 
                                                
332 1990: 96 ad 339-42. 
333 Cf. Kirk (1990:96 ad 339–42) for mention of the “ancient Mesopotamian concept of the gods actually 
feeding on sacrificial animals offered by mortal worshippers...”.  





The Sargonic ruler, it seems, has determined a means of avoiding becoming a full-blown 
theomachos like Diomedes, although it is perhaps an indication of the ruler’s general 
asebeia that he uses violence against potentially divine creatures to determine whether or 
not it is prudent to attempt violence against them.336 Importantly, he proves his potential 
adversaries for the “index of mortality,” namely the presence of ešḫar.337 In the Sumerian 
Vorlage to the Cuthean Legend of Narām-Sîn (itself the template for the Hittite version), 
whose earliest copies date to ca. 2000 B.C., the gods, especially Inanna, are offended and 
withdraw their favor from Akkad, though it is unclear why.338  
With a shriek, Aphrodite drops Aeneas (343), and Apollo catches him and covers 
him (ἐρύσατο) in a dark cloud (κυανέῃ νεφέλῃ) (344–5), lest anyone shoot him in the 
chest and take his life (345–6). One wonders whether this secondary rescue by Apollo is 
meant to provide a paradigm for the proper salvation of a mortal by a god. 
 
3.8 / Divine wounds as musical oppression 
 Meanwhile, Iris conducts Aphrodite out of the moil to her brother Ares, whom 
she begs for his chariot so that she may make her way to heaven. A few details of this 
transitional scene are worth exploring. First, the poet emphasizes in nearly superfluous 
                                                
336 Richard Janko (per litt.) reminds me of the irony of this action. Furthermore, when Diomedes 
encounters Glaucus in Book 6, at line 129 he says “I would not fight with heavenly gods” (οὐκ ἂν ἐγώγε 
θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισι µαχοίµην) before telling the story of Lycurgus. When Diomedes reiterates his point 
about being unwilling to fight against gods (141), he concludes by saying “but if you are of [the race] of 
mortals, who eat the fruit of the field, come closer, so that you may sooner reach the edges of destruction” 
(142–3). According to Kirk (1990:175 ad 142), the line end (ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν) recurs only in the 
Theomachy at 21.465. Kirk notes that the “idea of mortals as cereal-eaters recalls the distinctions of diet, 
and of blood versus ἰχώρ,” which are emphasized in Book 5. More precisely, mortal diet explains mortal 
blood, so again, Diomedes, like Narām-Sîn, is saying, “If you bleed, let’s fight!” 
337 Beckman (2011:95). The same test appears in the Standard Babylonian version of the Cuthean Legend 
of Narām-Sîn, but instead of  “deities,” a list of four groups of maleficent demons is provided as possible 
identifications of the miraculous horde (Astour 1976:577 n.61). 
338 Bacharova (2008:94). 
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detail that Aphrodite still suffers from the wound (352-4): τείρετο δ’ αἰνῶς / ... / 
ἀχθοµένην ὀδύνῃσι, µελαίνετο δὲ χρόα καλόν. The last detail, the darkening of 
Aphrodite’s skin, recalls both the image and the music of Aeneas’ affliction: the opening 
two syllables of the line-ending paroemiac in 354, µε-λαί-ν-, are parallel to κε-λαι-ν- in 
310. And when Iris and Aphrodite find Ares, at 357 the wounded goddess “collapses to 
her knees” (ἣ δὲ γνὺξ ἐριποῦσα), just as Aeneas had at 309. Thus we have an elaborate 
ring-composition organized not only by narrative parallelism, but also imagistic and 
conceptual opposition, as well as echo. The ring shows that Aphrodite has assumed in a 
way the wound that Aeneas initially suffered:  
[WOUND] > COLLAPSE  (309) > DARKNESS (310) > 
LIGHT (314-5) > [WOUND] > DARKNESS (354) > 
COLLAPSE (357) 
We ought not hesitate at this point to say that Aphrodite has fully assimilated Aeneas’ 
wound to her own being. 
 
3.9 / Consolations: Reorienting the goddess 
 In addition to the editorial explication of ἰχώρ, which serves in part to allay the 
theological absurdity of a bleeding goddess, Dione’s consolation of Aphrodite re-
contextualizes the goddess’ wound with the memory of earlier episodes of gods who 
suffered at the hands of mortals. This consolation achieves several effects: 1) Aphrodite’s 
suffering is recast as something that has happened to other members of the Olympians, 
which is to say that, if the wound initially called to mind the more carnal aspects of Near 
Eastern theology, it is now reimagined as an anachronistic contingency, rather than a 
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cultural one; 2) it reiterates the dangers born of the interaction between mortals and 
immortals and demonstrates this danger through poetic and linguistic structuring, in 
addition to the narrative details; 3) if ‘Kypris’ was initially showing her more eastern 
visage, particularly that of the incorrigible Inanna, then this scene, in conjunction with 
Zeus’ subsequent address of the goddess, restricts her sphere of power somewhat. 
 The first detail that needs to be considered is the appearance of Dione in the role 
of Aphrodite’s mother. This genealogical detail might strike one as strange when set 
alongside the more famous genealogy of Hesiod’s Theogony, where she emerges from 
the foam that is generated about the genitals of Ouranos, which Kronos had thrown into 
the sea (188–92): 
µήδεα δ’ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀποτµήξας ἀδάµαντι 
κάββαλ’ ἀπ’ ἠπείροιο πολυκλύστῳ ἐνὶ πόντῳ, 
ὣς φέρετ’ ἂµ πέλαγος πουλὺν χρόνον, ἀµφὶ δὲ λευκὸς  
ἀφρὸς ἀπ’ ἀθανάτου χροὸς ὤρνυτο· τῷ δ’ ἔνι κούρη 
ἐθρέφθη· 
And when at first [Kronos] had cut off the genitals with the flint 
and tossed them from the dry land into the crashing sea, the sea 
bore them along for a long time, and about the immortal skin 
arose white foam: in it grew339 a young girl.340 
 
In the first place, one cannot help but wonder whether the details of this birth-story for 
Aphrodite, particularly the anatomical ones, appear transformed in Iliad 5, which appears 
to be an ad hoc invention by the poet rather than an inheritance; even if Hesiod’s 
composition is younger, he might be more traditional, and Homer does have a tendency 
to suppress and allude to, rather than eradicate, variant or non-compliant traditions.341  
                                                
339 Also “coagulated”, Richard Janko per litt. reminds me. 
340 See West (1966:211–3 ad 154–210) on the complex etiological nature of the scene as well as the Near 
Eastern parallels for the castration. 
341 Cf. Slatkin (1995) on the function of Thetis and her mythic tradition in the Iliad. 
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 In Hesiod’s universe, by the violent act of Kronos, Aphrodite is the child of 
Heaven and the half-sister of the Erinyes, the Giants, and the Meliai342 (185–7), to whom 
Earth, having received the ‘bloody drops’ from Ouranos’ wound, gave birth. Thus at least 
two of her congeners have violent associations, and all three have chthonic ones. 
Furthermore, Aphrodite’s birth here precedes that of the Olympians proper; however, in 
the Iliad, Aphrodite is entirely Olympian, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, whose name is 
demonstrably a feminized Zeus.  
 If this genealogy for the goddess is a peculiarity of Homer’s, perhaps more 
precisely a peculiarity of Book 5, then we ought to determine why Dione might have 
been assigned the role of Aphrodite’s mother. Kirk suggests that, in addition to the 
suppression of “carnal extremes”, the “new but temporary addition” of Dione provides an 
apt comforter in a mother and also a variation on Ares’ (5.869ff.) and Artemis’ 
(21.505ff.) respective consolations at the side of Zeus.343 In the first place, Dione’s role at 
Dodona, other than as consort of Zeus, does not afford much help here. Second, Kirk’s 
suggestion that a mother is an apt comforter for a goddess seems unsatisfactory when we 
recall that it is Zeus who provides comfort to Artemis in Book 21, a fact Kirk that notes.  
 It turns out that the suppositions of G.D. Hadzsits, nearly eighty years before 
Kirk’s commentary, come very close to the explanation I would like to propose here, 
even if his might strike us as a bit misdirected toward allegorical reading. Hadzsits, 
apparently arguing from the premise that Aphrodite is through-and-through an import, 
proposes the following scenario:  
                                                




When the Greeks welcomed the great goddess from the East, 
whose life-creating animus pervaded the whole Universe, the 
choice of Dione from among the autochthonous Greek divinities, 
as mother of Aphrodite, brought the latter goddess into the 
closest association with the body of Greek beliefs, by reason of 
Dione’s great antiquity.344 
 
He suggests further that beneath this obvious mechanism of adoption are two conceptual 
factors: their common association with life and fertility, and their common identification 
with moisture as a creative element in the universe. 
 As regards the importance of Dione’s antiquity, it is hard to judge what the 
Homeric poet understood of the chronological development of the Greek pantheon and its 
members, and one would be hard-pressed to explain the variant visions of Dione in two 
of the oldest literary recognitions of her: besides Iliad 5 we have Hesiod’s placement of 
Dione among the Oceanids (Th. 353). Furthermore, Dodona’s antiquity does not 
necessarily entail the same for Dione, especially since the two are not explicitly 
connected in either Homer or Hesiod. Perhaps Dione is a subtle index—like the poet’s 
use of Kypris here—of the genealogy we see in Hesiod, if Dione as an Oceanid is a 
metonym for the sea. 
 It is also important to remember that, whatever accretions from the East coalesced 
with native Greek, Indo-European, and substrate goddesses to produce Aphrodite, those 
Eastern accretions could not have been simplex, since large-scale syncretism among 
Eastern goddesses had been taking place for some time, even within a single pantheon, it 
seems. (It actually seems somewhat misguided to talk of monolithic or synchronic 
pantheons in the Near East.) Smith argues convincingly that Israelite Yahweh is the result 




of one such process of syncretism among Canaanite deities.345   And there are certainly 
several ‘Queens of Heaven’ (who are also Queens of the Sea) in the East, but here I will 
suggest in passing the relevance of three Semitic goddesses, Asherah, Astarte, and Anat. 
In short, in both the Ugaritic and the Biblical literature—although there are only indirect 
allusions to Anat in the OT—the three goddesses appear as intimately connected with 
both Baal and Yahweh and seem to go through both diachronic and synchronic 
syncretisms with one another, aided by the similarity of the names Asherah and Astarte 
and perhaps consciously motivated by the attachments of the latter to prostitution.346  
 
3.10 / Consolations: Paradeigmata of suffering 
 The strangeness of the scene continues as Dione contextualizes Aphrodite’s injury 
and suffering with a tradition of other gods who have suffered at the hands of mortals. In 
a way, the scene reads like a typological analysis, and perhaps we can use that 
characteristic to discover certain psychological and poetological elements that are either 
subtle or absent. Dione’s concision is, after all, rather remarkable. We provide the speech 
in full (381–404): 
Τὴν δ’ ἠµείβετ’ ἔπειτα Διώνη, δῖα θεάων· 
“τέτλαθι τέκνον ἐµόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδοµένη περ· 
πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ τλῆµεν Ὀλύµπια δώµατ’ ἔχοντες 
ἐξ ἀνδρῶν, χαλέπ’ ἄλγε’ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοισι τιθέντες. 
τλῆ µὲν Ἄρης ὅτε µιν Ὦτος κρατερός τ’ Ἐπιάλτης                385 
παῖδες Ἀλωῆος, δῆσαν κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσµῷ· 
χαλκέῳ δ’ ἐν κεράµῳ δέδετο τρισκαίδεκα µῆνας· 
καί νύ κεν ἔνθ’ ἀπόλοιτο Ἄρης ἆτος πολέµοιο, 
εἰ µὴ µητρυιὴ περικαλλὴς Ἠερίβοια 
Ἑρµέᾳ ἐξήγγειλεν· ὃ δ’ ἐξέκλεψεν Ἄρηα                               390 
ἤδη τειρόµενον, χαλεπὸς δέ ἑ δεσµὸς ἐδάµνα. 
τλῆ δ’ Ἥρη, ὅτε µιν κρατερὸς πάϊς Ἀµφιτρύωνος 
                                                
345 2002. 
346 Day (2010); cf. Smith (2002). 
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δεξιτερὸν κατὰ µαζὸν ὀϊστῷ τριγλώχινι 
βεβλήκει· τότε καί µιν ἀνήκεστον λάβεν ἄλγος. 
τλῆ δ’ Ἀΐδης ἐν τοῖσι πελώριος ὠκὺν ὀϊστόν,                          395 
εὖτέ µιν ωὐτὸς ἀνὴρ υἱὸς Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο 
ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι βαλὼν ὀδύνῃσιν ἔδωκεν· 
αὐτὰρ ὃ βῆ πρὸς δῶµα Διὸς καὶ µακρὸν Ὄλυµπον 
κῆρ ἀχέων ὀδύνῃσι πεπαρµένος· αὐτὰρ ὀϊστὸς  
ὤµῳ ἔνι στιβαρῷ ἠλήλατο, κῆδε δὲ θυµόν.                             400 
τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρµακα πάσσων 
ἠκέσατ’· οὐ µὲν γάρ τι καταθνητός γε τέτυκτο. 
σχέτλιος, αἰσυλοεργὸς, ὃ τ’ οὐκ ὄθετ’ αἴσυλα ῥέζων, 
ὃς τόξοισιν ἔκηδε θεοὺς οἳ Ὄλυµπον ἔχουσιν.” 
Then Dione, most brilliant of goddesses, answered her. Endure 
my child, and hold yourself up, grieved though you are. For 
many of us who have Olympian residence have suffered at the 
hands of men: different men have afflicted different gods with 
harsh pains. Ares suffered, when strong Otus and strong Epialtes, 
the children of Aloeus, bound him in a strong bind: they bound 
him up in a bronze jar for thirteen months. And now Ares, 
insatiate of war, would have perished from that, had not their 
stepmother, beautiful Εeriboia, told Hermes. And he absconded 
with Ares, who was already worn out, and the harsh fetter was 
beating him down. Suffered, too, Hera, when the staunch son of 
Amphitryon had shot her beneath the right breast with his three-
pronged shaft. At that point she took on incurable pain. Suffered, 
too, monstrous Hades a swift shaft, when that same man, the son 
of aegis-bearing Zeus, shot him in Pylos and gave him over to 
pains. At that point he made his way to the house of Zeus and 
tall Olympus, grieving at heart and pierced with pains; the shaft 
had been driven into his bulky shoulder, and beset his spirit. But 
Paeion applied painkilling drugs and healed him. For he was 
nowise mortal. The incorrigible, wicked-doer, who did not 
shudder at doing wicked things, who vexed the gods who hold 
Olympian homes with his arrows. 
The entire speech strikes me as a short hymn to the gods who suffered or perhaps to the 
offending mortals. Its structure is highly rigid,347 but not inorganic. First, Dione 
encourages Aphrodite to take heart, to “endure” her pains. The quasi-hieratic formulation, 
τέτλαθι... καὶ ἀνάσχεο,348 recalls Hephaestus’ attempt to console his mother in Book 1, 
                                                
347 See Lohmann’s (1970:53–54 n.93) brief analysis of the speech’s composition, which is a combination of 
ring composition and parallel composition. 
348 cf. Kirk (1990: 96 ad 339–42). 
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after she is been threatened by Zeus for her meddlesomeness, but with the roles reversed: 
Hephaestus addresses Hera as µῆτερ ἐµή (2nd metron + princeps of third metron), while 
Dione addresses Aphrodite as τέκνον ἐµόν (same metrical position). In this way we get a 
sense of Diomedes’ power to inflict terror on at least Aphrodite: Aphrodite’s distress at 
Diomedes’ brazenness parallels Hera’s fearful silence at Zeus’ threat. Furthermore, the 
collocation in Book 1 of the imagined result of an Olympian row that might arise from a 
quarrel between Zeus and Hera, namely that Zeus could knock all the Olympians from 
their heavenly seats if he wanted (580–1), may bear on Aphrodite’s conclusion that the 
Danaans are now waging battle against the immortals (379–80: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι Τρώων καὶ 
Ἀχαιῶν φύλοπις αἰνή, / ἀλλ’ ἤδη Δαναοί γε καὶ ἀθανάτοισι µάχονται): to Aphrodite, 
wounded and terrified as she is, the threat to the immortals posed by mortal θεόµαχοι 
mirrors Hephaestus’ admittedly more valid concern about Zeus’ wrath. We may draw 
conclusions later about how Diomedes functions within the larger framework of the 
Iliad’s theological concerns. 
 As Kirk notes, τέτλαθι “is the first of five successive uses of τλάω.”349 The verb 
provides a lexical node that will connect the gods that Dione lists with Aphrodite, 
although the imperative “means ‘endure’ rather than something closer to ‘suffer’ as in the 
other instances.”350 In fact, this lexical bivalence is quite pointed: the ability of a divinity 
to ‘endure’ is indexed directly by his or her ‘suffering’. This conforms with the examples 
of divine τληµοσύνη that Dione provides her daughter as part of her consolatory speech: 
the extremeness of the suffering, nearly to the point of death in the case of Ares, 
emphasizes the theological absurdity, and therefore the impossibility of such cases 
                                                
349 1990:100 ad 382. 
350 Kirk (1900:100 ad 382). 
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reaching the point where the gods’ appellation as “deathless ones” makes no sense. At the 
same time it introduces a complex of myths wherein immortals, perhaps because of their 
deathlessness, can be shown to suffer awfully from the violence of men. 
 The first example that Dione adduces, that of Ares, is marked as distinct from the 
other two by the detail that the Aloadai, and not Heracles, are the perpetrators. This fact 
strikes me as strange, since Dione introduces the list by saying that many gods have 
suffered at the hands of ἄνδρες (384). Although Otus and Ephialtes are certainly 
considered mortals, as the story in the Nekyia shows, they are “of monstrous size... [and] 
equivalent... to Typhoeus and the Titans as rebels against Zeus.”351 But Dione’s point 
must be that many immortals have suffered at the hands of mortals. Her use of ἄνδρες to 
mean θνητοί is oblique, but parallels the obliqueness of Ὀλύµπια δώµατ’ ἔχοντες (383). 
 The next detail, of the binding of Ares by the Aloadai, is fascinating and part of a 
rich Mediterranean mythological nexus. As Teffeteller has argued, the confinement of the 
war-god parallels the binding and confinement in the Underworld of the Hittite Storm-
god in the strange and fragmentary ‘Canaanite’ myth of Elkunišra and Ašertu,352 and 
incarceration in jars is a form of capital punishment among the Hittites.353 Garcia, Jr., 
picking up on the work of Stokes, West, and Johnson, and based on the description of 
                                                
351 Kirk (1990:100–1 ad 385–7). In the Nekyia, they are not classified as ἄνδρες or anything else. We are 
merely told that they were the tallest and fairest after Orion, who is understood as a giant (ps.-Apollodorus 
1.25) and a possibly a hero (Diodorus Siculus 4.85), depending on whether Diodorus meant by his 
comparison of him with the heroes with respect to “greatness” and “brute force” that he was an exceptional 
specimen among that race. They were also buboniform (and nightmarish) (see Janko 1982:408 ad 13.478–
80,  
352 2010:138–41; for bibliography on Hittite ‘Canaanite’ myth, see especially p. 133 n.1. That myth 
apparently involves cuckolding, like the story of Ares and Aphrodite in the lay of Demodocus. 
353 Hoffner (1997:219–20), cited by Teffeteller (2010:140–1, nn. 37–8). 
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Tartarus in the Theogony, a passage whose authenticity has been doubted,354 points out 
that the “brazen jar” in which Ares is imprisoned is Tartarus itself.355 
 As for why Ares is incarcerated, the bT scholiast’s remark that the binding of 
Ares was in revenge for Ares’ killing of Adonis seems out of place, “like Hellenistic 
aetiology,” according to Kirk;356 we need not try to unearth a rationale for the episode, 
since Dione’s main point is merely that other gods have been victimized by men.  
We can perhaps say something, however, about the length of Ares’ confinement, for 
elsewhere in early epic we hear of a discrete length of time that gods are said to be 
punished and suffer. At Theogony 795-803, Hesiod tells us that gods who break oaths are 
punished in the following way:357  
κεῖται νήυτµος τετελεσµένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν·                             795 
οὐδέ ποτ’ ἀµβροσίης καὶ νέκταρος ἔρχεται ἆσσον 
βρώσιος, ἀλλά τε κεῖται ἀνάπνευστος καὶ ἄναυδος 
στρωτοῖς ἐν λεχέεσσι, κακὸν δ’ ἐπὶ κῶµα καλύπτει. 
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νοῦσον τελέσει µέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν, 
ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἆθλος·          800 
εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαµείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων, 
οὐδέ ποτ’ ἐς βουλὴν ἐπιµίσγεται οὐδ’ ἐπὶ δαῖτας 
ἐννέα πάντ’ ἔτεα·358 
 
[The oathbreaker] lies breathless for a full year, and not ever 
does he approach ambrosia and nectar, his sustenance, but rather 
he lies breathless and voiceless on spread beds, and an evil coma 
veils him over. And when he finishes out this ailment for a great 
year, in exchange for one trial another more grievous trial is 
accepted: for nine years he is bereft of his share in the gods who 
live forever, nor ever for nine whole years does he take part in 
their council or feasts. 
 
                                                
354 See note 86. 
355 2007:450–3. 
356 1990:101 ad 385–7. 
357 The extensive description of Styx, which includes the following punishment, has been marshaled as 
evidence for the authenticity of the description of Tartarus (721–819) in the poem. See Johnson (1999). 
West (1966:357 ad 72–819) argues compellingly that this portion of the description of the underworld is 
genuine. 
358 Text is that of West (1966). 
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The poet provides us with two discrete time measurements: the coma lasts a great year 
(however we are to imagine its length359) and the suspension from divine activities nine 
years. Furthermore, we are provided a number of details about the punishment, all of 
which involve deprivation: they are breathless (795 and 797, with two different lexemes), 
unable to approach ambrosia and nectar (796–7), voiceless (797), and eventually unable 
to participate in Olympian affairs (801–3). Garcia, Jr.’s sensitive reading of the complex 
temporalities invoked in the Homeric poems is applicable here, but with some 
modification.360 On Hera’s wound, to which we will turn briefly, he comments as 
follows: 
Although ageless... and immortal, Hera comes to experience 
human time through the physical pain of her wound, for she must 
endure incurable [ἀν-ήκεστον] pain when she is shot by 
Herakles... The physical pain ensnares Hera in mortal time.361 
 
While I agree that pain introduces a novel, para-mortal, experience to the gods who feel 
it, the pain’s incurability in Hera’s case does not fetter Hera to mortal time; rather the 
pain is grafted onto immortal time-reckoning by virtue of both its being incurable and its 
being suffered by an immortal. For while mortal bodies are eventually overcome by 
incurable pains or otherwise deteriorate before the pain ever abates, the incurable pain is 
assimilated to her deathlessness. Perhaps it is rather a trenchant paradox: immortals can 
feel incurable pain, a mortal experience that indexes death, forever. When we turn to the 
details of Hera’s wound we will suggest just how pointed the detail of the incurability of 
her pain might be. 
                                                





 As it stands, Garcia, Jr.’s comment seems more applicable to Ares’ imprisonment 
and perhaps the divine oath-breaker’s punishment in Hesiod, since there finite sentences 
are mentioned, and the suffering of the gods who are involved is connected with those 
discrete timeframes: Ares’ near-death experience is somehow linked with the thirteen 
months during which he is imprisoned, as if, despite his agelessness and deathlessness, 
the finitude of his incarceration afflicts him as it would a mortal prisoner;362 the 
hypothetical oath-breaker in Hesiod is afflicted with complete privation of function 
(νήυτµος—ἀνάπνευστος—ἄναυδος—ἀπάµειρεται) for the duration of his sentence.363 
Perhaps ironically, during the coma or, as is likely, causing it, the foresworn cannot 
approach ambrosia and nectar (i.e. ‘deathlessness’). Although the deprivation of these 
preservatives does not kill the god, it renders him temporarily defunct.  
 Yet Ares’ condition seems decidedly worse than that of the oath-breaker. He 
would have perished, except for the help of Eeriboia, a murky figure in the mythological 
record, and Hermes. For we are told that, when Hermes broke him out, Ares was “at that 
point being worn down, and the grievous bond was subduing him” (391).364 Garcia, Jr.’s 
point that τείρω is a lexeme befitting mortal exhaustion or consumption is on the mark,365 
but the fact remains that the aspect of both the participle τείροµενον and the finite verb 
ἐδάµνα are progressive; no end, no completion, is discernible. But what can we make of 
                                                
362 Of course, unlike the oath-breaker in Hesiod, whose sentence is prescribed, Ares’ thirteen month stint is 
merely how long it takes before Hermes rescues him. It is nonetheless interesting that that length of time is 
logically connected with his deteriorated state at the moment of jail-break. 
363 With these two cases we ought to compare the indentured servitude of Apollo, who is made to serve 
Admêtos, variously for killing the dragon or for killing the Cyclopes, since they fashioned the bolt of Zeus, 
with which he had killed Asclepius. Fontenrose (1959:87), following Phillipson (1944), observes that 
“Admetos is the invincible, a form of Hades... Apollo’s servitude means his sojourn among the dead.” 





the counterfactual statement? The rescue involves two steps: the first, which is properly 
the protasis of the counterfactual statement, and therefore the condition that makes the 
apodosis contrafactual, is the announcement by the Aloadai’s stepmother to Hermes; the 
second, the actual rescue, is no longer part of the conditional statement. Therefore, it 
stands to reason that Hermes’ ability to rescue Ares was predicated on his finding out 
about his imprisonment. Had Eeriboia not shared that information with Hermes, Ares 
would have remained imprisoned; but I suspect that he would not have died in the sense 
of being destroyed. Rather he would have been rendered indefinitely defunct in a fashion 
similar to the punishment of the oath-breaker. If this seems like ontological hair-splitting, 
I insist that deciding exactly how the poet imagines that gods can suffer is crucial for 
determining precisely what is the psychological and philosophical infrastructure of the 
poem as regards its insistence upon division of men and gods, especially when it calls 
into question that division. 
 In addition to the depiction of an overcome Ares, I propose that the poet uses the 
features of epic language to indicate the subjugation of the war-god. For example, in line 
385, there is a marked difference between Ares’ name (Ἄρης), an iambus, bare of 
epithets and the paroemiac-long names of the Aloadai, which end the line (Ὦτος 
κρατερός τ’ Ἐπιάλτης), plus the continuation of their appellation into the beginning of the 
next verse (παῖδες Ἀλωῆος); the onomastic imbalance may be further heightened by the 
fact that Ares becomes the insignificant-seeming enclitic accusative µιν in the clause in 
which the Aloadai are the giant subject. Perhaps more significantly, when we are told that 
the fetter was subduing Ares, the war-god, as object of ἐδάµνα, is represented by the 
other enclitic 3rd person accusative pronoun ἑ (<*ϝε). Of the nearly seventy places in 
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Homer where the poet uses this enclitic pronoun, only here is it used of a god. It is hard 
to determine whether is the result of accident, or whether there could have been a lexical 
distinction in Ancient Greek analogous to the T-V distinction in second person pronouns 
in many modern languages. Either way, it sounds as if Ares has been reduced to a single 
short syllable. 
 The introduction of Hera’s suffering (392) is identical in structure to the 
introduction of Ares’ suffering at 385. The formula, τλῆ... GOD, ὅτε µιν ASSAILANT, 
postpones the verb of assault until the next line, thereby fronting the abovementioned 
onomastic imbalance. In Hera’s case, she is overwhelmed by the paroemiac-long 
patronymic(+modifier) of Heracles: κρατερὸς πάϊς Ἀµφιτρύωνος. Like Epialtes and the 
‘fetter’ the Aloadai use to bind Ares, Heracles is called κρατερός “mighty”. Formally, 
this adjective is neither comparative nor contrastive (like δεξιτερός or ὀρέστερος), but 
given the context and the otherwise lazy-seeming repetition of the word, one wonders 
whether the poet has called upon the resemblance of the adjectival suffixation here to the 
comparative/contrastive suffix to inculcate further the extraordinary nature of the mythic 
material into this scene. After all, in each case that Dione provides, the mortal assailant(s) 
and their equipment have proven “mightier” than their victims. 
 The details of Hera’s wound affliction are less full than in the case of Ares. We 
learn in succinct terms where on her body she was shot (δεξιτερὸν κατὰ µαζόν), what 
kind of arrow it was (τριγλώχινι366), and what the result was (ἀνήκεστον λάβεν ἅλγος).367 
                                                
366 This exceedingly rare descriptor (5x in the entire Greek corpus!) shows up in one other place in Homer, 
at Il. 11.507, where Paris shoots Machaon (interestingly) in the right shoulder with a “three-tongued shaft.” 
The wounding of Machaon terrifies the Achaeans, since he is a “doctor worth as much as many / at cutting 
out arrows and applying gentle drugs” (514–5: ἰητρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων / ἰούς τ’ ἐκτάµνειν 
ἐπί τ’ ἤπια φάρµακα πάσσειν.). One wonders whether there is something about an explicitly “three-
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The only other use of the adjective ἀνήκεστος in the Homeric corpus occurs when 
Poseidon threatens (ἀπειλήσω, 15.212) that there will be “incurable” χόλος between 
himself and Zeus in the event that Zeus will not let Troy be sacked.368 As indicated 
above, I think that the adjective fits better with immortality; thus pain, which may be 
primarily a mortal experience, gets immortalized, and in that way creates an intractable 
paradox, namely that Hera is subjected to mortal experience in the indefinitude of 
immortal time. 
 Finally, Dione presents the case of Hades. This time the poet modifies the 
structure slightly. While 395 does start with the expected τλῆ + GOD, here the verb is not 
absolute as in 385 and 392, but takes a direct object, ὠκὺν ὀϊστόν. And although Hades is 
πελώριος in 395, in 396 he, like Ares and Hera is reduced to µιν, while Heracles’ name 
occupies the second metron onward. 
 The details of Heracles’ encounter with Hades are somewhat obscure and there is 
little agreement as to what the phrase ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι indicates.369 Furthermore, the 
following lines, 398–402, have been suspected and were deleted by Koechly as an 
interpolation from 899–904 of the same book, the description of Ares’ healing by Paieon. 
                                                                                                                                            
tongued” arrow and issues of curability. If the γλωχίς is to be understood as a barb (cf. LSJ s.v. and the 
scholia to Sophocles’ Trachiniae 680–1), then a triple-barbed arrow seems especially apt to beset those 
who are struck by one with pains, and not easily cured ones, we might say binding ones; one might 
compare the “triple-barbed” isle (Sicily) that lays atop Enceladus (Call. Aet. 1.36). 
367 As with Ares, the reasoning or the occasion for the wound of Hera is not stated explicitly. But the bT 
scholia mention that some thought Hera received the wound in the same battle against the Pylians in which 
Hades got his, while others say that Heracles wounded her out of revenge for her not letting him nurse 
when he was an infant (ἡ δὲ ἱστορία ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πυλίους µάχῃ αὐτὴν ἔτρωσεν. 
οἱ δέ φασιν ὅτι, διότι νήπιον ὄντα οὐκ εἴασεν αὐτὸν σπάσαι τὸν ἴδιον µαζόν, ἔτρωσεν αὐτήν). 
368 Compare Artemis’ χόλος in Bacchylides 5.103–4 (to Hieron), where it is ἀνίκᾱτον on account of 
Oeneus’ impiety in her regard. This line must be a clever intertext on the part of Bacchylides. 
369 See Kirk (1990:102 ad 396–7) for the variant suggestons in the scholia; he is inclined toward the 
interpretation (of Aristarchus) that the phrase indicates that this encounter took place at the entrance to the 
underworld, but see also Janko (1986:49). 
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Kirk seems not to notice Koechly’s deletion,370 and West does not seem to feel strongly 
one way or the other about them, although he brackets them.371 Yet the textual evidence 
for interpolation is weak at best. The only line shared by the two passages is τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ 
Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρµακα πάσσων (401; πάσσεν at 900, with 901=402 unknown to 
Aristarchus, neglected by the scholia and omitted by a number of manuscripts). 
Furthermore, no manuscript is missing lines 398–402, and the bT scholia comment on 
them; it seems Aristarchus felt them to be secure. 
 As regards arguments about the logical interruption posed by lines 398–402, I 
find Leaf’s and West’s assessments wrongheaded. The relative clause in 404 is a 
reminder that Heracles is the offending party, a reminder needed because the poet has 
taken several lines to describe the (admittedly surprising but pointed) fact of Hades’ 
removal to Olympus; Heracles is not named here, but referred to by his actions. In the 
same way, Dione does not immediately name Diomedes at 406, but refers to him as 
τοῦτον. Thus, with this relative clause, Dione finishes her paradeigma, and the poet 
closes this ring.372 My understanding of the composition of the speech thus far, expanded 
                                                
370 1990:102–3 ad 398–402. He comments on them as if they are secure, noting that Hades’ ascent to 
Olympus surprisingly has not provoked more comment. 
371 1998:156. West (2001:192) comments as follows: “Koechly’s deletion of these lines deserves to be 
taken seriously. Hades’ withdrawal to Olympus and his treatment by Paieon cannot have been an essential 
part of the original myth, and indeed the idea of his ever entering Olympus is startling. The abrupt change 
of subject back to Heracles in 403 lends weight to the suspicion of interpolation. The only justification for 
the lines is that they introduce a complementary element into Dione’s consolatory speech: not only should 
Aphrodite bear in mind that other deities before her have suffered violence at the hands of mortals but they 
have the option of retiring to Olympus and finding easy healing there—as indeed in a moment Dione 
herself will heal Aphrodite’s little wound. Even so, the lines do interrupt the rhetorical structure, and they 
reflect Ares’ healing by Paieon in 899-904 rather than Aphrodite’s by Dione.” Although Lohmann (1970: 
53-54 n.93) reckons them a later interpolation on account of their not fitting within the ring composition 
that he outlined (“die Verse... sind daher deutlich als späterer Zusatz erkennbar”), he overlooks the 
parallelism that West (2001:192) mentions, as well as the parallelism between Hades’ removal to Olympus 
and Ares’ salvation. His reckoning of the speech’s composition is anemic. 
372 Lohmann treats this speech in his chapter on “die kombinierten Formen”, which use both ring 
composition and parallelism. 
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and modified from Lohmann’s, is as follows: 
1) Dione begins her speech (382) by framing the opposition between suffering (here, κηδ-) and 
enduring, and playing on the bivalence of the lexeme (τλα-);  
 
2) Dione then (383-4) justifies (γάρ) her imperatives to Aphrodite by saying that 
gods (referred to obliquely by the residence on Olympus)373 have formerly 
suffered (τλα-, demonstrating the bivalence of the lexeme) at the hands of men, 
another opposition;  
 
3) Dione provides three parallel examples (385-402) of such suffering in 
nearly the same structure (GOD SUFFERED when MAN ASSAILED 
him/her); each example is given an outcome, with the first and third 
examples demonstrating the availability of relief: 
 
 a) Ares was rescued,  
 
  b) Hera received an incurable wound,  
 
 a’) and Hades withdrew briefly to Olympus to be cured by 
 Paeion; 
 
3’/2’/1’) Dione closes her general paradeigma (402-4) by invoking both the endurance 
mentioned in 382, but obliquely this time and through the specific moral to be derived 
from the recuperation of Hades (402: οὐ µὲν γάρ τι καταθνητός γ’ ἐτέτυκτο) and 
reiterating that gods have (again, referred to obliquely by their residence on Olympus) 
suffered (κηδ-) at the hands of men, specifically Heracles. This fourth section is thus 
organically connected with the final exemplum, the general paradeigma, and the 
introductory opposition that Dione invoked. 
 
 At line 403 Dione moves from the mostly theocentric content of the preceding 
lines to a moral evaluation of Heracles as a theomakhos. Heracles is σχέτλιος and 
αἰσυλοεργός, she says, because he felt no qualms about performing αἴσυλα [ἔργα], 
namely besetting the gods with cares (ἔκηδε, 404) by means of his arrows. The language 
is precise and loaded. The etymological figure in 403 (αἰσυλοεργός374 — αἴσυλα ῥέζων) 
is not tautological, since ὅ τ’ οὐκ ὄθετ’ αἴσυλα ῥέζων actually explains the entire 
appraisal σχέτλιος αἰσυλοεργός; perhaps we ought to delete the comma between the two 
                                                
373 Noticed also by Lohmann (1970:53–4 n.93). 
374 It should be noted that αἰσυλοεργός is the reading of Aristarchus and looks like “the kind of 
etymological appendage not uncommon in Homer” (Kirk 1990:103 ad 403–4); for comparanda see West’s 
(1998:156) critical apparatus ad loc. The manuscripts all have ὀβριµοεργός. 
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adjectives. And it is important that Dione specifies what is entailed by Heracles’ hard-
hearted and wicked deeds. The besetting of gods with cares (κηδ-) may seem frivolous 
alongside the gruesome wounds and death that men suffer, but there may be a subtle 
theological point. For at 24.525–6, Achilles, who among mortals is perhaps most in a 
position to understand the status of gods as opposed to that of men, advises Priam about 
the lifestyle of the immortals: 
ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι 
ζώειν ἀχνυµένοις· αὐτοὶ δέ τ’ ἀκηδέες εἰσί. 
 
For the gods spin out for wretched mortals to live in vexation, 
but they themselves are carefree. 
 
Recall, too, the overarching problem of Hesiod’s gold men, which I discussed in Chapter 
1: they are too much like the gods by virtue of the fact that they live possessed of an 
ἀκηδὴς θυµός (WD 112). So even if Heracles, the Aloadai, and Diomedes cannot 
overcome the physiological immortality of the Olympians by injuring them, they can 
afflict the gods’ mental health in a way that could be seen as ‘mortalizing’ them. 
 
3.11 / Dione’s threats and Diomedes as guarantor of Zeus’ reign 
 
 Having characterized the impiety of Heracles and, by association, the Aloadai, 
Dione returns to the present issue of Aphrodite’s wound and Diomedes’ hand in it. Thus 
the ring, which opens with Dione’s encouraging Aphrodite to “endure” in spite of her 
grief, moves to the recollection of analogous suffering by other gods, and turns to an 
evaluation of their assailants, closes with a lengthy evaluation of Diomedes’ criminality 
as she sees it (405-415): 
σοὶ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·                 405 
νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδε κατὰ φρένα Τυδέος υἱὸς 
ὅττι µάλ’ οὐ δηναιὸς ὃς ἀθανάτοισι µάχηται, 
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οὐδέ τί µιν παῖδες ποτὶ γούνασι παππάζουσιν 
ἐλθόντ’ ἐκ πολέµοιο καὶ αἰνῆς δηϊοτῆτος. 
τὼ νῦν Τυδεΐδης, εἰ καὶ µάλα καρτερός ἐστιν,                  410 
φραζέσθω, µή τίς οἱ ἀµείνων σεῖο µάχηται, 
µὴ δὴν Αἰγιάλεια περίφρων Ἀδρηστίνη 
ἐξ ὕπνου γοόωσα φίλους οἰκῆας ἐγείρῃ 
κουρίδιον ποθέουσα πόσιν, τὸν ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν, 
{ἰφθίµη ἄλοχος Διοµήδεος ἱπποδάµοιο.}                    415 
 
But against you the owl-faced goddess Athena sent him. What a 
fool! Tydeus’ son does not know in his wits that not at all long 
for this earth is the man who fights against the immortals. Nor at 
all do his children sit on his knees and call him “Papa” as he 
returns from battle and horrid violence. Thus now, even if he is 
rather staunch, let Tydeus’ son keep in mind lest he fight 
someone stronger than you; else, shrewd Aigialeia, Adrestus’ 
daughter, will long rouse her household from their sleep with her 
wailing as she yearns for her husband, that best of the Achaeans, 
Aigialeia that noble wife of Diomedes tamer of horses. 
 
In spite of the unambiguousness of Dione’s threats here, neither the Iliad nor the tradition 
knows of any actual harm to have come to Diomedes: he has “an uneventful nostos to 
Argos.”375 
 Still, the specificity of Dione’s language deserves comment. In the first place, the 
knowledge that Dione says Diomedes does not have, namely that theomakhoi tend to die 
quickly, is distinct from the threat directly related to him and his household. Line 407, 
“that whoever fights against the immortals is really not long for this world” is a general 
gnome, and line 408, although applicable with respect to the detail of the children to most 
of the men in the poem, seems to refer by virtue of its specificity and “intimacy” to a 
specific outcome for a theomakhos.  
 Besides the examples that Dione adduces to assuage Aphrodite’s distress, the 
poem knows of other theomakhoi and their downfalls: in Book 6 (132–41) we hear of 
Lycurgus’ persecution of Dionysus, which results in the assailant’s blinding and early 
                                                
375 sub “Diomedes” (Andersen, 208–9) in the Homeric Encyclopedia (HE) v.1 (2011). 
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death; in Book 16 (700–11) Patroclus attacks the walls of Troy relentlessly in the face of 
Apollo before being rebuffed, and shortly thereafter Hector kills him with Apollo’s help; 
and in Book 21 Achilles struggles with the river Scamander, and is nearly drowned 
before Hera bids Hephaestus intervene. According to the summary of the Aithiopis in 
Proclus, Apollo is partly responsible for Achilles’ death. And as regards Dione’s 
examples, we know from Odyssey 11.316–20 that the Aloadai are killed by Apollo before 
they reach manhood and pile Pelion on top of Ossa; the Iliad refers to Heracles’ death, in 
which Hera is implicated (18.119). 
 Furthermore, if we look beyond Greek literature to Near Eastern myth, we find 
scenes eerily analogous to this one. West draws numerous parallels between our episode 
in Iliad 5 and Near Eastern literature.376 One of them involves Gilgamesh’s rejection of 
Ishtar,377 wherein he cites the bad ends suffered by her previous lovers, and Ishtar’s 
subsequent rage: the spurned and insulted goddess demands that Anu send the Bull of 
Heaven after Gilgamesh to kill him, but Gilgamesh and his comrade Enkidu dispatch the 
Bull and gain glory (VI). But while Gilgamesh is not killed for his θεοµαχία, Enkidu is in 
Table VII. 
 Yet the content of Dione’s general gnome, namely the image of the children, and 
the threat specifically leveled at Diomedes, which is focalized through his wife Aigialeia, 
bear resemblances to the Hittite myths of Illuyanka. In one of the “mutually 
supplementary versions” of the myth,378 a mortal hero(?) named Hupasiya assists the 
                                                
376 1997:361–3. 
377 Cf. also Theocritus Idyll 1.105-–3, where Daphnis mocks Aphrodite and tells her to betake herself back 
to Anchises or Diomedes(!), the connection of which to Gilgamesh was noted by Hunter (1998:96 ad 105) 
following Halperin (1983:190–1). 
378 Beckman (1982:24 n.87). 
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goddess Inara in tying up the Serpent and his children. The condition whereby Hupasiya 
agrees to help the goddess is that he be able to sleep with her. Thus following the 
Serpent’s defeat, Inara settles Hupasiya in a house on an outcropping of Tarukka and 
insists that he not look out the window, for he will see his wife and children. He disobeys, 
sees them, and demands to go home. The text breaks off, but some scholars expect that he 
is killed. Similarly, in the other version, the mortal offspring and helper of the Storm-god 
is killed along with the Serpent. Beckman comments as follows on the deaths of the two 
mortal protagonists: 
Although the direct causes of their destruction are different... 
both mortal protagonists are punished for a too intimate 
relationship with the deities whom they aid... While Ḫupašiya 
clearly demonstrates hubris by his demand for the favors of Inara 
and the anonymous son of the Storm-god is a blameless tragic 
figure trapped by his social obligations, both have nonetheless 
crossed the line separating mortals from deities.379 
 
In a sense, Inara, who is the daughter of the Storm-god, parallels Athena, and Hupasiya 
parallels Diomedes, although there is clearly no sexual element to Athena’s support and 
employment of Diomedes. Furthermore, there is a parallel notion that the mortal 
theomakhos or aide is in a way a guarantor of the reign of the Storm-god. Although this is 
essentially explicit in the Hittite myth, in Iliad 5 it has to be inferred from subtle details. 
 One of those details is how Diomedes is actually employed by Athena to injure 
Aphrodite. As I argued above, Aphrodite, though perhaps unaware of it, presents a 
challenge to the cosmic order under the reign of Zeus until she is assimilated into the 
Zeus-centric paradigm. So I propose that here Athena employs Diomedes specifically for 
the purpose of forcing this assimilation, which is achieved through her wound, her 
                                                
379 1982: 24-25 
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education at the hands of Dione, and her admonishment at the hands of Zeus. 
 That Diomedes is in a sense re-purposed toward this end is evident from how 
Athena ignores the wounded Diomedes’ prayer to be able to pay back the vaunts of 
Lycaon, the Lycian archer who wounded him, and instead enables him to discern and 
engage with Aphrodite (128–32). This non sequitur shows that Athena’s investment in 
Diomedes’ aristeia is oriented towards the goal of ‘correcting’ Aphrodite’s behavior.380 
After all, once Dione finishes her speech, Zeus tells Aphrodite that love is her concern 
but not the “works of war” (428-30): this is not a reminder,381 but the initial assignation 
of her τιµή, which she receives in the Theogony (203) when she joins the race of θεοί 
(202). 
 Meanwhile, Diomedes attacks Apollo, overstepping the bounds of Athena’s 
instruction at 130–1 (µή τι σύ γ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖς ἀντικρὺ µάχεσθαι / τοῖς ἄλλοις).382 
Apollo’s warning is marked (440–2): 
φράζεο, Τυδεΐδη, καὶ χάζεο, µηδὲ θεοῖσιν  
ἶσ’ ἔθελε φρονέειν, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποτε φῦλον ὁµοῖον 
ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαµαὶ ἐρχοµένων τ’ ἀνθρώπων. 
Careful, Tydeus’ son, and give way, and do not be willing to 
think on par with the gods, since never is the race of immortal 
gods and men who walk the earth the same. 
 
In the first place, the imperative φράζεο recalls Dione’s third-person imperative 
φραζέσθω (411). Thus Apollo becomes the mouthpiece for Dione’s forewarning. Second, 
the structure of the double imperative, interrupted by the vocative, echoes the double 
imperative at the beginning of Dione’s consolatory speech to Aphrodite (382: τέτλαθι, 
τέκνον ἐµόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο...). Just as Dione’s orders begin to deactivate Aphrodite’s grief, 
                                                
380 Eustathius 530.10 ad loc. notes Athena’s ἔννοια προαναφωνητικὴ ῥητορικῶς τοῦ µέλλοντος.  
381 Pace Kirk (1990: 105 ad 428-30). 
382 See Kirk (1990:105–6 ad 434–5). 
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as well as her boundary-crossing behavior, Apollo’s orders momentarily deactivate 
Diomedes’ theomachic hubris; it will be reactivated later when he wounds Ares, although 
Athena is much more proactive in that encounter. Finally, as Andersen seems to suggest, 
the instruction not to (continue) making himself equal to the gods in mind appears to 
recall Diomedes’ very name, which he renders “god-like cunning.”383 One wonders 
whether we could take it another way, namely that Diomedes has fulfilled the 
machinations (µήδεα) of Zeus by wounding Aphrodite, but has now transgressed that 
capacity by attacking Apollo.
                                                






Chapter 4. Immortal desire and mortal grief 
 
4.1 / Introduction: Aphrodite and eros 
In the previous chapter I examined how Aphrodite causes trouble in Iliad 5, both 
within the cosmos of the poem and for the poetic idiom itself. First, she transgresses her 
erotic dominion and participates in war. Second, she comes dangerously close to 
upsetting the distinction between mortals and immortals by rescuing her son Aeneas 
when he is in extremis: it is here that she also unsettles the stability of a formula that the 
poet often employs to herald the death of a hero. The process of destabilization is both 
subtle and linguistically complex. The result for Aphrodite is a wound on the wrist, a bit 
of spilt god-blood. This wound proves innocuous, but it causes the goddess distress as if 
she were a mortal.  
One explanation for the troublesomeness of this Aphrodite is that she has retained 
features of her much more powerful and much more troublesome Near Eastern analog, 
Inanna-Ishtar. A number of textual-linguistic clues suggested as much to us. But the 
Iliad’s Aphrodite is not just a slave to genetics or analogy: her inclination to cause 
problems involves how early Greek poetry envisaged erotic love and yearning and their 
function within the cosmos. In short, the power of Aphrodite is dynamic, both generative 
and destructive, functional more than structural, and in that way capable of changing 
structures. Empedocles will later position Aphrodite as a basic entity alongside and acting 
on the “roots” in conjunction with Strife, but he does not seem to discuss whether or not 
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Love and Strife co-depend; in early myth, Aphrodite and Strife seem to be two sides of 
the same coin.384 
 After all, Aphrodite impels the deathless gods to come into sexual contact with 
mortals, and these sexual unions produce demigods, men who perform superhuman feats 
and who often possess preternatural beauty, but die, often young, but otherwise through 
the usual processes of decay and degradation, phthisis. But at some point in the 
mythological reckoning of history, this miscegenation of gods and mortals explicitly 
comes to a stop. Indeed, the Greeks were fascinated by the circumstances of this epoch’s 
end. Yet the psychological and intellectual impulse behind this particular complex of 
myths remains subtle. In other words, what exactly the Greeks determined was 
problematic with divine-human intercourse is far from obvious. 
 So whereas in the first chapter I examined mortal fantasy about immortality and 
its attendant bliss, in this chapter I address the issue of the gods’ sexual and emotional 
experience of mortality. Yearning and sexual fulfillment of that yearning, it seems, 
compromise the power, specifically the immortality, of the Olympians, including Zeus. 
This makes good sense: yearning involves, by definition, a response to lack, and yearning 
after potential lovers who are mortal is to yearn for something that is constantly 
progressing toward permanent absence, toward irremediable lack: the progeny of these 
unions, too, while capable of ascending to divine brilliance in discrete moments or series 
of moments, also decay or are snuffed out. Divine genetic material or, if we want to 
stretch the idea, immortality itself, dies with them. But the remedy, at least at first, is not 
                                                
384 On Yasumura's reckoning, “... Aphrodite's power of love is characterised by its control over the 
interrelations of all living creatures—which inevitably involves the other gods and goddesses. The mode by 
which her power operates is problematic: her activity directly attacks other gods and, as a consequence, 
could pose a challenge to the Olympian order” (2011:149). 
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to offer these children immortality. Instead, mortals suffer more and die. The economy of 
death and deathlessness remains zero-sum. In fact, I will show that immortal recovery 
from quasi-human distress must involve an increase in suffering on the part of mortals, 
especially mortal lovers. Pathos can be neither created nor destroyed: it can only be 
diffused or transferred. 
 At first glance, this would seem paradoxical. Why would gods not deify their 
mortal lovers and mortal progeny? At times they have. At times they seem to want to but 
are prevented by themis. This question is complicated, but part of the answer involves our 
discussion from Chapter 1: divinity as an idea is destabilized as the number of 
participants increases, especially when those participants were once subject to death. 
 
4.2 / Maternal grief 
 
 In the last chapter, Aphrodite’s “maternal solicitousness,” to borrow a phrase 
from Harris’ discussion of Inanna-Ishtar, was evidenced by her illicit rescue of Aeneas. 
In fact, Aphrodite’s protective swaddling of Aeneas closely parallels the expressions of 
Ishtar’s motherly persona vis-à-vis Mespotamian kings.385  
 This parental devotion is of course not unique to Aphrodite and her congeners. 
Furthermore, other gods are not always as successful in protecting their children from 
their often violent fates. In this section, I assess both the type and the function, both 
narrative and theological, of the emotional distress that the gods experience because of 
the suffering of their mortal offspring. I will conclude that the lines between men and 
                                                
385 From Harris (1991:269–70): “She (Ishtar) held you in her kind arm (like a child)” and “In her loving 
bosom she embraced you and protected your whole figure.” Slatkin (1991:25) speaks of Thetis’ “maternal 
solicitude” in the Aethiopis. 
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gods are blurred not just because demigods have divine blood, but also because the gods 
become bound up in mortal experience through the act of lamenting the death of their 
children. Foley makes this very point in explaining the theology of the Eleusinian 
mysteries, but she underemphasizes the extent to which grief and lamentation actually 
begin to enact an ontological change;386 gods who are suffering grief do not just confront 
mortality and find it abhorrent and unpleasant, but start to be spoken of in terms that 
begin to call their deathlessness into question. As with the “near death” of Ares in Iliad 5, 
a action generates a new logos that, in turn, nearly brings about an unconscionable action, 
the death or mortality of the deathless. Grief, then, like wounding, diminishes divinity. 
This process will help us to reassess the longer Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite (h. Aphr.), a 
poem that has received several treatments in the last ten years,387 and more closely 
integrate the issues of the power struggles on Olympus with the pathos of the mortal 
condition. 
 Achilles’ divine mother, Thetis, though ostensibly a minor deity in that she is not 
a resident of Olympus, provides one of the more memorable examples of divine grief on 
behalf of her child. Almost twenty-five years ago, Slatkin demonstrated how Thetis 
wields immense allusive power in the Iliad, and this allusive power is achieved largely 
through the depictions of her plight on account of her mortal son, Achilles.388 One 
particular scene is worth reexamination here. At 18.428–37, Thetis goes to Hephaestus to 
ask for a new set of special armor for Achilles, since his first set was lost to Hector when 
Patroclus, who donned it at the time, fell under the spear of the Trojan prince: 
                                                
386 1994:84–97. 





τὸν δ’ ἠµείβετ’ ἔπειτα Θέτις κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα· 
“Ἥφαιστ’, ἦ ἄρα δή τις, ὅσαι θεαί εἰσ’ ἐν Ὀλύµπῳ, 
τοσσάδ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀνέσχετο κήδεα λυγρὰ                   430 
ὅσσ’ ἐµοὶ ἐκ πασέων Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἄλγε’ ἔδωκεν; 
ἐκ µέν µ’ ἀλλάων ἁλιάων ἀνδρὶ δάµασσεν, 
Αἰακίδῃ Πηλῆϊ, καὶ ἔτλην ἀνέρος εὐνὴν 
πολλὰ µάλ’ οὐκ ἐθέλουσα. ὃ µὲν δὴ γήραϊ λυγρῷ 
κεῖται ἐνὶ µεγάροις ἀρηµένος, ἄλλα δέ µοι νῦν,                    435 
υἱὸν ἐπεί µοι δῶκε γενέσθαί τε τραφέµεν τε 
ἔξοχον ἡρώων·” 
 
And then Thetis, shedding a tear, responded: “Hephaestus, is 
there any goddess on Olympus who endured as many wracking 
cares in her heart as Zeus, Cronus’ son, gave to me out of all the 
goddesses? Of the daughters of the sea he submitted me to a 
man, Peleus, Aeacus’ son, and I suffered the bed of a man, 
exceedingly unwilling though I was. Indeed he lies in his great 
halls worn out by baneful old age, but now I’ve got other cares, 
since he gave me a son to bear and to rear to be exceptional 
among heroes.” 
 
There are many striking features of the beginning of Thetis’ complaint to the Smith-god. 
One that stands out in particular is her initial query, which may in large part be rhetorical 
(viz. “Of course no Olympian goddess has suffered this much!”), but seems to have an 
element of earnestness in it, seeing as she goes on to define her exceptionality in terms of 
the ἅλιαι. Irrespective of the question’s rhetorical timbre, how Thetis phrases her 
affliction indicates that she thinks it is unparalleled: κήδεα λυγρά is rather marked. 
 The context here alone—Thetis mentions that Peleus is laid up with old age and 
will go on to tell Hephaestus how Patroclus has been slain (454–6) as well as call her son 
ὠκύµορος (458)—shows that the goddess’ “grief” is connected with the mortality of 
those about whom she cares and of those about whom they care. I suggest that κήδεα are 
precisely “cares” that attend those whose relatives have died or are moribund. Given the 
context, this ought not be surprising, but I suggest further that κήδεα are a particularly 
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human and therefore humanizing experience. I will note in passing here that Greek κηδ- 
is cognate with English hate.389 
 The only other instance of the pairing κήδεα λυγρά in the Iliad occurs in Book 5 
in reference to Diomedes’ slaughter of the two sons of Phaenops, Xanthus and Thoön. By 
killing the two of them, Diomedes “left behind for their father wailing and wracking 
grief” (156–7: πατέρι δὲ γόον καὶ κήδεα λυγρὰ / λεῖπ[ε]). In this passage, too, the father 
of the heroes is worn out (τείρετο) by γῆρας λυγρόν (153). The collocation of Phaenops’ 
old age and the obliteration of his only heirs—he had not sired another son to whom he 
could leave his possessions (154)—serves to emphasize his extreme aporia; in his case, 
χηρωσταί end up dividing up his possessions. Furthermore, the collocation of γόος with 
the “wracking cares” must refer to funeral rites, at least generally. We could say, then, 
that Thetis, seeing as Peleus is immobilized in Phthia, anticipates having to perform the 
funereal rituals on behalf of the family. 
 Indeed this is exactly what, in Odyssey 24, Agamemnon tells Achilles happened 
after his death: 
µήτηρ δ’ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἦλθε σὺν ἀθανάτῃσ’ ἁλίῃσιν 
ἀγγελίης ἀΐουσα· βοὴ δ’ ἐπὶ πόντον ὀρώρει 
θεσπεσίη, ὑπὸ δὲ τρόµος ἤλυθε πάντας Ἀχαιούς. 
καί νύ κ’ ἀναΐξαντες ἔβαν κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας,            50 
εἰ µὴ ἀνὴρ κατέρυκε παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδώς, 
Νέστωρ, οὗ καὶ πρόσθεν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή·  
ὅ σφιν ἐῢ φρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ µετέειπεν· 
‘ἴσχεσθ’, Ἀργεῖοι, µὴ φεύγετε, κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν. 
µήτηρ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἥδε σὺν ἀθανάτῃσ’ ἁλίῃσιν                    55 
ἔρχεται, οὗ παιδὸς τεθνηότος ἀντιόωσα.‘ 
ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἱ δ’ ἔσχοντο φόβου µεγάθυµοι Ἀχαιοί. 
ἀµφὶ δέ σ’ ἔστησαν κοῦραι ἁλίοιο γέροντος 
οἴκτρ’ ὀλοφυρόµεναι, περὶ δ’ ἄµβροτα εἵµατα ἕσσαν. 
Μοῦσαι δ’ ἐννέα πᾶσαι ἀµειβόµεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ                           60 
θρήνεον· ἔνθα κεν οὔ τιν’ ἀδάκρυτόν γ’ ἐνόησας 
                                                
389 Beekes (2009:s.v.). 
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Ἀργείων· τοῖον γὰρ ὑπώρορε Μοῦσα λίγεια. 
ἑπτὰ δὲ καὶ δέκα µέν σε ὁµῶς νύκτας τε καὶ ἦµαρ 
κλαίοµεν ἀθάνατοί τε θεοὶ θνητοί τ’ ἄνθρωποι· 
 
And your mother came out of the sea with the deathless sea-
nymphs, hearkening to the announcement. A prodigious scream 
rushed over the sea, and trembling fear came upon all the 
Achaeans. And now they would have jumped onto their hollow 
ships, had not the man who knows many ancient things checked 
them, Nestor that is, whose counsel, even before, seemed best. 
He, being kindly disposed to them, advised them and spoke up 
among them: “Stop, Argives! Do not flee, young Achaeans. This 
is his mother, who has come with the deathless sea nymphs, to 
care for her dead son.” So he spoke, and the stout-hearted 
Achaeans checked their flight. The daughters of the Old Man of 
the sea surrounded you, wailing pitifully, and they enshrouded 
you in immortal clothes. And the Muses, nine in all, sang the 
dirge, responding to one another with lovely voice. At that point 
you would not have seen anyone among the Argives who wasn’t 
crying. For such was the dirge that the shrill Muse raised. For 
seventeen days and nights, all the same, we wailed for you, 
immortal gods and mortal men alike. 
 
Although this passage has provoked many worthwhile questions,390 I want to focus here 
on the fact that, although the Danaans begin the funereal rite appropriately (43–6) by 
carrying Achilles’ corpse back from the battlefield, washing and anointing the body, 
crying the requisite ‘hot’ tear, and cutting their locks, the ritual is fulfilled only with the 
participation of the sea-goddesses and Muses, and especially Thetis. In fact, the funeral 
brings mortals and immortals into the same arena of activity, much like the state of things 
before Mekone and much like the situation with the Aethiopians, who still enjoy 
commensality with the gods. 
 In the rest of early hexameter poetry the pairing κήδεα λυγρά occurs four times: 
once, in Odyssey 11, where Alcinous praises the skill with which Odysseus has narrated 
the κήδεα λυγρά of his comrades and himself, clearly in reference to the deaths of the 
                                                




Ithacan king’s hetairoi and his grief on account of them;391 twice in Hesiod’s Works and 
Days, once when Zeus is said to have devised (ἐµήσατο) “wracking cares” for men by 
hiding fire,392 and once when Pandora is said to have done the same by scattering the 
baneful contents of the pithos;393 and once in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (h. Dem.), 
when Metaneira sees Demeter placing Demophoön in the fire.394 Although the two 
examples from Hesiod are interesting, in that both are collocated with the larger narrative 
of the separation of gods from men, the episode in h. Dem. makes it quite clear that κήδεα 
λυγρά are the experiences of a bereft parent: 
καί κέν µιν ποίησεν ἀγήρων τ’ ἀθάνατόν τε 
εἰ µὴ ἄρ’ ἀφραδίῃσιν ἐΰζωνος Μετάνειρα 
νύκτ’ ἐπιτηρήσασα θυώδεος ἐκ θαλάµοιο 
σκέψατο· κώκυσεν δὲ καὶ ἄµφω πλήξατο µηρὼ          245 
δείσασ’ ᾧ περὶ παιδὶ καὶ ἀάσθη µέγα θυµῷ,  
καί ῥ’ ὀλοφυροµένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα· 
 ”Τέκνον Δηµοφόων ξείνη σε πυρὶ ἔνι πολλῷ 
κρύπτει, ἐµοὶ δὲ γόον καὶ κήδεα λυγρὰ τίθησιν.” 
And now [Demeter] would have made him ageless and deathless 
had not well-girdled Metaneira in her witlessness kept watch 
from her fragrant bedchamber and seen. She shrieked and 
smacked her thighs in terror for her child and was deeply 
unhinged in her spirit, and in her wailing she addressed her son 
winged words: “My child, Demophoön, this strange woman is 
hiding you in the blaze and setting wailing and wracking cares 
upon me.” 
 
Demeter aborts the process of immortalizing Demophoön and chastens Metaneira for her 
folly, before revealing herself and giving instructions regarding her worship. Although 
                                                
391 The pair occurs at 11.369, but see lines 362–84 for context. 
392 49–50. 
393 95. 
394 249. One wonders whether the κήδεα λυγρά in the Odyssey and in WD suggest a special “paternal” 
relationship between Odysseus and his men and Zeus and men in general. As we discussed in Chapter 2, 
Zeus' paternal identity is more psychosocial than actual. As we will see below, Zeus does seem to mourn 
for his actual son and the combatants of the Trojan war at large in similar ways. 
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the Demophoön episode serves an etiological function in h. Dem.,395 the theological-
narratological implications of the episode situate the myth at large in the broader context 
of early Greek literary thought. Felson-Rubin and Deal read the episode thus: 
The resolution of the Demophoön episode not only refocuses 
attention on Demeter’s relationship to the gods and her recovery 
of Persephone, but also... motivates... Demeter to see that 
shortsighted and ineffectual interference in divine plans belongs 
to the realm of human folly... Her own initial and ineffectual 
withdrawal from the gods was in fact like Metaneira’s failure to 
recognize and accept divine gifts.396 
 
I would like to be somewhat more precise here. Metaneira’s exclamation of what the 
χείνη has caused, namely γόος and κήδεα λυγρά, are just what the goddess is attempting 
to obviate while she herself mourns for her lost daughter. Although Demeter is not 
described as being afflicted with κήδεα λυγρά, Helios does demand that she stop her 
µέγας γόος (82). And although Persephone is technically immortal, that she is snatched 
by Death certainly complicates her divinity. 
Furthermore, “Demeter’s mourning ritual, elaborated several times (40ff, 90ff, 
and 304), includes such gestures of grief as tearing her headdress, refusing food and other 
comforts, wearing dark mourning clothes, wailing, etc.”397 These actions and abstentions 
serve to “mortalize” the goddess to an extent, and when she reveals herself after 
Metaneira’s interruption and holes up in her new temple, she has foisted her grief and her 
temporary mortality onto a mortal woman and the cosmos at large: what results is not 
only Demophoön’s remaining mortal, but also humankind’s being brought to the brink of 
annihilation. To be sure, Foley is sensitive to the ways in which the “Hymn is unique in 
                                                
395 Foley (1994:114): “Demophoön's story serves above all in the Hymn to motivate the foundation of the 
Mysteries (because Demeter has failed to immortalize a mortal) and to stress the tragic inevitability of the 
mortal lot.” 
396 Felson-Rubin and Deal (1980) in Foley (1994:196). 
397 Felson-Rubin and Deal (1980) in Foley (1994:192) 
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archaic Greek poetry for the degree of humanization its gods experience,”398 and how in 
the Demeter/Persephone myth “divinity becomes embroiled in a struggle over the very 
human issues of marriage, sacrifice, agriculture, and death.”399 But I would argue that 
much of early hexameter poetry confronts these very issues, and furthermore that it does 
so by a certain, though subtle, misapplication of the poetic and intellectual idioms in 
which it deals. The result is that, more than merely encountering mortality, gods suffer a 
legitimate, if conceptual, vulnerability. To counterbalance this, mortals end up suffering 
even more. The division between men and gods, obscured by divine experiences of grief, 
gets re-clarified through an increase in mortal suffering. But before I talk more about the 
violent diffusion of grief, I will look more closely at some of the lexical indices of 
Demeter’s “mortalization” in the hymn. 
 
4.3 / Divine suicide? 
 Even before Demeter learns exactly what has happened, she hears her daughter’s 
plaintive cry (39). At lines 40–1, “sharp grief seized her heart, and she rent the veil about 
her ambrosial hair with her own hands” (ὀξὺ δέ µιν κραδίην ἄχος ἔλλαβεν, ἀµφὶ δὲ 
χαίταις / ἀµβροσίαις κρήδεµνα δαΐζετο χερσὶ φίλῃσι...): she has begun to mourn. Except 
for the detail of her hair being ambrosial, these two lines paint a picture of very human 
mourning.  
 In the first place, the collocation of ἄχος and κραδίη in early epic is used almost 
exclusively of mortals, such as Odysseus, Diomedes, Achilles, and Penelope. Just once, 





at Iliad 15.208, does the pair describe the affliction of a god. Poseidon, in response to 
Iris’ report of Zeus’ displeasure and not-so-veiled threat, yields grudgingly (208-10): 
... τόδ’ αἰνὸν ἄχος κραδίην καὶ θυµὸν ἱκάνει 
ὁππότ’ ἂν ἰσόµορον καὶ ὁµῇ πεπρωµένον αἴσῃ 
νεικείειν ἐθέλῃσι χολωτοῖσιν ἐπέεσσιν. 
 
This terrible grief afflicts my heart and spirit, whenever he’s 
willing to rebuke with wrathful words someone who is equally 
apportioned and who has been dealt an equal share. 
 
Janko notes that the two words for ‘lot’ here bear no allusion to fate or death,400 but the 
nature of Zeus’ threat (163-5: φραζέσθω δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυµὸν / µή µ’ 
οὐδὲ κρατερός περ ἐὼν ἐπιόντα ταλάσσῃ /µεῖναι, ἐπεί εὑ φηµὶ βίῃ πολὺ φέρτερος εἶναι... 
/ “Let him bear in mind and heart then, lest—especially since he is not at all mightier—he 
dare withstand me when I come after him, since I claim to much more capable of 
violence than he…” ) and Poseidon’s concession do point to a diminution of his status; 
the specter of some catastrophe of Poseidon’s divinity looms. In a sense, because of his 
continued close participation in the war of men and thereby his being disjoined from the 
race of the gods—part of Zeus’ order is that he “either go among the tribes of gods or into 
the brilliant sea” (161)—Poseidon’s divinity may be compromised, even if only 
cognitively or in rhetoric, and this is accomplished in part by the Poseidon’s adoption of 
human form.401 
                                                
400 1992:249 ad 209–11; but cf. Janko (1992:5). 
401 In fact, in all of Homer, the κραδίη is used of gods only three times (in more than fifty instances): here 
of Poseidon, and twice of Zeus, first, when Achilles suggests to his mother that she may have some 
emotional leverage with Zeus (1.394–5), and then when Zeus himself contemplates saving Sarpedon 
(16.435–8), a scene which presents Zeus at his most human, as we will discuss below. Achilles’ use of 
κραδίη could be understood as a projection of human anatomy onto divine relations or even Thetis’ earlier 
assimilation of divine relations into human terms, since Achilles says that this is what Thetis used to claim 
in the house of Peleus. To be sure these assimilative moments were probably not jarring for the ancient 
audience, but even so, they function as part of the subtle machinery that blurs the lines between god and 
men in early epic. The cognate word for heart, κῆρ, is applied to gods three times in the Iliad, of wrathful 
Apollo (1.44), terrified Hera (1.569), and unanimous Zeus and Hera (15.52). 
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 Next, the detail that Demeter rends her headdress is remarkable. Foley compares 
the actions of Hecuba and Andromache in Iliad 22, although she is not quite right to say 
that they, too, tear their veils.402 At 405–6 Hecuba begins to tear out (τίλλε) her hair and 
hurls away (ἀπὸ... ἔρριψε) her veil, and at 466–72 Andromache faints, tossing off her 
elaborate headdress as she falls. Thus, Demeter’s act of mourning seems to be a goddess’ 
modification of human mourning; in other words, it would be alarming for the goddess to 
tear her hair, “ambrosial” as it is, so she instead rends the covering, and rather violently, 
as δαΐζω is a verb better suited to the cleaving of flesh, usually fatally.403 One instance in 
which δαΐζω does not involve the cleaving of human flesh is when Achilles, beside 
himself at the news of Patroclus’ death, rends his own hair (18.22–7): 
ὣς φάτο, τὸν δ’ ἄχεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε µέλαινα· 
ἀµφοτέρῃσι δὲ χερσὶν ἑλὼν κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν 
χεύατο κὰκ κεφαλῆς, χαρίεν δ’ ᾔσχυνε πρόσωπον· 
νεκταρέῳ δὲ χιτῶνι µέλαιν’ ἀµφίζανε τέφρη.  
αὐτὸς δ’ ἐν κονίῃσι µέγας µεγαλωστὶ τανυσθεὶς 
κεῖτο, φίλῃσι δὲ χερσὶ κόµην ᾔσχυνε δαΐζων. 
So spoke Antilochus, and a black cloud of grief enshrouded 
Achilles, and taking the sooty dust with both hands he poured 
down upon his head, and sullied his lovely face. And black ash sat 
upon his unctuous tunic. And he himself, huge, lay stretched out 
vastly, and he defiled his hair by tearing it. 
 
This passage bears much similarity to the passage in h. Dem. Edwards is right when he 
notes that here “the language of mourning is mingled with that of death, for defiling the 
head with dust is the sign not only of extreme grief...”404 Even before Achilles defiles 
himself, the cloud of grief recalls very distinctly the cloud of death that occupied much of 
our discussion in Chapter 3. It also resembles the mist that seizes the windows in the 
                                                
402 1994:37 ad 33–50. 
403 Cf. Il. 11.497, 21.147, 24.393. 
404 1991:144 ad 18.22–31. 
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Hittite myths about disappearing gods, which is the first step in the sequence of 
malignant changes to the cosmos in those myths.405 Furthermore, as Edwards notes, (ἐν 
κονίῃσι µέγας µεγαλωστὶ) τανυσθεὶς / κεῖτο is otherwise used of a corpse.406 We should 
also note, as does Edwards, the double contrasts in 24–5 between χαρίεν and ᾔσχυνε on 
the one hand, and the “nectarous” tunic and the ash that dirties it on the other: that which 
is paradigmatically lovely, in fact the most lovely,407 gets besmirched; that which is 
deathless is blanketed in death.408 But what of δαΐζω? Achilles is not merely plucking his 
hair, as Hecuba does in Iliad 22. Rather, he is tearing it with murderous violence, which 
is clearly self-directed. Antilochus is right to hold his hands.409 
 Similarly, we might read Demeter’s actions as quasi-suicidal. At line 42 Demeter 
substitutes her headdress, which, in addition to being ‘ambrosial’, was probably 
envisioned as golden or at least resplendent, for a ‘cyan’ shawl (κυάνεον δὲ κάλυµµα 
κατ’ ἀµφοτέρων βάλετ’ ὤµων). We might compare Demeter’s exchange of headdresses 
with Telepinu’s putting his shoes on the wrong feet before going missing.410 I am not in 
full agreement with Slatkin on the detail of the black garment. On lines 38–44, which 
describe Demeter’s initial experience of ἄχος, Slatkin argues as follows: 
This gesture of Demeter covering herself with a dark shawl has 
                                                
405 See Hoffner (1998) for a number of these myths. The phrase GIŠlu-ut-ta-a-uš kam-ma-ra-a-aš IṢ-BAT, 
contains the Akkadian verb ṣabātu, which is used of demonic possession as well as the seizure of people by 
the underworld (cf. Greek αἱρέω).  
406 1991:145 ad 18.26–7. 
407 At Il. 17.279–80 Ajax is described as surpassing all the Greeks in beauty and fighting accomplishment 
except for Achilles (Αἴας, ὃς περὶ µὲν εἶδος, περὶ δ’ ἔργα τέτυκτο / τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν µετ’ ἀµύµονα 
Πηλείωνα). Cf. Il. 2.673–5, where Nireus, king of Syme, is described as the κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ after Achilles 
to come to Troy (2.674=17.280). Zenodotus omitted this line since he athetized 673 and 675, but 
Aristarchus maintains it, and Philodemus, On the good king 20.5, makes reference to it. See West (1998: 
app. crit. ad loc.) 
408 1991:145 ad 18.25. 
409 It makes most sense in this context that Antilochus fears lest Achilles harm himself, as Edwards 
(1991:146 ad 32–4) argues. Achilles' hands, after all, when directed at others, are ineluctable. 
410 CTH 324 A i 5–9. 
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been shown to signify her transformation from a passive state of 
grief to an active state of anger. In contrast to the image of the 
black cloud that surrounds a dying warrior or a mourner, here the 
goddess’s deliberate assumption of the dark garment betokens 
her dire spirit of retaliation, the realization of her immanent 
wrath.411 
 
Slatkin seems to have confused the course of the narrative, since Demeter has not yet 
learned what transpired. She knows only that her daughter has disappeared. Her 
assumption of the dark cloak, which recalls the dark cloud of death, and her subsequent 
actions lead directly to Hecate’s arrival and camaraderie. I suggest instead that Demeter’s 
assumption of the black shawl, the nine-day δᾳδουχία, and her abstention from nectar and 
ambrosia, all prepare her to receive Hecate’s assistance in finding out what has happened 
to Persephone. In other words, Demeter, as an initiand herself, ritualizes a katabasis (47: 
ἐννῆµαρ µὲν ἔπειτα κατὰ χθόνα πότνια Δηὼ...).412 Inasmuch as she is able, she mortifies 
herself in order to gain access to chthonic information. Note that when Hecate meets 
Demeter on the tenth day of her roaming, “when resplendent dawn arrived” (51), she 
comes bearing a torch (52), like Demeter herself at 47–8, as if the space where Demeter 
roams remains untouched by Dawn’s light. In this way, like Achilles, Demeter is both 
mourner and deceased. To be sure, we ought not allege a sharp distinction between grief 
and wrath, for Slatkin is right that later in the hymn the black shawl indexes her wrath.413 
And this is the point: divine grief, inasmuch as it compromises divinity, leads to divine 
wrath, which through its destructive power reinvigorates divinity as wholly other than 
                                                
411 1991:92–3. 
412 Foley (1994:4) rightly translates this as “Then for nine days divine Deo roamed over the earth”, but, 
given the context, as well as the weird element of the daidoukhia, it is not hard to imagine a second layer of 
meaning that envisages Demeter making her way to the underworld. 
413 1991:91. Cf. Kim (2000:126) on Achilles’ pity: “The theme of his pity thereby develops into that of his 
mēnis, which is the thematic equivalent of his pitilessness… Achilles’ pity for his friends killed by the 
enemy entails, by the very nature of that pity, his pitilessness toward the enemy; the κήδεα of his friends 




 The detail of Demeter’s abstention from nectar and ambrosia should be familiar 
from our discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 of the divine forswearer, a comparison that often 
goes overlooked because scholars have tended to overemphasize aetiological readings 
vis-à-vis the Eleusinian mysteries.414 Even if the fasting of initiates was meant to imitate 
the sorrow of Demeter,415 it is unsatisfactory to say that the detail of Demeter’s fasting in 
the poem is aetiological for this initiatory practice without considering exactly what 
physiological and psychological effects fasting has on the gods. Note that, at least until 
Hecate conducts her to Helios, Demeter is explicitly silent. When Hecate asks about 
Persephone’s rape and admits ignorance about who the culprit is (55–8), Demeter does 
not answer (59): ὣς ἄρ’ ἔφη Ἑκάτη· τὴν δ’ οὐκ ἠµειβετο µύθῳ…. The important contrast 
between Hecate’s speech and Demeter’s non-response in these lines has been ignored in 
favor of connecting her silence to the ritual silence of the initiand.416 But it is important 
that nowhere else in Greek does one see the negation of ἀµείβω, when it refers to 
speech.417 It cannot be by chance that the poet chooses to negate the lexeme par 
excellence of epic dialogue. Moreover, Demeter’s silence, when seen alongside her 
refusal of ambrosia and nectar, recalls the ἄναυδος oathbreaker of Th. 797.418 But 
Demeter does not fall into a coma. 
 After Helios tells Demeter who is to blame (Zeus), attempts to console her by 
suggesting that Hades is no mean son-in-law, and chides her for both her γόος and her 
                                                
414 Richardson (1974:165–6 ad 47), for example. Clay (2006:202–3) recognized this tendency as well. 
415 Richardson (1974:167 ad 47) 
416 Richardson (1974:171 ad 59–61); Foley (1994:40 ad 59–60), citing Clay (1989:219 n.64), does say that 
Demeter’s silence “suggests shock and grief.” 
417 In the Aesopic fable (329) on the raven who was envious of the swan’s whiteness, the raven, despite his 
ablutions, is unable to change his color (οὐκ ἤµειβεν). 
418 See §3.8. 
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χόλος (75–87), at his rebuke ὀµοκλή (88),419 Demeter withdraws, even more grief-
stricken, although this grief is becoming indistinct from wrath (90–4):  
τὴν δ’ ἄχος αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον ἵκετο θυµόν. 
χωσαµένη δἤπειτα κελαινεφέϊ Κρονίωνι 
νοσφισθεῖσα θεῶν ἀγορὴν καὶ µακρὸν Ὄλθµπον 
ᾤχετ’ ὲπ’ ἀνθρώπων πόλιας καὶ πίονα ἔργα 
εἶδος ἀµαλδύνουσα πολὺν χρόνον· 
 
A more dread and more dogged grief came to her heart. And 
angry now at black-clouded Cronus’ son, she abandoned the 
assembly of the gods and tall Olympus, and went to the cities of 
men and the rich fields, diminishing her beauty for a long time. 
 
The nature of this renewed ἄχος is complex. The pairing αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον appears 
once in Homer, at Od. 11.427, “as a term of censure of women.”420 I rather think that the 
notion of shame that Richardson sees in the usage of κύντερος in Homer is actually 
secondary to the sense of banefulness.421 As Richardson himself points out, at h. Dem 
305–7, we see the “physical correlative” of Demeter’s grief:422 
αἰνότατον δ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπὶ χθόνα πουλυβότειραν 
ποίησ’ ἀνθρώποις καὶ κύντατον, οὐδέ τι γαῖα 
σπέρµ’ ἀνιει· κρύπτεν γὰρ ἐϋστέφανος Δηµήτηρ. 
 
And over the earth, abundant in nourishment, she made a most 
dread and dogged year for men, and not a single seed did the 
earth send up. For Demeter with her lovely crown was hiding it. 
 
We can say more. What is more grievous and more “dogged” for the goddess earlier 
eventually becomes that which is superlatively baneful for men (and the other gods). The 
affliction of the goddess and her abstention from ambrosia and nectar is transformed into 
                                                
419 Cf. the opening to one version of Telepinu (Text 2 in Hoffner), where the god seems to respond to a 
threat or a rebuke before departing: “Telepinu [… screamed]: ‘Let there be no intimidating language.’ 
[Then] he drew [on the right shoe] on his left foot, and the left [on his right foot].” 
420 Richardson (1974:177 ad 90) is actually referring only to κύντερον, but cites this line as evidence.  
421 Cf. the English adjective dogged (OED s.v.). 
422 Richardson (1974:177 ad 90). 
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famine and the threat of annihilation for men.423 (Should we think of Achilles’ refusal 
food and drink, his being sustained on nectar and ambrosia, and his supernatural violence, 
which makes men fodder for the birds and dogs?) In the first place, the poet undercuts the 
matter-of-factness of earth’s principal feature in the formulaic system, namely that it is 
“much-nourishing”.424 Second, the counterpoise between the mankind’s being on the 
brink of annihilation and the grief of the goddess is mediated through her own apparent 
decline toward death. In the lines preceding these, Demeter is seated in her temple where 
“far off from all of the makares / she remained wasting away in yearning for her low-
girdled daughter” (303–4).425 This “diminution” of Demeter’s being, which repeats nearly 
verbatim line 201 (the opening trochee is ἧστο instead of µίµνε), must also recollect her 
diminution of her own εἶδος in line 94, where the rare and somewhat elusive lexeme 
ἀµαλδύνω is used. 
 In extant early hexameter poetry, ἀµαλδύνω is found in only three other places, all 
in the Iliad in reference to the destruction of the Achaean wall.426 Formally it is of 
unclear etymology, although connections with *smel-d (or *h2mel-d?) ‘melt’ are 
                                                
423 Della Casa (2010:101) comments similarly on the relationship between Telepinu’s footwear mishap and 
the disarray of the cosmos: “This image suggests that the harmony of the cosmos was in danger, that the 
normal order of things was altered. The hasty movement and the confusion present in this first image 
foreshadow the coming crisis, which upsets the world due to the god’s feeling of anger. Right from the 
start, this personal imbalance becomes a collective imbalance, spreading out towards all living beings, 
objects, and even gods.” 
424 In Homer, when χθών occurs in the dative, πουλυβότειρα is the only epithet used of it, although an 
epithet is not always used. When it is in the accusative, and an epithet is employed, πουλυβότειρα is used 
three times, δῖος once, and βωτιάνειρα once, at Od. 19.408, where Odysseus reveals and etymologizes his 
name. There, too, the epithet might be deployed somewhat wryly, since the hatred of men and women 
throughout the world would seem to neutralize the earth’s ability to nurture ἀνέρες. Although there is 
nothing marked about the context of the other places where πουλυβότειρα is used, the earth’s capacity vis-
à-vis the heroes of the war is more as their receptacle than as their nurturer.  
425 … µακάρων ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἁπάντων / µίµνε πόθῳ µινύθουσα βαθυζώνοιο θυγατρός. 
426 The most sensitive treatment of the Achaean wall, both with respect to its place in the broader traditions 
about the destruction of [one race of] humans and with respect to its function within the Iliad’s narrative, 
remains that of Scodel (1982). 
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tempting, especially since Hesychius glosses ἀµέλδειν (an apparent byform of µέλδω) as 
τήκειν and στερίσκειν.427 Although the single use of µέλδοµαι in Homer (21.363), in the 
simile of the cauldron being boiled and melting the bacon fat within it, to which the 
Scamander’s being boiled by the blast of Hephaestus is compared, involves heat, the 
lexeme usually emphasizes the fluidity of the resulting substance that is melted. Perhaps 
Homer is playing with the suitability of this simile, since at 366 the Scamander οὐδ’ 
ἔθελε προρέειν, ἀλλ’ ἴσχετο· τεῖρε δ’ ἀϋτµή… (“He did not want to flow forth, but was 
checked; the seething428 breath [of Hephaestus] was wearing him out.”).429 But we should 
remember that to melt something is to cause it to soften and thereby cause it to flow, 
principally by the addition of liquid. This is clearly the case with Poseidon and Apollo’s 
destruction of the Achaean wall (12.18–9):430  
δὴ τότε µητιόωντο Ποσειδάων καὶ Ἀπόλλων 
τεῖχος ἀµαλδῦναι, ποταµῶν µένος εἰσαγαγόντες… 
 
Indeed at that point Poseidon and Apollo were contriving to melt the 
wall by bring against it the might of the rivers… 
 
Scodel comments as follows: 
The destruction of the wall entails the obliteration of the great funeral 
mound which the wall incorporates, so that the passage is similar to 
21.316-323, where Scamander threatens to bury Achilles, so that he 
will require no tomb; Poseidon’s declared motive for destroying it 
shows that this is a reduction of the Achaeans’ κλέος. They are 
scattered like the founders of Babel, almost “nameless” like the Bronze 
                                                
427 See Beekes (2010:s.v.). Formally, Benjamin Fortson (per litt.) assures me, the connection is tenuous at 
best. But Sihler (1995:§90) does connect ἀµαλδύνω and µέλδω, and suggests that this shows that the 
prothetic vowel of the former cannot come from a laryngeal. We might compare ἀστεροπή and στεροπή. 
Semantically, things are closer, but we are still on unsure ground. For the possible overlap with τήκειν, 
whose Armenian cognate means to moisten or get wet, see Theocritus Idyll 1, where Daphnis ‘melts’ (82) 
away and becomes part of the river (140). 
428 The noun ἀϋτµή is from *h2seut- ‘seethe’. See Beekes (2010: s.v.).  
429 Cf. Ares’ being worn out by the jar in Il. 5.385–91. Interestingly, this vision of heat so intense that it 
checks the flow of a liquid corresponds with a model of theoretical thermodynamics wherein maximum 
order, what we would think of as occurring at absolute zero (-273.15 C), is achieved by making a system 
infinitely hot. 
430 Cf. the close of the ring at 12.31: τεῖχος ἀµαλδύνας· ποταµοὺς…. The other place where ἀµαλδύνω 
occurs is 7.463, where Zeus suggests destroying the wall once the Achaeans have gone home. 
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Men (Hes. Erga 154).431 
 
Can we possibly connect Demeter’s disguise (perhaps ‘dysguise’ would be better) to the 
destruction of the wall? To what extent the poet means us to recollect the Achaean wall is 
hard to determine, since Demeter’s self-disfigurement seems easily remedied, but the 
verbal echo in εἶδος ἀµαλδύνουσα (94) of τεῖχος ἀµαλδῦναι (12.18) (=τεῖχος ἀµαλδύνας 
at 32) is unmistakable. Of course, I do not think we should imagine that Demeter is 
liquefying or melting her beauty, but on some level, she is not just disguising it; she is 
obliterating it, erasing it. We should also recall Hermes’ fear in Aristophanes’ Peace: 
ἀλλ’, ὦ µέλ’, ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀµαλδυνθήσοµαι, / εἰ µὴ τετορήσω ταῦτα καὶ λακήσοµαι 
(“But, my friend, I will be melted by Zeus / unless I shrilly announce these things [viz. to 
him].”).432 
 Once Demeter’s grief becomes wrath, she resumes her divine µέγεθος καὶ εἶδος 
without much ado (275) and shoves off old age (276). But before the full epiphany takes 
place after the aborted immortalization of Demophoön, Demeter partially reveals her 
divinity. Scholars seem largely to have overlooked how this partial epiphany fits into the 
psychological drama of the poem, again in favor of connecting the narrative with the 
ritual narrative at Eleusis. 
ἧστο παρὰ σταθµὸν τέγεος πύκα ποιητοῖο 
παῖδ’ ὑπὸ κόλπῳ ἔχουσα νέον θάλος· αἱ δὲ παρ’ αὐτὴν 
ἔδραµον, ἡ δ’ ἄρ’ ἐπ’ οὐδὸν ἔβη ποσὶ καί ῥα µελάθρου 
κῦρε κάρη, πλῆσεν δὲ θύρας σέλαος θείοιο. 
τὴν δ’ αἰδώς τε σέβας τε ἰδὲ χλωρὸν δέος εἷλεν·            190 
                                                
431 1982:48 n. 38. Poseidon and Apollo’s destruction of the wall does not, in fact, diminish the heroes’ 
kleos; in fact, they become ‘authors’ of a flood myth, to which heroic kleos is attached and around which it 
is amplified. 
432 Pace Olson (1998:150 ad loc.), ἀµαλδύνω there is probably not to be connected with ἀµαλός. In Homer, 
this rare adjective is used of very young animals, who are thereby vulnerable (cf. Callimachus fr. 502). It 
appears to be used only of an enfeebled old man in Euripides’ Heracleidai 75, and I do not think that 
Aristophanes has this in mind. Hermes probably imagines being lightning-blasted by Zeus (cf. Anchises’ 
anxiety about having slept with Aphrodite in the h. Aphr.). 
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εἶξε δέ οἱ κλισµοῖο καὶ ἑδριάασθαι ἄνωγεν.  
ἀλλ’ οὐ Δηµήτηρ ὡρηφόρος ἀγλαόδωρος 
ἤθελεν ἑδριάασθαι ἐπὶ κλισµοῖο φαεινοῦ, 
ἀλλ’ ἀκέουσα ἔµιµνε κατ’ ὄµµατα καλὰ βαλοῦσα, 
πρίν γ’ ὅτε δή οἱ ἔθηκεν Ἰάµβη κέδν’ εἰδυῖα  195  
πηκτὸν ἕδος, καθύπερθε δ’ ἐπ’ ἀργύφεον βάλε κῶας. 
ἔνθα καθεζοµένη προκατέσχετο χερσὶ καλύπτρην· 
δηρὸν δ’ ἄφθογγος τετιηµένη ἧστ’ ἐπὶ δίφρου, 
οὐδέ τιν’ οὔτ’ ἔπεϊ προσπτύσσετο οὔτε τι ἔργῳ, 
ἀλλ’ ἀγέλαστος ἄπαστος ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος…  200 
 
 
[Metaneira] sat beside the pillar of the sturdily built house, 
holding a child, a new shoot, beneath her breast. His sisters ran 
beside her, but Demeter stood, feet on the threshold, and her 
head touched the rafter, and she filled the doorway with divine 
radiance. Reverence, and awe, and pallid fear took hold of them. 
Metaneira yielded her bench to her and bade her take a seat. But 
Demeter, conductor of seasons, giver of shining gifts, was 
unwilling to sit upon the shining bench; rather, silently she 
waited, her beautiful eyes cast downward, until, in fact, fine-
thinking Iambe set a compact stool, and threw a silvery fleece 
down upon it. There the goddess sat and with her hands she held 
her veil before her face. For a long time she sat speechless and 
suffering upon that bench, nor did she greet anyone with a word 
or a gesture, but unlaughing, and not tasting food or drink… 
 
Foley does note how “the contrast between mortal and immortal is augmented by a 
doubly emphasized difference in height; not only is Demeter taller than mortals, but 
Metaneira is seated in a chair.”433 But Metaneira has a νέον θάλος (“new shoot”) at her 
breast and is surrounded by her daughters. Thus, there is a competing contrast between 
the bereaved and (notwithstanding this partial epiphany) wizened goddess and the intact 
issue of the mortal woman. This seems to be amplified by the shifting focalization in the 
scene: we see Metaneira’s abundance through Demeter’s eyes, and Demeter’s divine 
radiance through Metaneira and her daughters’. Furthermore, although this partial 
epiphany reminds us that Demeter has not actually mortalized or mortified herself, as I 
                                                
433 1994:44 ad 189–90. 
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am suggesting that her various gestures seem to have, it also emphasizes how diminished 
she is. For example, given how far the negating οὐ in 192 sits from ἤθελεν (193), we 
might hear line 192 (ἀλλ’ οὐ Δηµήτηρ ὡρηφόρος ἀγλαόδωρος) first as “[it was] not 
Demeter, who conducts the seasons and gives splendid gifts”. Furthermore, the goddess 
aborts her own epiphany and counteracts the αἰδώς of the onlookers by casting her eyes 
downward—a display of αἰδώς434—and her subsequent silence and motionlessness (i.e., 
once Iambe has fetched her the appropriate seat), alongside her refusal to eat and drink, 
connect her once more with the divine oathbreaker at Theogony 793–8.435 
 We should also note how she is addressed, by both the daughters of Celeus and 
Metaneira herself. Once Demeter has sipped the kykeon, Metaneira hails the goddess, but 
only as γύναι (213), although she does comment on the nobility and charm in her eyes.436 
Earlier, at the “Maiden’s Well” (99), Metaneira’s daughters hailed Demeter as γρηῢ 
παλαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων (113). Notwithstanding how Callidice goes on to reason that 
Celeus and his brothers would receive her because she is θεοείκελος (159), these initial 
addresses are unique alongside Anchises’ address of Aphrodite in the h. Aphr. (93–7), 
where he runs through a number of goddesses (“Artemis or Leto or golden Aphrodite / or 
noble-born Themis or gray-eyed Athena”), the Graces, and the glen-, river-, and swamp-
nymphs as possible identities of the female before him, or even Odysseus’ address of the 
mortal Nausicaa at Od. 6.149–85 (“I clasp your knees, queen! Now are you goddess or 
mortal?”). So although Demeter’s divinity might be responsible for her resemblance to 
                                                
434 Compare Aphrodite’s casting down of her eyes as she makes her way to Anchises’ bed (h. Aphr. 155–
157) and Olson (2012:217 ad 155–6).  
435 See §2.5, §3.10. 
436 Again αἰδώς (214) is the pivot around which the drama rotates, and here it empowers Demeter. 
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divinity, it only achieves that much, namely her appearing noble enough to be called 
“god-like”; it does not prompt those who meet her to wonder whether she is divine. 
 
4.4 / …ὃ καὶ θανάτου ῥίγιον ἀργαλέου 
 If she is not dying, perhaps old age is the key. Demeter commits the closest thing 
to a divine suicide by subjecting herself to old age. We should compare the fate of 
Tithonus as Aphrodite tells it in the h. Aphr., when she explains to Anchises why she 
would not immortalize him. Dawn—νηπίη!—forgets to ask Zeus to preserve Tithonus’ 
ἥβη, when she asks Zeus for her mortal lover’s deathlessness (220–4).437 Although Dawn 
and Tithonus have a lovely time together while he remains young, once old age changes 
his form, her desire for him dwindles quickly. She does keep him in her home and feeds 
him both sitos and ambrosia (232), a combination of sustenance that scholars have 
pointed out indexes Tithonus’ being between fully functional divinity and mortality.438 
What is interesting about Tithonus, however, is that, whereas his body disintegrates 
entirely, his voice persists (236): τοῦ δ’ ἤτοι φωνὴ ῥεῖ ἄσπετος… (“his voice flows 
ineffable…”).439 One of the main marks of the diminution of Demeter’s status is her 
voicelessness.   
 Aphrodite goes on to describe why she would not subject Anchises to Tithonus’ 
fate, and how her eternal suffering now has begun (243–55):440 
                                                
437 On Tithonus and the envisagement of abhorred old age, see also the ‘New Sappho’ (P. Köln 21361 and 
21376) on old age and Mimnermus fr. 4 West, which is the source for the quotation in the section’s title. 
These poems and others are adduced by Olson (2013:243 ad 218–38). 
438 The point goes back to van Eck (1978:81). Both Faulkner (2008:275 ad 232) and Olson (2012:250 ad 
230–2) repeat it.  
439 On this somewhat strange locution, see Faulkner (2008:276 ad 237) and Olson (2012:252 ad 237–8). 
440 On the otherwise unattested χείσεται (<*χάσκω) and ὀνοµαστόν (codd. ὀνότατον), see Olson 
(2012:259–60 ad 252–4).  
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οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτά µ’ ἄχος πυκινὰς φρένας ἀµφικαλύπτοι. 
νῦν δέ σε µὲν τάχα γῆρας ὁµοίιον ἀµφικαλύψει 
νηλειές, τό τ’ ἔπειτα παρίσταται ἀνθρώποισιν,          245 
οὐλόµενον καµατηρόν, ὅ τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ. 
αὐτὰρ ἐµοὶ µέγ’ ὄνειδος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν 
ἔσσεται ἤµατα πάντα διαµπερὲς εἵνεκα σεῖο, 
οἳ πρὶν ἐµοὺς ὀάρους καὶ µήτιας, αἷς ποτε πάντας 
ἀθανάτους συνέµειξα καταθνητῇσι γυναιξί,          250 
τάρβεσκον· πάντας γὰρ ἐµὸν δάµνασκε νόηµα. 
νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκέτι µοι στόµα χείσεται ἐξονοµῆναι 
τοῦτο µετ’ ἀθανάτοισιν, ἐπεὶ µάλα πολλὸν ἀάσθην 
σχέτλιον οὐκ ὀνοµαστόν, ἀπεπλάγχθην δὲ νόοιο, 
παῖδα δ’ ὑπὸ ζώνῃ ἐθέµην βροτῷ εὐνηθεῖσα.         255 
 
Then grief would not enshroud my dense wits. But now soon 
indiscriminate old age will enshroud you—pitiless—which 
stands next to humans, accursed, wearying, which the gods abhor 
especially. But for me there will be great contumely among the 
deathless gods all days and forever because of you, the gods who 
formerly were afraid of my whispers and plans, by which I at 
some point caused all the deathless ones to sleep with mortal 
women. For my intellect used to overcome all of them. But no 
longer will my mouth open to say this aloud among the deathless 
ones, since I’ve been utterly deluded—harsh and unspeakable 
thing!—I’ve been driven out of my mind, and I put a child 
beneath my girdle by bedding with a mortal man. 
 
Although Olson’s assessment that Aphrodite “no longer has any motivation to exercise 
her power [viz. of making gods sleep with mortals], for the fun has gone out of the game” 
is not wrong,441 it falls short of exploring what is entailed by this ‘noetic’ failure. The fact 
is that she realizes that it was never a game, and this has to do less with the erotic aspects 
of her sleeping with Anchises than with her newfound maternity. And, in fact, the ways 
in which Aphrodite glosses over the tenuous applicability of the Ganymede and Tithonus 
myths—as Olson rightly notes, if Dawn was νηπίη not to ask for eternal youth for 
                                                
441 2012:256–7 ad 247–55. 
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Tithonus, then something else is going on in Anchises’ case442—to Anchises’ situation 
suggest that the “dread grief” that she suffers could nod to something quasi-historical.443  
For even if Zeus should be considered nasty for granting such a cruel wish to 
Dawn, i) why would Aphrodite not characterize it as such? and ii) why would she not 
narrate that she herself had asked but had been denied such a request by Zeus? I do not 
think the answer is quite that she does not actually want Anchises as a lover, and 
although I think that the poem is concerned to emphasize the distance between mortals 
and immortals through the extreme intimacy (ἀγχίθεοι δὲ µάλιστα at 200) of the 
Anchisids with the gods,444 one more detail suggests that Aphrodite’s impending 
maternity is the crux: Zeus’ abduction of Ganymede obviously does not result in any 
children, and Aphrodite makes no mention of any progeny of Dawn and Tithonus. Hesiod 
(Th. 986–7) tells us that “to Tithonus Dawn bare Memnon of the bronze helm / king of 
the Aethiopians, and lord Emathion”, and the Aethiopis ascribed to Arctinus of Miletus 
makes Memnon the slayer of Antilochus and the victim of Achilles. The Aethiopis also 
tells us that Dawn procured immortality for Memnon.445 (Presumably, since he was cut 
down in the prime of youth, his immortality also entailed agelessness, unlike his father’s.) 
So either the poet of the hymn imagines Dawn and Tithonus as childless, or the 
immortality of Memnon is suppressed, in part because the events of the Trojan War have 
not yet occurred, but it bears on the lot that Anchises gets here. In other words, there are 
three variations—in this poet’s estimation—of the possibilities when gods love mortals: 
                                                
442 2012:253 ad 239–46 for discussion and bibliography. 
443 As I think more about this text and Il. 20 (and even Il. 5), the historical fact of the Aeneidae increasingly 
strikes me as plausible. For the sake of not straying too far from the topic of this chapter, I will avoid 
engaging that question head-on, but I imagine that my assessment of the poem’s structure could be applied 
(cautiously) to arguments for their historicity. 
444 Faulkner (2008:261 ad 200), following van der Ben (1986), notices a pun on Anchises’ name. 
445 See Bernabé (1987:67–8) for text of the argumentum, from Proclus’ Chrestomathy. 
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i) homosexual and non-progenitive erotic love, wherein the mortal lover can be given 
deathlessness and agelessness, especially if the erastês is Zeus;446 ii) heterosexual love 
that does or does not produce offspring, the lover(-father) is given a diminished 
immortality, and the son, if there is one, is given immortality, but seems to have no 
offspring; or iii) heterosexual love wherein the father is denied both immortality and 
agelessness but becomes the progenitor of a line that will last forever (196–7: σοὶ δ’ 
ἔσται φίλος υἱός, ὃς ἐν Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει, / καὶ παῖδες παίδεσσι διαµπερὲς ἐκγεγάονται· / 
“You will have a son who will rule among the Trojans, and children will be born to 
children forever…”).447 
But our interest here is in Aphrodite’s affliction. And this emerges from her 
announcement of Aeneas’ name (198–199): τῷ δὲ καὶ Αἰνείας ὄνοµ’ ἔσσεται οὕνεκά µ’ 
αἰνόν / ἔσχεν ἄχος, ἕνεκα βροτοῦ ἀνέρος ἔµπεσον εὐνῇ (“And his name will be Aeneas 
since dreadful (ainon) grief held me / because I fell into the bed of a mortal man”).448 I 
think this grief has less to do with having sex with a mortal man itself—after all Anchises 
and his male family members are especially beautiful (201)—than with the product itself, 
Aeneas, Smith’s “nursling of mortality”. The apodosis at 243—“grief would not 
enshroud my wits”—although logically connected with her inability to offer Anchises 
immortality, seems rather to do with the interconnectedness of that inability to 
immortalize (and preserve the youth of) Anchises and the birth of the mortal Aeneas. In 
other words, her pregnancy prevents the immortalization of Anchises, and the inability to 
                                                
446 See Smith (1981:72) on the negative aspects of Ganymede’s abduction. 
447 This accords with Smith (1981:95–7), who talks about the social aspects of immortality, namely the 
disruption and loss of normal family relationships. See Faulkner (200:256–7 ad 197) for problems with 
ἐκγεγάονται. 
448 See Faulkner (2008:258 ad 199) for discussion of the difficulty of ἕνεκα. 
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immortalize Anchises indexes her pregnancy. And we know from Iliad 5 how that grief 
gets Aphrodite into trouble. Perhaps the etymology of Aeneas’ name in 199–200 and the 
“enshrouding grief” of 243 point specifically to Aphrodite’s folly in Iliad 5, where she 
enshrouds (ἀµφικαλύπτω) Aeneas to save him from death, and where, once she has been 
stabbed, we see her beset with terrible grief (352–4): ἣ δ’ ἀλύουσ’ ἀπεβήσετο, τεῖρετο 
δ’αἰνῶς. / τὴν µὲν ἄρ’ Ἶρις ἑλοῦσα ποδήµενος ἔξαγ’ ὁµίλου / ἀχθοµένην ὀδύνῃσι… 
(“And she avoided Diomedes and went away, and she was dreadfully worn out. / Iris the 
wind-footed took her and conducted her out of the fray / as she was aggrieved with 
pains”).449   
Although it is not pellucid from the earliest sources, it seems as though 
Aphrodite’s suffering actually does diffuse to Anchises. At the end of the hymn, the 
goddess warns him against divulging that he slept with “fine garlanded Cytherea” (287). 
The result would be that “Zeus in his anger will blast him with a smoking bolt” (288).450  
“Check yourself,” she insists at 290, “and do not mention my name–beware the wrath of 
the gods!” At this threat Aphrodite takes off, and the poet closes his hymn. As Olson 
notes, however, “that Aphrodite was Aeneas’ mother is commonplace in the Iliad,” and 
therefore he must not have kept his relationship with the goddess secret: some ancient 
sources “conclude that he was accordingly punished in the way referred to here.”451 Aside 
from the allusion in 284, where Aphrodite instructs Anchises on how to respond to 
queries about Aeneas’ mother, to Il. 20.206, where Aeneas goes on to vaunt his divine 
                                                
449 There is a play on Aeneas’ name with αἰνῶς at Iliad 13.481–2. See Olson (2012:233 ad 196–9) for a list 
of other heroes’ whose names get folk-etymologized. 
450 Ζεύς σε χολωσάµενος βαλέει ψολόεντι κεραυνῷ. 
451 2012:274 ad 286–8. Olson lists Sophocles’ fr. 372.2–3, Vergil’s Aeneid 2.649, and Hyginus fab. 94. 
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lineage to Achilles,452 we might detect an internal echo that suggests that Aphrodite’s atê, 
which brought her to this point might have ‘infected’ Anchises as well. For the protasis of 
Aphrodite’s warning at 286, εἰ δέ κεν ἐξείπῃς καὶ ἐπεύξεαι ἄφρονι θυµῷ, may pun on the 
goddess’ name. And since ἔρος, which deludes even gods, seized Anchises (91), it is hard 
to imagine he is exactly σώφρων after this episode. 
                                                







This study, like many of the objects of its inquiry, is unfinished, brutish perhaps. 
It is hybridized along lines of both method and content and engages with a variety of 
texts spanning some twenty-five hundred years, from Mesopotamia to Sicily, in order to 
approach a level of panopsis about the sharing and transformation of mythic material in 
the ancient Mediterranean. At the same time, it examines a number of discrete, often 
intractable units of language and (one hopes) sheds some light on some mythic details 
that are shrouded in murk. Myopia sometimes results.  
But this investigation has never been just about the infrastructure—geographic, 
linguistic, and cognitive—of cultural and literary koines. Rather it was about beginning to 
describe the machinery of myth and poetry with respect to a certain complex of (to use a 
somewhat heavy-handed term) neuroses about cosmic structure, death, and language. For 
example, I proposed that mythic narratives seem to be moved by the recognition that 
categories of mortal and immortal, benevolent and malevolent, themis and ou themis, are 
contingent and shaky, and that one mechanism of destabilization—what we might call the 
linguistic moment of recognition—involves grammatical play and ambiguity. We do not 
simply imagine narratives that involve man’s assimilation to the divine, shape-shifting 
snakes’ threats to the Lord of the Storm, and bleeding goddesses; we demonstrated the 
inherent unsteadiness—at the very least the contingency—of our linguistic signifiers. The 
secondary hypothesis was that these linguistic ‘moments’ must have been salient as such; 
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as a result, they either accompanied the exchange of mythic material or facilitated it (or 
both). This process is largely unobservable, but I proposed that besides the representation 
of the phenomenon across languages, the various ‘blips’ (perhaps the misunderstanding 
of ikhôr is one) that are found in proximity to them demonstrate at least semi-conscious 
engagement with these features. 
In a sense, then, what may be said to emerge from this study is a new theory of 
myth and poetry. Although we would not call all myth poetry in the strong sense, we can 
at least say that the myth that is under investigation here, metrical or not, involves itself 
in poetics, which I operationally define as the marked usage (or the misuse) of the 
phonological qualities of words and groups of words, or the symbolic repurposing of 
certain idiomatic elements (e.g., metaphors, epithets, and formulae), in order to generate a 
new textual meaning or subvert an old one. This theory might appear to be an extension 
of Straussian theory, the modification being that, instead of myth’s being seen as offering 
“a logical model capable of overcoming contradiction,”453 it is in fact the non-logic that 
carries the mythos forward. In other words, it is the emotional and intellectual aporia that 
the insoluble contradiction generates that leads to narrative violence, which forces the 
contradiction to be practically, though importantly not intellectually, solved.  
This sort of Deconstructionist reading, if it avoids the pitfalls of Derridean 
obscurantism, could really be a valuable tool for tracking the rhythms of trauma and 
recovery in ancient myth: reconciliation generates its own type of anxiety, and perhaps 
undercuts itself. Although far outside the purview of this particular project, Vergil’s 
                                                
453 Strauss (1963:229). 
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Aeneid, I think, makes itself particularly available to this sort of reading. More germane, 
perhaps, are the intractable ethical and moral convolutions in, say, the Oresteia. 
In other words, the fantasy of avoiding death and the trepidation about the 
universe’s crumbling into disarray are both momentarily aborted or allayed through 
violence. Yet we continue to fantasize, and we continue to feel deep anxiety. Thus, myth 
can provide a temporary anodyne, but is hardly curative.  
Furthermore, the deep (both profound and latent) tragedy of much myth, which 5th 
century tragedy concentrates and amplifies more than any other genre, enables 
catharsis—Proclus’ suggestion that the gods are καθαρεύοντες πάθους could also 
describe our (fleeting) mental state when we read or hear or watch myth—but our daily 
lives, intransigently mortal, sully our νοῦς once we exit the mental and emotional space 
of reading, and watching, and listening. Perhaps we can imagine Inara’s prohibition 
against Hupasiya’s looking out the window lest he see his family as having encoded this 
process. (Perhaps she implies something like, “Since you’ve slept with me and aided the 
Storm-god, you are god-like, but mortal yearning yet crouches outside.”) Given the other 
version of the Illuyanka myth, in which the Storm-god’s son dies along with the snake, as 
well as Hittite’s euphemistic conflation of divinity and death, we might also read 
Hupasiya through Plato.454 
                                                
454 Particularly that offered by the Phaedo (66c–67a): καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡµῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυµοῦµέν τε 
καί φαµεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωµεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σηµαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ µὴ 
οἷόν τε µετὰ τοῦ σώµατος µηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον ἢ οὐδαµοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ 
τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώµατος, πρότερον δ’ οὔ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν 
ζῶµεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόµεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι µάλιστα µηδὲν ὁµιλῶµεν τῷ σώµατι µηδὲ 
κοινωνῶµεν, ὅτι µὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, µηδὲ ἀναπιµπλώµεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωµεν ἀπ’ 
αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡµᾶς· καὶ οὕτω µὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόµενοι τῆς τοῦ σώµατος 
ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς µετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόµεθα καὶ γνωσόµεθα δι’ ἡµῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο 
δ’ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές· / “And then, so it seems, we’ll have that which we desire and say we are lovers 
of—wisdom—when we die, as the argument indicates, but not while we’re alive. For if it is not possible to 
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But we have gotten ahead of ourselves here. One of my main interests in 
undertaking this study was to try to determine just how early myth anticipates the 
sometimes polemical cosmological and epistemological statements of the pre-Socratics, 
particularly Parmenides fr. 6, where the goddess roundly abuses mortal doxastic reason as 
subjecting men to a “wandering nous” (line 6), as well as the Heraclitean riddles 
regarding the ontological (or maybe the epistemological) relationship between immortals 
and mortals, life and death (and sleep and wakefulness). That is to say, I suspect that the 
moments of cosmological and linguistic aporia in much early myth are wrapped up in the 
palintropia that the goddess ascribes to the third path. Even though this is primarily an 
epistemological model, Parmenides’ goddess parses the experience in terms that would 
seem to index the emotional angst generated by this wandering. Heraclitus’ riddles often 
generate a similar aporia. For both of them, but explicitly for Parmenides, linguistic 
aporia (amêkhaniê for Parmenides) results in an insoluble and delusive 
phenomenological cosmos. 
So what we might say, then, about all of the episodes that we have brought under 
study here is that they represent a projection of a collective (un)consciousness of the 
instability, or at least the extreme contingency, of our cognitive-linguistic models of our 
universe, including the role of our death, which, unlike for the golden race, generates 
deep aching in us. In case this should seem reductive, let me say that these myths ought 
                                                                                                                                            
come to know anything purely accompanied by the body, there are two possibilities: one, either it is not at 
all possible to possess knowledge or it is possible when we’ve died. For at death the soul will be all by 
itself and apart from the body, but not before then. And while we’re alive, in this way, it seems, we will be 
next to knowing, we most abstain from accompanying or communing with the body, unless entirely 
necessary, and we are not filled up with its nature, but are purified of it, until the god himself frees us. And 
thus pure and apart from the thoughtlessness of the body, the likelihood is that we will be with the pure and 




not be treated as fully isomorphic to one another; but there is a sense in which they all are 
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